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Summary
This thesis looks at the way in which human nature has been construed and 
examined, with the focus on modern theorisations and conceptualisations. Here I 
separate theories of human nature according to a taxonomy of location – where they 
“place” human nature in the wider context of human existence (physical/biological, 
interpersonal, psychological, social, cultural etc.). I assert that this is the key to 
assessing theories of human nature; such theories can be evaluated on how well their 
placement encapsulates some meaningful aspect of what it means to be human.
To this end, each of the first three chapters is concerned with a grouping of 
approaches within the aforementioned taxonomy – what I refer to as “schemas” – which
I assert have affinities due to similarities in the ways they address what they understand 
to be human nature. I dissect their approaches, considering each on its own merits, and 
discuss their strengths and weaknesses. I devote a fourth chapter to objections to the 
very idea of human nature. Here I address a number of complications or issues that 
might affect any given theory of human nature (as opposed to specific issues relating to 
particular schemas). However whilst these objections pose a challenge for human nature
theories, in that they complicate our ability to accurately know and describe what makes
us quintessentially human, they do not conclusively disprove the existence of human 
nature per se.
Thus I conclude by suggesting how this location-based taxonomy might help us 
construct a consistent and accurate human nature theory. I argue for an interdisciplinary,
synthetic human nature theory that elaborates on a political interpretation of ethological 
and anthropological approaches, which I ultimately characterise as analogous to critical 
theory or evolutionary theory – in that it forms a general paradigm centred on a 
particular phenomenon rather than a fixed theoretical construct.
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3Introduction
Ways of thinking about ourselves and what we are invariably touch on the 
concept of human nature, even if it is just to deny it. The idea of human nature – what 
humans just are, beyond their own volition or before their subsumption into some other 
context (such as their particular culture) – emerges throughout human thought, 
including, or especially, in politics and social philosophy. Here I am mainly thinking 
about what is believed to condition our human experience, in terms of how we are 
psychologically geared or socially conditioned to engage with what we encounter in the 
world. Such notions may not be incorporated explicitly, or appealed to directly, but they 
are a persistent feature of many of our explanatory frameworks. Whether this thing is 
referred to as human nature, philosophical anthropology or simply as an unspoken 
constellation of expectations and presuppositions, the question of what we are impacts 
directly on questions of who we are and what we do (or should do). As such I do not so 
much discuss “what it means to be human” as what is supposed/presumed, 
fundamentally, to underlie this “humanness”. Thus I do not, for example, discuss the 
role of art and music in human life or their significance for mediating human 
experience, but I do consider how theories think we approach experiential scenarios 
(including, or rather especially, interactions with one another). To follow the previous 
hypothetical example, suppose someone proposes an “instinct for art”, or an ineffable, 
radically undetermined human essence which we must represent to ourselves and others 
via images – in both cases something underlies these movements (which serve to anchor
the relevance of spheres of human experience and meaning, vis a vis art) and this is 
what I discuss in the pursuit of a theory of human nature theories.
Such theories of human nature are ubiquitous. A sociologist or ethicist who 
makes presumptions about how an individual will react to a certain (kind of) stimulus is 
articulating an implicit theory of human nature. So too is a biologist who makes claims 
about the motivational and behavioural import of her genetic or neurological research. 
In a similar vein, various spiritual and religious traditions have offered ways of 
understanding what it means to be human (we could argue that this is part of their 
function) through a relation to some supernatural or divine force that governs our 
4essential nature. Human nature thus clearly serves an analytical and explanatory 
function – albeit in different ways dependant on the particular conception of human 
nature in question.1 As Charles Taylor notes: ‘[A study of Human nature] is both terribly
necessary, and also unbearably problematic.’ This is because our political and social 
projects ‘lean on certain assumptions about what human beings are like, which are often
highly questionable.’ (Op. Cit. Honneth & Boas, 1988: vii)
Given the importance of this issue, I propose that we dissect and categorise the 
various human nature theories on offer, with the aim of creating a taxonomy or topology
of human nature theory which tells us something about the way that this conceptual 
variety comes about. Most discussions of human nature, where they do not specifically 
concern themselves with a particular tradition, necessarily centre around (one might say 
confine themselves to) a survey of different theories. In contrast, rather than collect 
theories into kinds according to intellectual tradition or provenance, or a particular 
foundational thinker/paradigm, I want to adopt an alternative, previously unexplored 
approach. 
In order to do this I organise theories of human nature according to where they 
locate their subject matter – in other words, where they choose to place the emphasis 
when addressing the question of “what is human nature?” These broad families of 
theories, or spheres, range from ultimate rules or logics which fundamentally govern 
human nature and existence, through psychological, dispositional and behavioural 
regularities, to socio-cultural phenomena which fundamentally transform some 
(minimal) set of innate capacities situated in human agents. I contend that which sphere 
a particular thinker adopts is the real determining factor in how they develop and 
articulate their theory of human nature.2 We can imagine (overlapping) “territories” or 
niches within the ecology of approaches to human nature which each centre on one of 
these spheres. Consequently I devote the first three chapters of this thesis to influential 
examples within each of these areas, with the aim of discerning what characterises their 
common approach to human nature. In the fourth chapter I consider a generalised, 
critical approach to the very idea of human nature, which I nevertheless argue also 
reflects certain assumptions about what makes us human – in essence constituting a 
1 See Toddington & Beyleveld (2006) for a discussion of this; however their conclusions differ 
significantly from my own.
2 And consequently in how this affects their approach to other questions which make reference to it.
5fourth territory on our map of human nature theories. I conclude by suggesting that we 
can identify which spheres are most appropriate to serve as a starting point in discussing
human nature, and tentatively suggest what such a human nature theory might look like.
Assessing Human Nature
First, however, we should briefly consider some of the ways in which the 
concept has been discussed before. Human nature has usually been portrayed as 
separate from, and often in conflict with, culture. The division appears in the distinction 
between nomos (culture/convention) and physis (nature) in some of the earliest classical
philosophical thought, finding expression in the histories of Thucydides and Hesiod, in 
the sophists and of course in Plato and Aristotle. (Kahn, 2003; Sahlins, 2008:16ff) The 
result of this division was that “nature” came to be treated as static or immutable, whilst
culture was more changeable, or ‘fragile’, as Marshall Sahlins puts it. By contrast, 
Kenan Malik  (2002a: 40-1) attributes the emergence of a tension between nature and 
nurture – another instantiation of a division between nature and culture – to Cartesian 
dualism, wherein the concepts of a “mechanical” body and a free soul or subjectivity 
serve to divide individuals into two competing forces. Regardless of its exact origins, 
this theme resonates throughout the general idea of human nature, and gives it its 
power: the idea of inviolate nature reinforces its ability to rhetorically ground normative
claims – i.e. claims that we ought to take a particular course of action, either for its own 
sake or because of some resultant outcome such as cultivating a virtue or habit. Even in 
Aristotle, who could be argued to blur the distinction, or at least to see a reciprocity 
between the two sides, it serves this function.  
Of course the separation of nature and culture has helped generate the perception
of conflict between the two: they have often been seen as competing forces acting 
against one another. Unsurprisingly this has lent itself very well to the identification of 
one side as “good” and the other as “bad.” Thus much of the discussion of human nature
has typically taken place against a backdrop of the competing claims of two basic 
themes or tropes: violent, atavistic nature barely contained by culture, verses virtuous 
nature corrupted by defective culture. We can generally classify these as the Hobbesian 
6paradigm of a disordered and violent nature that requires restraint, juxtaposed with the 
Rousseauian paradigm of a “noble savage”, naturally benign and peaceful, made sick by
the intolerable impositions of toxic social norms.
These paradigms do not necessarily originate in Hobbes and Rousseau, however.
For example there are “Hobbesian” elements within Christian and Islamic thought – 
both have various interpretive traditions that represent human nature as in some way 
dangerous or corrupt, and at least in the former case this position informs Hobbes’ own 
perspective – with particular reference to sin – although it should be noted that 
genefrally they believe in the power of reason and faith (either in concert or with the 
former revealing the true wisdom of the latter) to guide human beings towards a 
negation of this corrupt (element of their) nature. (Stevenson et. al., 2013: 115ff, 137ff) 
These traditions are not exclusively in one camp or the other. Within Christianity for 
instance there is a gap between the Hobbes-like Augustine and the somewhat more 
Rousseau-like Aquinas. (Stevenson et. al., 2013:  154-156; Trigg, 1999: 35ff) 
The main point here, however, is that whilst certain traditions and thinkers 
clearly pre-date both Hobbes and Rousseau, the English political scientist and the 
French philosophe represent the extreme ends of the spectrum, and thus lend their 
names to these positions, acting as convenient ciphers for certain morally-inflected 
theories of human nature as it relates to society.3 Hobbes in particular is taken to be a 
primary model for, and culprit in the rise of, a particular kind of theory of human nature.
Mary Midgley (2010) identifies him (alongside Nietzsche) as a critical influence in the 
intellectual inheritance of gene-first Darwinian (pop-) evolutionary theory. In her eyes 
the Hobbesian paradigm has influenced the thinking of certain scholars, who have 
approached human nature with the preconception that it is a disruptive and antagonistic 
force (in this more modern incarnation, selfishness at a genetic level that pits individuals
against one another, even though they may not realise it) in need of tempering through 
the influence of culture. Steven Pinker, for example, cites Hobbes as a credible early 
model for his view of human nature and is content to include Rousseauian views of 
human nature in his list of targets in The Blank Slate – alongside what is ostensibly his 
real target, the tabula rasa view – on the basis that they deny some fundamental 
3 Nor, of course, is this a particularly “western” phenomenon, for example Xun Zi held that ‘Human 
nature is evil, and goodness is caused by intentional activity.’ 
I discuss the normative valencing and significance of human nature itself in more detail below.
7darkness within human nature which he thinks is inherent in us as a species. In doing so 
he further vindicates his central thesis – that liberal society helps tame human nature – 
by denigrating those theories that think culture is a negative force opposing an 
inherently benevolent nature. This suggests that, at the very least, the assumption that 
theories of human nature may be divided into Hobbesian and Rousseauian types still 
exists.
The Move Towards A Naturalistic Human Subject
Against this backdrop there is another point of contention, one concerning 
whether or not human beings are in some way exceptional, or else “merely” another 
kind of animal. An early precursor of this can be seen in the Platonic school of thought, 
wherein rationality and intellect are attributable to the presence of a soul which is only 
contingently present in a given body: the imperfect material world is the place of the 
physical body; human souls inhabit these bodies and imbue us with rationality. The 
presence of a soul, then, is rather like a special quality that separates humans from other 
entities in the material realm. This attitude found itself replicated to a large extent in 
Aristotle, for whom the characteristic activity of human beings – that which is unique to
them and gives them their telos – is to be rational. It is also expressed in the theological 
notion of a Great Chain of Being, the cosmological hierarchy according to which 
humans were set above animals by God who himself sat at the pinnacle of creation. 
According to some conceptions of human nature, however, we are much more similar to
other living creatures than this kind of view believes. In these positions those qualities 
or properties which make humans special or unique are seen as being actually more 
contingent and tenuous.
On this view there is no particular quality or set of qualities that separates human
beings from other animals. Rationality may be simply an extension of problem-solving 
abilities and the limited cognitive faculties of other, less complex animals. Morality 
could be a codification of sentiments necessary for members of any given social species 
to coexist in (relative) harmony. According to the materialist philosopher Julien Offray 
de La Mettrie, for instance, thought is simply the result of the excitation of matter 
(specifically neurological matter: the brain and nervous system). Changes in matter and 
its organisation affect thought and mental processes, and therefore, says La Mettrie, 
8there is no real difference (beyond the complexity of the organisation of said matter) 
between human thought and the sensory world of animals. In this he contrasts sharply 
with his predecessor René Descartes. For Descartes humans, like animals, are machines;
however humans, unlike animals, are rational, they have a soul which endows them with
self-awareness, which in the Cartesian system elevates them above other, unthinking 
biological machines. La Mettrie, on the other hand, did not deny that humans can think, 
but saw nothing particularly special to distinguish thought from other functions of 
biological “machines” beyond the material complexity it requires (an outcome which he
attributes largely to luck). (Kramnick, 1995: 181ff; 202ff) Both of these writers 
subscribed to a mechanistic world-view, essentially agreeing on the basic principles of 
human physical ontology. Their disagreement stems from something more subtle in 
their interpretation of human nature – its uniqueness and where its true essence lies – 
even whilst working within very similar paradigms. 
This divergence of approaches carries on into contemporary discussions, and is 
largely independent of other factors related to what certain scholars think human nature 
is and where they locate it. Psychologists like Melanie Killen regard human capacities 
as similar in kind to those of animals (Killen et. al., 2011; Killen & Cords, 2002) whilst 
Kenan Malik, (2002a) also a psychologist, robustly objects to the treatment of humans 
as “just” another animal. In chapter two we shall see another example of this divergence
in interpretation, in the work of those who deal directly with the question of animal 
behaviour. In this case, although both sides operate using the methods and perspective 
of comparative ethology – comparing human and animal behaviour and cognition, as a 
means to understanding human nature – they come to different conclusions about what 
makes humans distinct, and to what degree. Notably, these more modern forms of this 
debate are concerned less about souls (or their nature) and more about rationality, 
cognition, the nature of the subject, or language, and their role (if any) in making us 
distinctly human. (Trigg, 1999: 187) 
These developments also highlight how recent iterations of the human/animal 
distinction have taken on a new dimension, or at least a renewed emphasis, with the rise 
of evolutionary theory and a kind of “biologising” of human nature. As the notion that 
humanity is one evolved species amongst many has become more embedded, so too has 
the idea that it can be studied with the same tools as other species. Obvious early 
9examples include those who saw themselves as Darwin’s direct intellectual inheritors 
such as Francis Galton and Herbert Spencer, both of whom sought to apply the 
principles of evolutionary theory as they were then understood to “improving” the 
human species through eugenics. In Spencer’s case especially, the goal was to further 
improve the human stock, and to create a more consistently moral human animal, one 
perfectly suited to eighteenth century liberal democratic citizenship. (See Trigg, 1999: 
115; Loptson, 2006: 146-8) 
Not all positions that attempt to incorporate this new perspective on human 
beings are necessarily so tainted by the spectre of eugenics of course (and, as intimated 
above, nor do all of their adherents necessarily think of humans as unexceptional). 
There is a broad range of approaches which might reasonably come under the heading 
of evolutionary or naturalistic human nature theories, a number of which I will examine 
in detail in subsequent chapters. Most contemporary incarnations are content to frame 
their psychological and behavioural descriptions of human beings within an 
understanding of humanity as an evolved species, and to apply similar standards and 
methodologies to humans as to animals in their studies. In other words, whilst the idea 
of guiding human evolution towards certain ends has deservedly fallen out of favour, 
there is still a strong sense that human nature as it presently stands is inherently 
connected to the human animal and its evolutionary history. This is not to say that 
human nature is now the exclusive purview of evolutionary theory, but the two are 
closely associated in current debates. This is especially so in the case of those 
suspicious or hostile to the (mis)use of the evolutionary approach. (Rose, Lewontin & 
Kamin, 1990; Malik, 2002a, 2002b; Buller, 2005; Tallis, 2011) Humanity’s existence as 
an evolved, biological species has become something of a battleground for defining or 
denying human nature (particularly in the debates surrounding the biological work of 
Richard Dawkins). There is a certain appeal, connected to the normative power of 
“nature” discussed below, in being able to connect such a far-reaching concept as 
human nature to a naturalistic subject such as the human species. As we shall see in 
chapter four, this raises the suspicion that such naturalising projects are really illicitly 
legitimising particular, contingent conceptions of human nature.
Contemporary Discussions of Theories of Human Nature
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Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that generalised discussions of 
human nature theories have tended to include Darwin or Darwinian concepts in the 
spectrum of theories they examine. Yet Darwinian approaches are obviously only one 
perspective to be included amongst many. Most discussions of human nature theories 
still devote much of their time to a variety of approaches to human nature – traditional 
and contemporary religious, philosophical and political conceptions of what human 
beings really are. Most such surveys tend to focus on a series of discussions of iconic 
approaches to human nature, picking out a selection of individuals and/or traditions to 
examine. This is strikingly true of Twelve Theories of Human Nature, expanded from a 
mere seven theories with the addition of two more authors over the course of several 
editions. (Stevenson et. al., 2013) Each chapter is an essentially self-supporting 
discussion of a particular position on human nature. This approach has the undoubted 
advantage of treating each position (for example Aristotle’s ethics, Buddhism, Kant’s 
rationalism and so on) individually, thereby avoiding instrumentalising them to conform
to an overarching theme. However this also makes it more difficult to draw comparisons
between each position beyond those areas where particular authors/traditions share 
common interests or opinions (if they consider the role of dispositions such as love or 
reason to be important, and how; or if they agree over whether human nature is corrupt 
or saintly). 
Some authors, such as Roger Trigg (1999) attempt to trace the historical 
development of human nature theories through a series of influential intellectual 
landmarks – not in terms of a single theoretical movement but rather as a broad area of 
discourse, including the development of – and debates between – differing positions. By
doing this we can trace the shifting role that certain concepts, such as rationality, play in
the ways people have variously understood human nature, as well as the tensions 
between the “Hobbesian” and “Rousseauian” views on intrinsic human goodness. 
Again, treating influential thinkers or cultural traditions individually ensures a fuller, 
more comprehensive account of each, but restricts the overall argument to a rather light-
touch approach with regards to what it means to study human nature. Effectively we are 
left with a survey of different varieties of human nature but little in the way of a 
dissection of how and why these varieties come about. This falls short of what I want to 
do in discussing human nature theories. Peter Loptson (2006) appears to try and 
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compensate for this by introducing his own survey with a chapter framing his overall 
argument, as well as a postscript (Ibid: 251ff) in which he attempts to argue for the 
possibility of synthesising an intelligible comprehensive approach to human nature. In 
both instances he argues in favour of a human nature theory, to be taken as the product 
of some as yet undeveloped synthetic approach, and rejects the idea that the culturally 
situated position of scholars poses an insurmountable barrier to forming an accurate idea
of human nature.
Other, less generalist works focus on specific issues either within certain 
approaches or within specific debates about human nature. For example Stuart 
Toddington and Deryck Beyleveld (2006) explore the idea of human nature in terms of a
connective conduit between social structures and individual agency that explains how 
the latter retains its spontaneity in the face of determination by the former. Elsewhere 
political scientist Gary Olson (2013) has argued that socio-political conceptions of 
human nature must take into account empathy and emotional affect. According to Olson
this is an aspect of human nature which has been ignored in political debates, one which
ought to be reconsidered as both political issue and political tool. (In pursuit of this he 
concludes that we ought to import ethological sensibilities and findings into political 
conceptions of human agency.) Much of the work of primatologist Frans de Waal – in 
both his scholarly and more populist work – has also been aimed at building a detailed 
case for paying closer attention to empathy and cooperation. Similarly Midgely’s The 
Solitary Self (2010) argues against the atomistic conceptions of selves, individuals and 
agency that she believes have proliferated in the common (Western) idea of human 
nature, although it is not clear whether this represents a rejection of human nature per 
se, or rather extends her earlier critique of certain approaches in Beast and Man (1995), 
where she argued in favour of a broadly naturalistic approach to humanity. Conversely, 
Marshall Sahlins (1977; 2008) and David Buller (2005) certainly do argue against the 
very existence of human nature, and do so from a starting point of ostensibly criticising 
biologistic and evolutionary accounts, before broadening out to encompass all attempts 
to form general conceptions of what makes us human. In this respect, Sahlins and Buller
represent a position hostile to the very idea of human nature which is based on roughly 
similar grounds to those who argued for the separation of humans and animals. 
Specifically, attributes like language and culture, on their view, render human nature 
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unintelligible. What makes us human is transmitted through culture and through 
linguistic frameworks specific to a certain time. Accordingly human nature is effectively
overruled – any innate tendencies our species may once have had are treated as vestigial
and impotent – washed away by the complexity of language and culture. 
An alternative and equivalent reading is that this complexity makes 
generalisations about human nature impossible given the variety of cultural forms in 
existence and the ubiquity of culture in an individual’s life: it is simply impossible to 
divide the world of human existence into constituent parts, some of which are “nature” 
and some others “culture”. Malik, (2002a) expresses a similar position, and adds that 
“reason” in particular makes many attempts to unpick human nature futile, since our 
capacity for abstract thought escapes what he considers to be the atomistic approaches 
of ethology and computer modelling.4 These qualities, or elements very much like them,
make human beings resistant to the kinds of enquiry which treat them as evolutionary or
ethological subjects. The upshot, according to these human nature sceptics, is that 
human nature has effectively no causal role in human life (if it can be said to exist at all)
and is explanatorily superfluous, if not actively misleading and harmful. We shall 
address this latter issue in more depth in chapter four, where I call into question the 
efficacy of such critical claims in order to defend “human nature” as a useful concept. 
Human Nature, Politics and Normativity
Of course the obvious political implications of human nature only serve to 
underscore the importance and utility of the idea itself. It represents a form of self-
knowledge (ethical, existential or possibly even psychological) that is intuitively 
appealing as a reference point. I believe this to be the most important aspect of the 
concept of human nature, so that here we can set aside the idea that it is somehow about 
biologically distinguishing us from other species or stolidly defining us with a “laundry 
list” of characteristics and properties. Human nature is about what we are: (ethical) 
knowledge that seems intrinsically pertinent to understanding who we are and our place 
4 Malik includes a broad range of targets, from gene-first Darwinism to ethology to artificial 
intelligence studies, in his attempt to defend agency and subjectivity as the cornerstones of human 
existence. This may, as I point out in chapter four, constitute its own unintentionally (and ironically) 
expressed theory of human nature.
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in the (social) world. Hence, as a term, it has a rhetorical appeal that can be used to 
justify normative claims in other spheres. Human nature represents something primal, 
essential, objective or all three. As one commentator notes: ‘an appeal to human nature, 
like an appeal to God, is to invoke a seemingly independent arbiter to sort out our 
affairs.’5 (Malik, 2002a: 24) Human nature can be – and is – used to settle arguments 
beyond its own remit. As a consequence we ought to be cautious about the claims we 
make about it, and a taxonomy of human nature theories will help us with this aim.
This rhetorical and didactic appeal is, however, itself an extension of the appeal 
of nature in general. Scholars of history, science and natural philosophy are therefore 
unsurprisingly interested in the way that the symbolic or totemic power of nature 
manifests itself beyond the study of nature. In such diverse areas as values, morality and
political contestation, nature acts ‘as an allegedly neutral judge’ and those who study it 
are ‘allegedly disinterested interpreters of nature’s verdicts.’ (Daston & Vidal, 2004: 7; 
see also Malik, 2002a: 21-5) Because it represents a standard that supposedly transcends
the limits of convention and opinion nature has (paradoxically) been appealed to as an 
arbiter of correct and proper action, both in terms of politics and personal behaviour. 
(Vidal, 2004; Allen, 2004: 82-5) Nature is a potential source of value that goes beyond 
typical modes of reasoning and rationality, one that exists independently of other 
spheres such as economics or politics. (Price, 2004: 194-201) “Nature” looks as though 
it acts as a convenient heading for the way things just are; the patterns of the world as 
they operate outside the realms of human determination. It has also been pointed out 
that the objective character of nature reflects back on its own study. The elevated status 
of nature demands a certain propriety in the pursuit of natural knowledge, so imbuing 
nature with value in turn sets standards of appropriateness when dealing with it. (Daston
& Galison, 2010: 39-41; see also Daston, 2004)6 This should be unsurprising since, if 
the interpreters of nature are in a position to hand out these disinterested verdicts, they 
must themselves be seen to be beyond reproach, especially in matters concerning that 
which they are interpreting.7
5 He continues: ‘Humans no longer have to take responsibility; God or Nature will.’ We will examine 
the motivating critique behind this complaint in more detail in chapter four.
6 Lorraine Daston (2004) also notes that enlightenment naturalists’ legitimisation of their investigatory
practices contributed to the establishing of nature as a repository of specific virtues, through their 
attempts to connect even the tiniest observations of their studies to the overarching whole of 
monolithic “Nature”.
7 In this respect they are analogous to priests, or the attendants of any such similar source of value.
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The power of nature is also revealed in its association with regularity and 
predictability. (See pages 19-22, below.) The image of nature as lawful, and of certain 
observed regularities as being governed by laws of nature, underwrites much of its 
persuasive potential. “Nature” and “natural” give a semblance of permanence and 
stability to positions in need of rhetorical support. Somewhat tellingly, the tendency to 
talk in terms of natural law was itself more one of rhetoric, which portrayed nature as 
regular and lawful, rather than being an accurate depiction of the study of nature at the 
time. (Roux, 2008; Steinle, 2008) Regardless of such niceties, however, the term nature 
and the image of naturalness have power, which makes them useful tools for those 
seeking to make a political point, or contribute a hazardous source of reification in cases
of insufficient scholarly self-reflection.8 Society, monolithic as it sometimes may 
appear, is still conceptually a human institution based on convention, whilst nature 
appears to be governed by other means entirely.9  Consequently aspects of society (or 
behaviour, ethics and so on) with which we agree or disagree can be bolstered or 
countered by appealing to their respective naturalness or unnaturalness, at least 
rhetorically. Nature thus acquires an authoritative status in questions beyond those of 
how it works, both in its role as an independent repository of value and in its 
immutability.
This moral weight given to nature appears in a variety of contexts and cultures. 
Both the stoics and the Confucian tradition saw the natural order of things as inherently 
positive and virtuous. For his part, Aristotle backed up his thoughts on ethics and the 
state (the polis) by appealing to humanity’s nature as a political animal. (See Politics: 
1252b, 1253a) Even today less developed civilisations are lauded by some as being 
more “in tune” with nature. Of course this inherent rhetorical potential of “nature” need 
not always be positive, but it does lend – or is used to lend – an added power to 
associated claims about politics, ethics and the social order. This is doubly so in the case
of human nature, as evidenced by the tension between the Rousseauian and Hobbesian 
camps. In one instance humans have a natural virtue and benevolence, in the other they 
are inherently prone to anti-social acts. In both cases something about the nature of 
8 See below for a treatment of this latter question of reflexivity.
9 Natural laws and laws of nature, after all, are not subject to the legislative processes that human laws
are.
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human beings serves to justify how humans should behave towards one another and/or 
organise their lives and social institutions.
Saint Augustine is a paradigmatic case of this. He saw humanity as being locked 
in a battle between their rational, God-given will and their baser (often libidinous) 
desires. According to the doctrine of original sin that he developed, postlapsarian human
nature is fundamentally amoral (literally we have no inherent drive to be good, and so 
constantly threaten to lapse into sin). After the fall of Adam and Eve the human spirit 
was weakened, stripped of a disposition towards the good, leaving us unable to fully 
resist evil – further injuring the will by enslaving it to material desires. Furthermore this
state was passed on to their descendants, so that all of humanity was similarly mired in 
sin. As such only God could grant salvation through divine grace, although for 
Augustine this can only be demonstrated through repudiation of sin and acting in 
accordance with divine edict. (See his Confessions: 7.13.19; see also Mann, 2001) 
Human nature thus provides him with not only an explanation for the existence of evil, 
but also a modus vivendi – it dictates how the faithful should best live their lives. This 
Augustinian doctrine had a profound influence on the conception of human nature 
within the “west”, with some modifications such that later Christians reserved a place 
for earning salvation through righteous, often ascetic, devotion and belief. This 
intellectual inheritance has resulted in a generally negatively-charged interpretation of 
human nature, leading some to regard the very concept as a tool of social control. After 
all, if human nature is regarded as “fallen” then it makes it that much easier to advocate 
for social conventions meant to repair or “redeem” such a nature. This influence makes 
itself felt even in the avowedly naturalistic example examined in chapter one – there we 
shall look at gene-based theories of human nature, in which humans are again portrayed 
as amoral, and naturally inclined to serve their own interests. The human nature it 
presents is fractious and bereft of an inherent drive towards a positively ethical life (or 
else filled with equally negative or atavistic drives that balance out any innate moral 
sense). Accordingly, certain recommendations are made on the basis of this conception 
of human nature about the way we should organise society in order to sublimate its 
worst aspects and improve its moral status – strikingly similar to the Christian 
admonition to repudiate sin and act virtuously so as to gain redemption for our fallen 
nature.
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Nor, of course, is this a uniquely Christian interpretation. Anthropologist Scott 
Atran relates speaking to mujahideen as part of his own research on religion and human 
decision making. On being asked whether children switched at birth would become 
good Muslims, ‘nearly all’ gave a response similar to the one he got in an interview with
‘the alleged emir’ of Jermaah Islamiyah Abu Bakr Ba’akir:
Human beings have an innate propensity to tauhid – to believe in the one 
true God. If a person is raised in a Jewish environment, he’ll be Jewish. But 
if he’s raised in an Islamic environment, he’ll follow his fitrah – nature. 
Human beings are born in tauhid, and the only religion which teaches and 
nurtures tauhid is Islam. … If [a child] is born in an Islamic environment, 
he’ll survive. His fitrah is safe. (Op. cit. Atran, 2010: 14-15)
Here the emphasis is less on a fallen human nature in need of fixing, and more on a 
metaphysical essence that is liable to become ‘broken’ in the wrong circumstances. Thus
there remains a moral imperative to living in the correct way.
Such usage only underscores the importance of discussing human nature and 
theories of human nature. Ideas about human nature influence our folk psychological 
conceptions of what it means to be human,10 and as we shall see in chapter four, we 
cannot seem to do without them: they keep reemerging. At the very least they have a 
rhetorical, but also, I would argue, a genuine political utility and power that has an 
enduring appeal. We find it difficult to discuss how we live or should live without 
invoking some idea of who or what we are. So we really ought to discuss the issue 
openly. The question is, how do we analyse and evaluate the plethora of human nature 
theories, and perhaps equally importantly: how do we go about formulating a 
“definitive” human nature theory for ourselves? To do so we need to ask three 
questions: what is nature? What do we mean by human? And where do theorists 
generally start when trying to describe human nature?
What is Human Nature?
The first task is to consider what we mean by the term human nature, with the 
main emphasis on the second term, nature. If nature can be seen as a (supposedly 
10 Which is why the gene-first Darwinism of chapter one is such a powerful breed of human nature 
theory: its prevalence in the popular science literature gives it a cultural caché far more widespread 
than just the biologists and psychologists who articulate it.
17
immutable) repository of value then human nature is simply a subdomain of nature 
which pertains specifically to human beings, with a concomitant “added value” for 
human subjects. Conversely the concept “human” is relatively simpler to pin down, as a 
designator relating to a certain kind of beings (which we could also refer to as Homo 
sapiens). 
What is Nature?
Thus an appropriate place to start would be a consideration of some of the ways 
in which we approach nature in general. The main feature has already been alluded to 
above – it is whatever is not the product of culture, or human artifice. As a rule, nature 
is thought of as the opposite of culture and conscious modification, or at least as the 
absence of these things. In trying to define or conceptualise the natural world we do so 
in terms of a contrast with the ostensibly human, cultural world. Another way of 
thinking about this is that nature is what comes before society, culture, and human 
action more generally. In some sense it provides a resource that is transformed or a basis
on which to build. So some philosophers, such as Hobbes and Rousseau, posit a “state 
of nature” that came before the political community. In these conceptions said nature is 
structured such that there are good and bad paths to take with regards to that political 
community – given what we know about the state of nature we can determine how best 
to proceed.
Unsurprisingly ecology and ecological thought have called attention to an 
additional complexity here. Considering nature as a sphere distinct from culture is itself 
an artificial construct, in the way that we demarcate what is and isn’t “natural”. By 
existing within nature we automatically become entangled with it, notwithstanding the 
tendency of any animal to alter its environment in some way, and thus subsuming its 
activity within the general sphere of nature. By contrasting our socio-cultural 
formations with nature we create this self-same division between the two. William 
Cronon calls attention to this with respect to the idea of “wilderness”. We imagine 
wilderness as raw nature, untouched by human intervention. However in reality 
wildernesses are highly artificial, being created by legislative and political constructs 
which demarcate areas as nature reserves or protected land. (Cronon, 1996; see also 
McKibben, 2003) Furthermore such places are often patrolled and cultivated by 
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professionals (such as rangers) tasked with maintaining and preserving these areas in a 
particular state, usually with regards to some requisite level of biodiversity. Wilderness 
and nature emerge as somewhat fantastic, or as an imaginary Other that serves to 
demarcate our (cultural) selves. Analogously, in Larry Niven’s novel Ringworld the 
protagonists encounter an entirely artificial world; an immense ring with landmasses 
and seas built into the inner edge. The world’s designers constructed areas of 
wilderness, and the local inhabitants treat their world as natural – even mistaking the 
curve of their ring-shaped world as a great arch, standing over their heads – but the 
entire structure has been designed. As wild and natural as the world looks from the 
ground, the novel’s protagonists – from their position as outsiders – know they are 
standing on an artificial structure and treat both it and its inhabitants as remnants of the 
same (now defunct) society. It is thus safe to say that the division between nature and 
culture is permeable, and largely a matter of pragmatic convenience. It is certainly not a 
clean ontological split.
Clearly this will have some repercussions if we imagine possible analogous 
relationships in other discourses about nature. It becomes difficult to determine what is 
natural or unnatural, what is really characterised by the absence of cultural or agential 
mediation. Supposedly natural remedies have undergone cultivation, harvesting and 
processing by human hands (not to mention rather sophisticated marketing strategies) 
whilst synthetic pharmaceuticals may ultimately be based on the chemical composition 
of naturally occurring compounds. 
So it may be with human nature. Whatever makes us human which is not rooted 
in culture, which is not attributable to our socialisation and social constraints, can 
conceivably be considered to be our nature. However the same issue confronts our 
conceptualisation of human nature as it does our conceptualisation of nature above, 
namely how to extricate nature from culture when the former is so often conceived of as
simply the absence of the latter. Given this, how do we untangle our own nature from its
socio-cultural trappings? If we have misdiagnosed some cultural affect, in particular if 
we entirely fail to identify some part of ourselves as cultural in origin11, then we would 
risk mistakenly investing it as a part of our nature. The child and developmental 
psychologists featured in chapter two offer a potential response to this: their subjects are
11 Effectively the accusation levelled by some of the critics when they argue from provincialism or 
historicism, see chapter four.
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young enough to be largely free of cultural influence. In fact much of their work could 
be construed as tracing the gradual encroachment of culture on young humans’ 
developing faculties. By studying the behaviour and (once verbal) reported judgements 
and opinions of infants and young children these researchers can approach human 
beings in as culture-free a state as possible. However this solution comes with a trade-
off: such a human nature would then lack the contextualisation of fully grown human 
subjects; it would not represent human nature as it is instantiated in the majority of 
actual humans (this is the contention and focus of those theories dealt with in chapter 
three).
An interesting, if perhaps problematic, point we can derive from the above is 
that nature is often defined negatively. Noticeably, as well as being that which is not 
derived from culture, nature is also thought of as non-supernatural. Nature constitutes 
the world of non-supernatural cause and effect. So there are, by definition, no divine 
influences or entities in nature, though in various mythologies such things may be taken 
to make themselves felt in the natural world.12 This actually harmonises well with the 
Augustinian narrative on human nature, since in that case living well means repudiating 
our fallen nature in an attempt to live in accordance with the divine (i.e. supernatural) 
world. At best we are left with a definition of nature as something more or less self-
contained and self-sustaining: we shouldn’t have recourse to external influences to 
explain natural phenomena, it should all be present in the same ontological world. 
However this, of course, returns us to the problem highlighted by the ecologists once we
start trying to distinguish between what is “really” natural and those things which are 
the result of externalities such as human agency.
Natural Stability
Another way of considering nature is as a set of immutable regularities.13 It 
stands as a constant or set of constants which appear to us as simply the way the world 
works. (Farber, 2000) A common phrase used to capture this idea is the “law of nature”, 
a term that rose to prominence in the maturation of natural philosophy and its 
12 Through miraculous divine intervention, illusions perpetrated by malevolent and devilish entities, 
the actions of animist spirits or the Kami of the Shinto tradition, and so on.
13 This ties into the contrast with nature, since culture is more clearly amenable to modification and 
change via conscious action.
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transformation into science. In the seventeenth century – the common origins of our 
scientific and philosophical discourses on nature – the idea of a “law of nature” was 
invoked not just in natural philosophy but also in the explanations of the social and 
psychological functions of people. A law of nature was taken to be an axiomatic 
statement of the underlying guiding foundations of a behaviour or activity; the rule in 
accordance with which a thing acts. Like a platonic form, law was thought to be an 
expression of the regulating and regular aspect of the universe. It also did double duty, 
allowing natural philosophers of the day to respond to criticisms of atheism, by 
demonstrating that a law must have an author and that such an author, in the case of 
natural laws, could only be God. (Steinle, 2008: 226-227, 230; Roux, 2008: 207-213) 
But perhaps the most important feature of natural laws was their fundamental and 
universal character. They applied at all times and in all places.14 The central premise was
that a phenomenon of a given type could be traced to a single common cause. Thus 
certain phenomena, be they optics, weather patterns, gravity or anything else naturally 
occurring, could be described as having the same general cause whatever location they 
occurred in. (Roux, 2008; Joy, 2006: 85, 91-92, 102) 
The very idea of a lawful nature has obvious similarities with other types of law 
prevalent at the time. Theories of juridical and divine law permeated the intellectual 
climate, and they clearly had an effect on the ways people thought about other kinds of 
law, even if the relationship was not always an easy one. This was a climate in which 
people worked in a variety of fields, and usage of a term in one did not automatically 
mean that the same author would necessarily appeal to it in the same way (or at all) in 
another. (Ahnert, 2003; see also Pyenson & Sheets-Pyenson, 1999: 397-400) However 
since the universe was supposedly determined and guided by the dictates of each thing’s
internal “nature”, conforming to lawful behaviour according to the laws instituted by 
God, the law of nature in any given context was a manifestation of God’s will. As civil 
laws were laid down by the sovereign power, so were natural laws laid down by God 
(the ultimate sovereign power). 
An idea of nature as lawful also makes its presence felt in the idea of normative 
natural law – a prescriptive law set down by nature – and thus also worked its way into 
14  This point was not without its controversy, since it raised questions about the nature of miracles and
the efficacy and character of God’s will. (Roux, 2008; cf. Pyenson & Sheets-Pyenson, 1999: 395-
397)
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conceptions of human nature during this time. Whilst laws governing human 
behaviours were of a different kind from laws governing the activities of exterior 
nature, the very idea of a “law” implies they could still be considered to be just as 
universal and just as determinate as any other natural law. Human beings were seen as 
being subject to their own laws, or rather there were some natural laws which were 
concerned with human behaviour. As such nature was perceived as directly setting 
codes of conduct and as providing norms of appropriate behaviour or action. Thus in 
discussions of society or morality the laws of nature could and would be appealed to in 
order to ground certain normative claims. (Allen, 2004; Larrère, 2008) Laws of nature, 
qua statements about the fixed constants of the universe, were thus a feature of many 
aspects of early modern and enlightenment thought. At the individual level, especially in
(juridical) practice, the focus was on nature as benign and binding, whilst the concept of
being “unnatural” and going against the natural law was considered manifestly worthy 
of condemnation. (Puff, 2004: 237-239, 246-249; cf. Outram, 2005: 80-81) It was thus 
just as much a polemical rallying point and disciplinary category as it was a 
philosophical doctrine. The law of nature could also be used as a supposed guide to 
ethical and psychological hygiene, quite often linked to some concern with sexual 
practices. (Puff, 2004, Vidal, 2004) Noticeably, these instances imply that both the law 
of nature and the natural law could be broken – how else could some act or some 
individual be unnatural? This reflects a degree of inconstancy in the idea of laws of 
nature as universal and fixed features, since a notable feature of laws is that they may be
transgressed, and therefore cannot represent something that is ipso facto immutable.
Taking a closer look at this intellectual history we can begin to call the idea of a 
lawful nature into question. Laws suggest a definitive statement, but what was (and is) 
articulated in relation to nature is actually quite different. “Laws of nature” were really 
formulated in retrospect, to codify what had been discovered about nature; they were 
not the transcription of pre-existing edicts. In both nature and human nature we see the 
expansion of the use of law-talk to represent nature’s order coinciding with a loosening 
of the concept, to account for the lack of order or uniformity in (some of) the things it 
was used to describe. Theoretical and philosophical thought focused on the concept of 
“a law of nature” even as practical examinations rendered scholastic descriptions of 
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these principles problematic, and Lorraine Daston draws our attention to the disunity 
between the way the concept of a law of nature was thought about and how it was 
actually developed in application. (2008: 235, 242-244) In practice regularities were 
often recognised as conditional, and some people preferred to apply the name “rules” to 
them rather than laws. This tendency was embedded even in some of the earliest 
developments of ‘law-talk’ in natural philosophy – whilst the concept of a law of nature 
pulled a lot of weight rhetorically, in practice there was difficulty in the idea of calling 
the regularities being sought laws. (See Steinle, 2008) In fact it is worth pointing out 
that, as Sophie Roux notes regarding natural philosophy: ‘Not only do these texts [on 
the character of universal natural law] not produce any science, they are behind the 
science of their own time’. (Roux, 2008: 213) Only when “laws” became associated 
with empirically established regularities15 towards the latter half of the seventeenth 
century did the term increase in usage amongst the natural philosophers of the day, and 
Steinle notes this required a broadening of the term itself. (2008: 218-220, 223-229; see 
also Joy, 2006: 102-103) 
So whilst early modern science affirmed the regularity of nature, it initiated an 
openness to revision with regards to our knowledge of these regularities. Nature came to
be viewed as predictable, but our descriptions of it were not presumed to be absolute. 
We see this reflected in such perceptions today. Although “law talk” still persists to 
some extent it no longer has the same forceful or literal meaning it once did. The subject
of such a law may still be treated as though it were dutifully obeying a command, but 
no-one seriously believes any such command has ever been given, and furthermore we 
hold open the possibility that the “command” is in actual fact being filtered through a 
chain of intermediary processes. (Joy, 2006: 90-91; Carroll, 2011; see also Cohen & 
Stewart, 1995: 217-222)  If law is seriously invoked it is in a more metaphysical vein. 
These putative natural laws are the fundamental rules of the universe, and whilst they 
might pertain to phenomena in the everyday world, they will not necessarily be 
perceptible, given that such phenomena might be the result of many such laws. 
(Mumford, 2004; cf. Buller, 2005: 451-4) Whereas in the early Enlightenment laws 
could be thought of as ‘placed at the top of a deductive system’, albeit one based on 
observation, the new regularities can be thought of as some basic principles which 
15  Rather than unvarying absolutes.
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underpin observable phenomena, discovered (with the proviso that such discovery may 
be disproved or superseded) via deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as a certain 
amount of inference. (Steinle, 2008: 218; Mumford, 2004)16 
Thus the idea of a law of nature emerges as an ex post facto description of 
regularities, formulated on the part of human scientific observers, rather than an 
objective “edict” of nature. The stringent law of nature that comprehensively and 
definitively governs natural events was a theoretical formulation traceable to Kant, but 
this was and is simply not how it came to be used by the experimental natural 
philosophers who took it up. Instead the study of nature has revolved around observable
regularities, revised and amended as time goes by. A disconnect thus emerges between 
the philosophical category “law of nature” and discussions of the apparently law-like 
regularities found in nature.
The Case of Human Nature
I maintain that something akin to this applies in the case of human nature. Few 
human nature theories treat what they discuss as an incontestable, unchangeable fact; a 
trend I believe will be made apparent in the following chapters. In fact most theories are
amenable to the idea their theories could be revised (though some are confident such 
revision would only be minimal: a “filling in” of detail) and/or have an idea that there 
are various components which interact to make “human nature” rather more 
unpredictable. For the most part, whilst there might be some “law” – some truly 
immutable consistency – at some level, that is not necessarily what we are looking at 
with regards to what is natural about human beings (after all we would not consider 
physics to be particularly relevant to human nature, although humans are certainly 
subject to the laws of physics). 
Consequently we might regard the concept of human nature as the description of
regularities in the human world, once again not attributable to culture (though perhaps 
marked by mediation by it). However we ought to be wary of seeking inviolable “laws 
of nature”, not only because such edicts are formulated in retrospect, to describe 
regularities as we observe them, but also because this is simply not what many scholars 
think of when discussing human nature. It would be more appropriate to regard this as 
16 For two scientists’ view on these issues, see Cohen & Stewart, 1995: 13-15, 30-55, 220-221, 397-
399
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the attempt to locate dependable regularities, to describe and explain them, and this is 
what we see in the theories covered in this thesis. Although these theories may locate 
human nature in different parts of the human world, and adopt their own approaches to 
dealing with it, they can all be said to seek out regular patterns of human existence. In 
each case we are presented with an underlying consistency innate to the human being. 
In the case of Karl Marx, to take an example we will come to later, these regularities are
fairly minimal, and what really matters for his analysis is how they become transformed
through social practice, but there remains a universal structure to consciousness that 
makes the productive forces he identifies particularly relevant to the question of human 
nature. In this way even non-biologistic or non-naturalistic essences can be regarded as 
part of the variety of human nature theories, given that they describe something 
reasonably dependable in human life.
So human nature may, taking the foregoing into account, refer to an essence or 
general cluster of properties: humans are pro-social; or have certain moral preferences; 
or they are intimately bound up with their identity; and so on. It is entirely possible that 
we could analyse these in natural terms, and even trace them back to a naturalistic 
explanation, but we needn’t be reductive about them nor reduce them to biology (or 
anything else); it suffices that they function as we’ve described them and as we’ve been 
able to study them. For example, if Jürgen Habermas17 argues that we have a 
communicative essence – that is, we are characterised by our ability to formulate and 
communicate our ideas about the world – we can trace this essence to our “language 
instinct”18 and the coordinative necessities of a social species, but this would not 
necessarily add anything to the Habermasian account. What matters is that if we can 
determine that such properties or essences are not the product of socialisation or 
acculturation – and are therefore non-contingent – and occur reliably in human beings 
per se (i.e. cross-culturally), then we may reasonably describe them as part of our 
human nature. Hence in any eventuality, the concept of human nature refers to that part 
of human existence which is not entirely “political” in origin. 
This returns us to the central question of this thesis of where exactly people look
for these regularities. Different ideas of human nature will obviously each possess their 
17 See chapter three below.
18 See chapter one below.
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own quirks and eccentricities, and many theorists and scholars will delineate what they 
are discussing in radically differing terms to others. There is no guarantee that they will 
even use the term “human nature”. Hence the necessity of defining what we mean by 
human nature within the wider context of a discussion of human nature theories. Given 
the above, I propose that we can regard it in this way: human nature is simply what we 
just are by dint of being human. What I mean by this is that whatever a given theory 
claims is our nature (or is “natural” or intrinsic to the human condition) it considers we 
have it purely by virtue of our own “humanness”, however this is construed (indeed, 
this construal forms the basis of the taxa according to how I categorise theories in the 
course of this thesis). That is, human nature is whatever scholars identify as reliably and
universally present in humans, outside of (but in most cases only ever imperfectly 
insulated from) anything socially or culturally inculcated. This definition does not 
necessarily restrict human nature to some kind of essence, and it certainly does not 
require that human nature consist entirely of something exclusive to the human animal 
(although it would include accounts of human nature that involved either or both of 
these claims). It merely refers to a description of human beings, with an emphasis on 
innate features or potentialities.
What is Human?
Of course we should pause here to consider the other element of the human 
nature concept a little more. Having made an attempt to encapsulate what we mean by 
“nature”, surely we need to do the same for “human”. This is particularly so since the 
way I have proposed we try and grasp the subject of theories of human nature does not 
make reference to definition. In other words, I have suggested human nature is 
something existential or ethical, rather than a matter of definition; theories of human 
nature are not really about defining human nature so much as describing it. 
Nevertheless, the term human nature refers to something specific rather than the entirety
of nature, thus we should attempt to delineate what we refer to when we say “human” in
this context.
One way might be to define humans as not being animals, but this is 
complicated by the previously mentioned divergence of opinion of over the continuity 
between the two. If we are a kind of animal, then to what degree can we identify what 
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counts as some part of human nature or a part of an antecedent nature? It is difficult to 
try and further delineate this by appealing to our status as a species, since a species may 
not be a definitive and unbreachable boundary. In fact evolution depends upon this to 
work: one species becoming another, quite apart from the phenomenon of hybridisation.
Early humans may themselves have interbred with Neanderthals. There is therefore little
of ontological significance to being a member of H. sapiens that generates some kind of
philosophical anthropology, since in a sufficiently large timescale creatures of a certain 
lineage take on radical changes (we obviously have quite a different nature as ancestral 
Pan or primordial single-celled organisms). A solution would be to claim human nature 
is not unique to humans – not an Aristotelian characteristic essence – but can be 
characterised by certain faculties or dispositions which are shared by other animals 
(especially, but not necessarily restricted to, close evolutionary kin), thus reinforcing the
idea that human nature is descriptive. (See also Machery, 2008; Lewens, 2012) 
 The term “human” must also refer to a very general type of entity, since it not 
only covers numerous individuals displaying a range of physical and psychological 
variations, but also to children. These latter in particular might not display certain 
human faculties that only develop later in life, and conversely could be regarded as 
being closer to their “raw” nature in other ways, given that they are not yet fully 
socialised into a particular culture. As such I would propose that “human” denotes a 
variety of animal that shares a common evolutionary history resulting in our species as 
it is today, though not locked to a particular genome, nor identical with it, which may 
share certain similarities with other entities. 
Locating Human Nature
On this basis I would argue that human nature is in principle possible (it could 
exist) and, again in principle, is analysable (it can be studied), yet we still have not 
addressed the question of how existing theories actually approach and analyse what they
define as “human nature”. Clearly the human being exists within a whole host of areas: 
simultaneously biological, cultural, psychological and so on. My suggestion is that 
theorists come to explain human existence in terms of those areas relevant to the 
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phenomena in which they are interested. They form assumptions about human beings 
based on how we fit into the other theoretical constructs they employ. This results in a 
varied ecology of approaches to human nature when, in accordance with their 
preexisting theoretical constructs and areas of interest, these theorists subsequently try 
to situate that nature within the topography of human existence as a whole.
This topography poses its own challenges, since many human nature theories 
identify human nature at least partly within its environmental context. These accept that 
part of what makes us human is attributable to the circumstances we find ourselves in, 
even if this is somehow linked to how human nature manifests itself in response to 
contextual specificities. Hence we can divide the field of human experience into two 
general areas – or, to continue the topographic analogy, “biomes” – that of “nature” and 
that of “politics” (this latter being a simplification; a catch-all term for politics, culture, 
economics and so on). Yet these two are divided by an exceedingly nebulous and 
permeable border, so there is no reason to suppose that any given human nature theory 
will fall entirely within the sphere of the “natural”. Of course those that do incorporate 
an awareness of such environmental effects into their picture of human nature conclude 
that a crucial and characteristic part of our humanity is in fact the ways we engage with 
each other and/or our social world. (This, after all, is clearly the major part of the human
environment.) It is hard to deny that this would imply that such a nature already has a 
political dimension, whilst also opening up the possibility that its content is at least in 
some aspects contingent on the political circumstances of the day.
We can consequently create a taxonomy of human nature theories based on 
which aspects of existence are most commonly taken to be relevant to explaining what 
we are – how far into the “biomes” of nature and politics they reside. I refer to these 
groupings as “schemas” given that they are broad outlines describing the structure of 
these perspectives on the subject of human nature – the specific examples given are 
themselves ciphers, contemporary instantiations of potential modes of approach. They 
are broadly representative of the family of theories to which they belong (their schema).
In doing so I emphasise the question of where human nature lies; yet it is also 
simultaneously answered as our attention is directed towards the way such scholars, not 
always from the same intellectual background (not to mention others who draw on their 
work and observations), approach humanity. A single schema may encompass a number 
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of approaches or disciplines that makes either word unsuitable. The term schema also 
invokes the idea of a psychological schema: an epistemic framework about some part of
the world or object of knowledge, which can be adapted to new knowledge but which 
may also (as a matter of course or through force of habit) prioritise some types or 
sources of information over others. It should then be possible for us to understand and 
dissect theories of human nature by considering how the schema under which they fall 
characteristically approaches the topic of human nature.
The first of the most relevant sphere lies deep within “nature”, in the case 
considered here biological nature, and can be regarded as the search for definitive rules 
which will help us understand our own nature. These represent – or most closely 
approximate – something like a search for laws of nature: ultimate, universal principles 
– akin to laws of motion or gravitation – on which all human nature is based. A 
consideration of this schema forms the basis of the first chapter. There I will argue that 
this runs the risk of reductive functionalism, reducing observable human particularities 
to their supposed origins in these (evolutionary) principles. The second chapter, then, 
will focus more on individual humans themselves, with an emphasis on their 
interactions with one another. This approach I characterise as “motivationalist”, and 
focus on a set of paradigms within psychology, ethology, and anthropology that focus 
on motives and the faculties necessary to pursuing these motives. Here humans are often
regarded as a variety of natural being – in some instances specifically a variety of ape – 
a part of nature that we can analyse in particular ways. Most notably these include the 
kinds of ethological investigations we apply to other, “lower” animals, as well as direct 
comparisons with such creatures. In the third chapter I discuss a variant of human nature
theory that places the emphasis very much on politics, or context, rather than a natural 
facet of human existence. The schemas of the preceding two chapters pay little attention
to the political mediation of human activity and existence. By contrast, here human 
nature emerges as a composite of some basic human regularities, but these provide very 
little content. We might, for example, be inherently productive or communicative, but 
the substantive content of our nature is “filled in” by the particular forms of production 
or communication we engage in. The contention with these theories is that human 
nature is conditioned and given meaning by the environment it finds itself in.
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These variations require a discussion of how we can or should go about thinking
about human nature. Can we draw any conclusions about this ecology of approaches? 
Are any superior to any others with regards to explanatory utility or accuracy/truth? 
Rather than cataloguing the various existing human nature theories or selecting a 
particular conception of human nature and arguing for or against it, I feel discussions on
this subject ought to serve as a means of understanding how such theories are 
formulated, and to assess their ability to really articulate something meaningful about 
what it is to be human. Ultimately I hope this will allow us to formulate some kind of 
working theory of human nature. By dissecting existing theories  according to a 
taxonomy based on the loci with which they identify human nature we will be able to 
identify the most fruitful approaches from which to synthesise a new approach.
The Potential for Outliers or Unclassifiable Theories
As a caveat to all of the above, I do not take the content of theories to be 
indicative of their particular character except insofar as this content reveals something 
about the sphere(s) of human existence they take to be constitutive of human nature. (In 
other words: their specific claims about what human nature is merely indicate where 
they locate human nature.) Thus it may be possible to argue that the content of some 
theories not only resists easy categorisation (such that the theory may fall within the 
borderlands two schemas), but introduces some peculiar quality that makes these 
theories unique and entirely uncategorisable, since the specificity of this content cannot 
be compartmentalised from how and where the theory in question grounds human 
nature. Such may be the case with German philosophical anthropology, a tradition 
originating in the universities of early twentieth century Germany.19 Its central conceit 
was that there are imminent linkages between human beings that perforce lead to 
inherent requirements for and implications about how we should live. Thus the 
normative impact of this particular human nature springs directly from how it is 
approached – as something enmeshed with the interpersonal relations that individual 
human beings are constantly engaged in. Two of its disciples described it as attempting 
‘to grasp “the fundamental structures of humanity” through comparison of man and 
19 And consequently falling somewhat out of the timeline covered in this thesis. However it is included
here in the interests of pursuing this particular question and because like Marx and Freud (below) 
the tradition has had some influence on subsequent figures, albeit to a lesser extent than those two 
icons.
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animal, and through critical examination and appropriation of as many findings of the 
natural and cultural sciences as possible.’ (Honneth & Joas, 1988: 41) Unsurprisingly, 
from this description, we can note that some of this “anthropology” was influential in 
the development of ethology (the study of animal behaviour), which can be considered 
as one its intellectual children (the other being certain paradigms within social theory).
The requirements created by our social linkages manifest themselves as needs 
(and, indeed, in some instances wants). For a number of German philosophical 
anthropologists they are a direct result of our human plasticity – human nature is 
marked by a flexibility and near-protean indeterminacy, unlike the specific and 
specialised niches occupied by other species. (Ibid, 1988: 53-5, 73-6; Moss & Pavisch, 
2011: 147-8) We are capable of redefining our relationship to the environment – social 
or natural – since we are presented with an almost endless space of possibilities. Thus 
human nature is considered as the totality of biological facts (including plasticity) and 
culture which gives them context, meaning and a space of definition. It must be studied 
with a broad, interdisciplinary approach. (See Wein, 1957) It is, however, the move to 
culture which shows how needs emerge and give rise to certain human interests which 
must be satisfied in order to fulfil human nature. Cultural institutions, systems, and 
relationships serve to narrow the field of possible actions that an individual can pursue, 
but they do so by providing a context for action. In this way they provide material 
required for action, in terms of commitments (duties), responsibilities, cultural capital 
and, of course, physical materials like raw resources or goods (including status 
symbols). Our ability to engage with these possibilities and materials brings with it sets 
of expectations – needs and interests – associated with what these contextual 
determinants are supposedly for. Humans assign meaning and value to their practices 
and expect this meaning to bear fruit, to play out as expected; and we expect a lot, given
that humans are not “locked in” to a meaningful relationship to our environment as a 
simpler animal which merely wants its hunger sated or a suitable habitat might be. 
(Moss & Pavisch, 140-1, 159-61; Honneth & Joas, 1988: 52-4) Some German 
philosophical anthropologists even went further, noting that as human culture becomes 
more complex and produces more complex systems of relationships and goods human 
needs and interests proliferate. Not only is (social) activity necessary to engage with and
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satisfy these needs, but (social) activity is creating them.20 (Honneth & Joas 1988: 99-
101) Consequently human nature – being simultaneously synthetic, syncretic and 
protean – gives rise to inherent normative conclusions (arising primarily through its 
plasticity and position on the ever-permeable and indistinct border between nature and 
culture) and stands awkwardly amongst the schemas here elaborated.
However, as a caveat to this caveat, German philosophical anthropology is not 
necessarily unique in this emphasis on an inherent normativity. We could potentially 
reword Buddhist cosmology in such a way as to draw some similarities between it and 
the European proto-ethologists. Buddhists hold that we desire – we have certain human 
needs and interests – and that these desires are particular to individuals whilst falling 
within common categories: we are susceptible to lust, or pride, or we become attached 
to things like possessions or status. However we also have a universal, general interest 
in acknowledging our oneness with the universe and our place as part of a larger nature 
that exists above and beyond our particular human selves. They thus reject certain 
human interests over a greater, more important one. In order to properly realise our 
nature we must give up its transient, ephemeral (and ultimately unreal) elements such as
desire or the impression we are a separate, isolatable self. The question then becomes 
one of why one approach demands that historically-determined needs be fulfilled whilst 
another rejects them utterly. I would suggest that this is resolved by situating them 
within the landscape of human nature theories elaborated in this thesis. Buddhism 
locates the most important facet of human nature within a different sphere to the 
Germans and those influenced by them – it approaches human nature as a part of a 
wider whole, effectively identifying it with nature in general. Though both have 
putatively normative implications inherent in the way they construct their theories of 
human nature, the differences might be thrown into stark relief if we attempt to situate 
them within the general landscape of human nature theories as I attempt to map it.
This thesis is thus a qualified defence of the concept of human nature, and an 
attempt to identify the most appropriate place to locate it. However I also want to say 
that its mediation by a social and cultural environment complicates the issue and makes 
it difficult to definitively encapsulate human nature in any single instance (without 
20 Note, however, that this is largely a recasting of Karl Marx’s view on needs, expressed several 
decades earlier. See discussion in chapter three.
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claiming that such mediation renders human nature mute or eternally elusive). If, as I 
have suggested, approaches are differentiated by schema, and human nature and politics
are merely two regions within the same conceptual landscape, then it may not prove 
possible to simultaneously encapsulate everything about human existence into one 
approach, even one such as I describe. More importantly, it may not be possible to 
completely say what human nature is and completely say what it is doing. Yet, keeping 
this in mind, it may prove possible to say what human nature is more exactly than 
previously possible – in part through accounting for its political mediation – and to 
subsequently import such theorisations into the political dimension – replacing assumed
or a priori philosophical anthropologies – on condition that the provisional and ongoing
character of human nature study is recognised and accounted for. In order to do this, 
however, we first need to see how existing human nature theories address the issue.
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1: The Algorithm
If human nature is basically a set of universal, non-artificial regularities of 
human behaviour and thought (in short, the natural part of human existence), and if we 
can find some axiomatic way of expressing these regularities, then it would be 
appealing to locate human nature at the level of this expression. We might therefore be 
forgiven for thinking that human nature could be summed up by a description of these 
ultimate, universal regularities. This first schema might reasonably be characterised as 
doing precisely that. Its main feature is that those whose human nature theories fall 
within the scope of this chapter locate a set of ultimate rules from which all the rest of 
our nature flows or unfolds. They hold that the most important factor in human nature 
lies in some area that could be said to be, if not foundational, then certainly fundamental
and necessary. Here I characterise such a perspective on human nature as an algorithmic
one: a conception that understands human nature in terms of some set of principles that 
produce a result (in this case human existence).
Here I focus on the most prominent modern incarnation of such an approach, the
construal of human nature as the outcome of (a particular interpretation of) evolution, 
and an evolutionary logic as the defining determinant of much of our experience. This is
in part related to the emergence of biologised views of human nature post Darwin. A 
deeper historical (and metaphysical) analogue might be a democritean determinism, by 
which all that exists, including agents or at the very least the world as they experience it,
is the result a deterministic process of cause and effect. Everything that is is only so 
because of an unbroken chain of prior events, and can be understood as such. (In fact, 
the philosopher Daniel Dennett invokes a democritean metaphysics in Freedom Evolves 
in order to explicate why free will and Darwinism are sometimes seen as incompatible.) 
Few now subscribe to a hard determinism such as that espoused by Democritus, 
however, but other more modern incarnations tend to bring us back to a scientific, 
biologistic view of human nature. These would include paradigms such as 
neurophilosophy and the like, including neuroaesthetics, which describes 
pheonomenological and aesthetic reactions to various artistic forms and media in terms 
of their activation of neural pathways and physiological changes in the brain, and makes
conjectures about why it might be advantageous for our brains to be set up in such a 
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manner. Although this approach comes in for its own share of criticism (see Tallis, 2011;
see also Hatfield, 1988; Churchland, 2013) it is a compelling example of an algorithmic 
approach. In the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century la Mettrie’s idea that our 
conscious thought was the result of physical excitations of nervous tissue, in part a 
result of his physiological studies, might have been the closest relation. Nevertheless 
here I confine myself to discussing a circumscribed set of paradigms within 
evolutionary theory that approach human nature algorithmically, in terms of the role 
they ascribe to evolution and the attention they tend to place on genes.
In fact an algorithm is precisely how Daniel Dennett, himself a prominent 
proponent of this kind of post-Darwinian theorist, characterises Darwin’s insights into 
evolution. In his terms ‘[an] algorithm is a certain sort of formal process that can be 
counted on – logically – to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is “run” or 
instantiated.’ (Dennett, 1995: 50) It follows that natural selection is the algorithm of 
natural history,21 and that therefore an examination of that algorithm supposedly informs
us about the fundamental workings of our nature. In this chapter I attempt to illustrate 
the idea of an algorithmic human nature theory via an examination of what we can call 
“gene-first Darwinism”. I contend that whilst there is some explanatory power to these 
ideas, and our humanity is undoubtedly underpinned by our physical existence and its 
origins, such an approach adds relatively little to our understanding of human nature.
The Primordial Origins of “gene-first” Darwinism
There are in fact two strands to this gene-first Darwinian human nature theory. 
First is the idea that genetics “programs” a being’s nature. The important thing for gene-
first Darwinism is the idea that this can be extended beyond their physical body, to their 
behaviour, if we accept that genes also control the development of the brain and hence 
(at least in part) the being’s psychology. Humans could be intrinsically conditioned 
towards certain behaviours or reactions, a contention that has ramifications for how we 
relate to interpersonal and socio-cultural experiences. The second strand is the 
evolutionary process itself, the culmination of which is instantiated in our current 
21 For all species; only a set of metaphysical precepts would yield a more universal basis for human 
nature.
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genetic components. What we are now, then, is the outcome of these two processes; the 
first proximal, the second ultimate. An algorithmic interpretation of this holds that 
understanding these processes will reveal something of unique import about human 
nature.
Mendel and the Synthesis Theory
The first step towards the gene-first Darwinian paradigm hinges on the 
connection between these two strands: the fusion between the theory of natural selection
developed by Charles Darwin and the genetic theory of inheritance developed by 
Gregor Mendel. Working at a similar time to Darwin, Mendel worked out a mechanism 
by which the inheritance of biological characters was carried out – the main element 
that his more famous counterpart lacked. His experiments on peas in the gardens of his 
monastery in Brno gave him some intimation of the means by which one generation’s 
traits are passed onto their progeny. Mendel had gathered data suggesting that characters
were affected by two determinants, segregated in the ‘germ cells’ (gametes). These 
determinants are now referred to as genes and Mendel even managed to describe how 
some genes or traits are recessive and others dominant, illustrated through his tracking 
of the prevalence of yellow peas through successive generations of plants. (Stern & 
Sherwood, 1966)
Whilst the connection between these ‘germ cells’ and natural selection was not 
made at the time (Darwin was ignorant of Mendel’s work), in the twentieth century 
biologists began to see how the transmission of traits via genes provided a crucial 
mechanism which could complete the theory of evolution. (Olby, 1985:  45-47; 103-
104; Rose, 1998: 39-41) As a consequence of Mendelian inheritance biologists could 
now describe how particular characteristics could be preserved and passed on, via 
‘particulate inheritance’ and the development of population genetics – the tracking of 
subtle changes across generations – further refined the understanding of these 
mechanisms. It allowed biologists to trace the spread and variety of characteristics 
within a species, a prerequisite of modern evolutionary thought.
This gave rise to what is more accurately called the Synthesis Theory of 
evolution, but is sometimes conflated with the term neo-Darwinism, (particularly by 
those calling themselves neo-Darwinists and most vociferously advocate for gene-
36
centric models of natural selection). Indeed, Mendel is often credited with providing the
key to particulate inheritance which neo-Darwinists see as completing the groundwork 
of Darwinism. (Dawkins, 2006: 33-34; Ridley, 1999: 42-45; cf. Cziko, 1995: 23; Ryan, 
2002: 64-65) The synthesis effectively unites Mendel and Darwin, although as Frank 
Ryan (2002) points out it is still arguably ignorant of several pertinent mechanisms. It 
identifies changes in a species’ adaptive fitness, required for its continuing survival,22 
with gradual change to sections of its DNA, the substance of which genes are 
composed. As such we can not only hypothesise about the nature of genes and their role 
in human evolution but we can also track them at a molecular level.23 
Where this insight becomes interesting, from the perspective of an inquiry into 
human nature, is the idea that human behaviour might be genetically driven – that our 
dispositions and propensities to act in certain ways are influenced by our DNA. If some 
of our behaviours, dispositions and faculties are natural we can think of them as traits, 
genetically “programmed” for in the same manner as physical traits like eye colour (or 
the colour of a pea’s fruits). Thus human nature could be described in terms of our 
shared genetic heritage.
Sociobiology
This idea – that human nature might have a genetic component which is 
analytically useful – formed the core of early sociobiology, the conceptual precursor of 
modern gene-first Darwinism. Sociobiology has now largely diffused, becoming an 
influence within various other paradigms and disciplines, especially gene-first 
Darwinism. The term was used by Edward O. Wilson as the title for his well-known 
1975 treatise on ‘behavioural biology’. He coined to term to refer to a branch of 
evolutionary biology which he held (and still holds) to be helpful in understanding 
human motivation and activity in terms of their most fundamental characteristics. In 
essence it means approaching and analysing society through the lens of species’ 
interests and biologically embodied characteristics that facilitate them. That is, 
22 At least until a dramatic enough shift occurs to classify it as a new species.
23 It is important to note, however, that just because genes are generally agreed to be the main unit of 
inheritance – they are how characteristics are coded for and transmitted to the next generation – this 
does not mean that all evolutionary theorists share the view that genes are the only thing being 
selected for (more on this below). Nor does it imply those who do think that selection solely works 
on genes will necessarily subscribe to an algorithmic theory of human nature (if, for example, they 
think something other than biology takes precedence vis a vis human nature and experience).
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biological impulses and instincts make up the commonest components of the activities 
of living things and, humans being another, albeit highly complex, type of living thing 
they must surely be subject to such forces too. 
Perhaps the most important aspect, however, is the role of adaptation and 
natural selection assume in this approach. Wilson bases sociobiology on the foundation 
of evolutionary necessity. That is, species exist by virtue of ensuring that they 
reproduce, and surviving long enough to do so. In order to do this they must be well 
adapted to their environment – “fit”, in Darwin’s terminology, for purpose, where that 
purpose is simply survival. Wilson’s behavioural biology extends this to include the idea
that behaviour, just as much as physiology, is geared towards enhancing relative fitness 
within a certain environment. Some behaviours are more conducive to survival, and 
survival means a creature will have more success in reproducing, passing on its genes 
(and its genetically-driven behaviour) to the next generation and generally proliferating 
the species. When we encounter a species, then, we can reasonably presume that most 
of its behavioural repertoire will be the end result of this process, and therefore not just 
adaptive but innate.
The convergence of the evolutionary imperative and our own particular 
evolutionary history can thus conceivably inform our understanding of modern human 
behaviour. After all, animals are predisposed to act and react to an environment to which
they are adapted in certain ways, new adaptive behaviours arising amongst older, 
simpler ones. Humans, too, have expanded and refined adaptive behaviours throughout 
our evolutionary history, and so we have a biological and evolutionary dimension to 
both our natures and our societies. (Wilson, 2000: 3-5, 550-552, 457-459) 
As far as this goes for society itself, certain social and cultural mechanisms are 
taken to be a part of the intrinsic characteristics of a species by virtue of their ultimate 
origins in behaviour biologically “programmed” into individuals. (For example, 
nationalism may emerge from an atavistic territorial instinct.) In particular there are 
certain mechanisms which consistently appear in many species, although not always in 
the same ways – the work of sociobiology as a scholarly discipline is to identify where 
and in what ways these mechanisms appear in various species. (Mundinger, 1980) To 
this end, sociobiologists identify a number of common mechanisms that arise in some 
way in all animal societies as a matter of instinct. These usually consist of dominance 
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strategies, methods of delineating territories or building nests/hives, and 
communication.
Once again, these same principles apply to human beings, although not in such 
instinctual or reactive ways. In fact Wilson stresses that the more developed the 
organism is the more elaborate will be the mechanisms. (Wilson, 2000: 144ff) As 
humans and our environments both become relatively more complex the adaptive traits 
that will arise can be expected to be correspondingly more complex, in particular our 
abilities to reflect and communicate. So too will the manifestations of more ancestral or 
primordial behavioural traits. Territorial instincts, to take one example, manifest in 
social phenomena such as tribalism, nationalism, xenophobia and war. (Ibid: 564-565, 
572-574) Human economic norms are also traced back to the systems and mechanisms 
that animals possess in their social lives. In Wilson’s early sociobiology, bartering and 
the division of labour are asserted to have a biological and evolutionary basis, akin to 
the fixed biological castes or roles of (in particular) insect societies. (Ibid: 551-555) 
Even human culture itself, whilst not controlled directly by genes, is conceived of as 
indebted to a biological capacity for communication and language.
Sociobiology thus encapsulates the conceptual trends that characterise the more
recent versions of gene-first Darwinian thought of the past forty years. These are that 
human nature is instantiated and passed on via the genome, that at least some cultural 
formations take their cue from this nature, and that this nature is the outcome of a 
universal process: evolution. The natural human regularities we inherit are there and 
have thrived because they (or the genes that give rise to them) have emerged from the 
process of natural selection.
Wilson and the Levels of Selection Debate
In his latter work, Wilson diverges from the position that subsequent algorithmic
human nature theorists of this stripe tend to adopt regarding the centrality of genes. In 
particular, in elaborating an explicit stance on human nature Wilson makes it clear that 
whilst genes may be the biological carriers of our nature, our evolution owes more to 
the relative adaptiveness of groups. It is, in some instances at least, the group which is 
selected for. (Wilson, 2012, 2015) For example two competing groups that share the 
same evolutionary niche (say, the apex predator within a particular food chain, or the 
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niche of opportunistic scavenger in a savannah ecosystem) may play the role of 
competing candidates for evolutionary selection. Their whole suite of physical and 
behavioural traits will contribute to their relative fitness. (cf. Boyd & Richerson, 1990) 
When this happens between two groups of the same species or two closely related 
species, this will have massive implications for the evolutionary future of the species. 
This is one way of interpreting the rise of Homo sapiens at the expense of Homo 
neanderthalensis and other hominid cousins.
For Wilson, this is the way we should understand evolution in general and our 
evolution specifically. Our nature is defined by the traits and characteristics which made
our groups more successful than others (including those which contributed to our ability
to live and work together as a group in the first place). He still approaches human nature
as the outcome of an evolutionary process, and humans as biological beings, but now 
the beneficiary of that process is a larger unit – the group, or ultimately the species – 
rather than an atomistic gene. The relevant measured output has changed (and, to 
anticipate some of the later discussion below, moved further towards the sphere of 
everyday human experience and interpersonal interaction) but the algorithm itself is the 
same, as are many of its axioms. This noted, it must be said that whilst he retains an 
evolutionary sensibility, and whilst his early work certainly remains within an 
algorithmic approach (because his human nature is still the result of the processes of 
inheritance and evolutionary necessity) this is an important difference. In Wilson’s case,
human nature is a collective property instantiated in individuals rather than something 
proper to each individual. We shall return to this notion when examining Marx, and it 
becomes relevant in the conclusion.
What this does do is call our attention to a contentious issue within biology – 
and the philosophy of biology – that may partially explain why not all biologists or 
evolutionary theorists would necessarily articulate an algorithmic human nature. (See 
chapter five, below.) It is not a foregone conclusion that genes are the only thing to be 
selected for under evolutionary pressure. Traits, combinations of traits, or group 
dynamics may be selected for – that is, give an advantage to the species chances of 
survival – and specific gene sequences will only proliferate insofar as they positively 
contribute to these other features. Multi-level selection theorists, for example, are happy
to concede that some (or the majority) of selection can be construed as happening at the 
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level of genes, but sometimes what is being selected is some other unit, such as the 
group.24 There is nothing particularly divergent in the way they approach evolutionary 
theory – as noted above, the gene-first model is only one of a number of evolutionary 
models. 
Consequently gene-first human nature theorists are merely those theorists (from 
biology, psychology, philosophy or whatever) who subscribe to a gene-centric view of 
evolutionary selection (what Dawkin’s characterised as the “selfish gene theory”) and 
incorporate this into their conception of the human condition. Conversely if a theorist 
places sufficient emphasis on the group-level then they may well begin to see a species 
nature in terms of its inter- and intra-group dynamics, or its place in its environment, or 
both. Doing so will likely move them further and further away from the algorithmic 
schema – and further into some other territory – as they shift the focus on what 
influence(s) constitute a species’ (i.e. human) nature. Indeed, an intellectual history of 
Wilson’s own thought could be said to describe a migration from deep within the 
algorithmic schema into the intellectual landscape that borders that of the next chapter. 
Thus what a theorist thinks about the levels of selection debate may or may not have an 
effect on where a theorist subsequently falls in the topology of human nature theories, 
should they proffer an analysis of ethics and/or politics which draws on their opinions 
about selection. Of course, these opinions may well play no part in theories articulated 
by those who, consciously or unconsciously, compartmentalise their treatment of 
evolutionary selection and their ideas about human nature (even if the latter retains a 
naturalistic slant or influence). Chapter five, below, discusses such issues in more detail.
For, though, we turn to consider a more modern incarnation of this schema.
The Modern Gene-First Darwinian Concept of Human Nature
“Reading” the Genome
No-one is naïve enough to think that they can simply look at a gene and know 
something new about human nature. However the expectation is that any behavioural 
24 The topic here, however, is human nature. For a full discussion of these issues see Boyd &  
Richerson, 1990; Okasha, 2006; Sterelny, 2012; Sterelny et. al. 2013 cf. Carey, 2012. Sterelny and 
Okasha, in particular, ultimately come down in favour of the gene selection model, but also 
endeavour to give scrupulously fair hearing to those positions with which they ultimately disagree.
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characteristic will have an evolutionary explanation, which for gene-first Darwinians 
means an identifiable (in principle) genetic cause.25 Thus it is thought to be possible to 
“read” the genome and better understand human nature, but this requires a certain level 
of translation – in other words knowing which traits are associated with which genetic 
markers. Once this is known, says the reductionist gene-first Darwinian, we in principle 
have access to the total biological knowledge of the species.
Less prosaically this understanding is implemented in a number of ways. The 
crudest is to talk about “a gene for” something (a popular preoccupation of journalists), 
and whilst this phrase is still occasionally used it cannot be said that gene-first 
Darwinism’s supporters do so without caveats and at least some acknowledgement that 
it is an abstraction. The more common way is to simply note the covarying of a gene 
and a phenotypic effect. More accurately what is varying is a polymorphism of a 
particular gene – a specific form of the gene, which when observed together with a 
phenotypic expression implies a correlation, if not causation, between the two. The 
classic example used here is that of eye colour. The gene that causes eyes to be brown or
blue is an allele of the same gene: a slightly different version of the same segment of 
DNA.
More specifically and more complex is the example of the hox genes in the 
animal kingdom. Hox genes are found in a number of organisms, but have differing yet 
related roles in each. In insects such as Drosophila flies these genes determine the 
development of body segments. Depending on which hox genes are active (and which 
are inactive) a section of the developing fly will become either a head, an abdomen or a 
thorax. In humans hox genes govern the development of the body along the anterior-
posterior (head-to-tail) axis, most notably the spine. In this role they are instrumental in 
developing the ‘limb buds’ where arms and legs begin to develop on the embryo. 
However they also govern the development of these limbs themselves. (cf. Leroi, 2005: 
112ff, 126-129) Should a hox gene be mutated it will lead to physical abnormalities at 
the phenotypic level. Flies can develop legs where their antennae should be, or vestigial 
wings. Humans can acquire a range of mutations, such as polydactyly (many-fingers) or
extra ribs. It is partially through such mutations that we are able to determine the 
functioning of certain genes. When they are mutated or absent entirely (either by 
25 Hence Matt Ridley’s belief that reading the genome will be able to vindicate or verify some of the 
assertions made about human evolutionary development. (Ridley, 2000: 35)
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accident or, in the case of laboratory animals, by human design) we observe changes to 
the normally stable phenotype.
Gene-first Darwinist theory holds that we can find similar examples concerning
the human character. These range from the capacity for language, to violence, and even 
to the degree to which an individual might be affected by environmental conditioning. 
The first of these is quite instructive as it offers a way of transitioning into more 
complex questions of human nature. It is based in the idea that human language is 
innate, not in the sense that there is any given ur-language, but rather that we are born 
with a sense of grammar and a set of linguistic mental tools. This is a ‘universal’ or 
‘mental’ grammar which reveals itself in the way people think about and decode 
language. This observation is attributable to certain linguists, such as Noam Chomsky, 
who noted that any given human language will share certain structural similarities and 
ways of interpreting grammatical rules with all other languages. (Pinker, 1995; Ridley, 
2000: 91ff; see also Chomsky, 1976) An instinctual or innatist view of language 
typically locates this capacity in Broca’s area, a region of the brain associated with 
linguistic use and ability. Damage to the area often leads to Broca’s aphasia, an inability
to understand or implement grammatical rules. Some research suggests that an increase 
in the size of Broca’s area correlates with improved communication skills in 
chimpanzees. (Hopkins, Russell & Schaeffer, 2012) According to Steven Pinker this 
implies that an innate capacity for language is a biological fact, and furthermore an 
evolved one. Our complex ability to communicate is a product of our genetic heritage as
members of H. Sapiens. The genetic dimension is reinforced by suggestions that this 
inherent grammatical ability is disrupted by genetic mutation. One diagnosis of some 
linguistic difficulties, such as specific language impairment (SLI) – a condition which 
hampers verbal and written language use – holds that they may be genetic. (Pinker, 
1995: 48-49, 322-325; Gopnik & Crago, 1991; Gopnik & Goad, 1997) People with SLI 
have difficulty in applying grammatical rules, such as how to combine root words or 
pluralise others. A dominant genetic marker seems to be present in certain people with 
SLI, which suggests that perhaps some section of the ‘language module’ of the brain is 
not functioning as it does in the average human. This is not without its controversies 
(Ridley, 2000: 98-101), but if true it would serve to reinforce the contention that 
language, a crucially human trait, is biologically – and genetically – founded. 
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On a more dispositional note, the science writer and geneticist Matt Ridley 
collects a number of possible examples that may account for sexual preference, at least 
in men. (Ridley, 2000: 116-121; 2004: 160-162; cf. Pinker, 2003) Indeed one or two of 
these potential discoveries were taken as proof that homosexuality is not a choice, 
indicative of moral laxity, but something that certain people are born with, a natural 
occurrence. (see Ridley, 2000: 116) Alongside the more obvious description of a 
potential incidence of genetic causation (a correlation of homosexual preference with a 
particular gene) Ridley also locates a rather more interesting example. Here the gene 
involved does not belong to the individual organism, but to the mother. Second sons are 
statistically slightly more likely to be attracted to the same sex, implying that something
is happening in development which affects a hormone balance in the foetus. It appears 
that antigens released during the masculinisation of the body provoke an immune 
response from the mother, which is stronger in subsequent pregnancies (since the 
immune system has already encountered the antigen and adapted). The antigen is thus 
suppressed more in male pregnancies after the first. If, as some suggest, the antigen is 
responsible for activating other genes within the foetus that are involved in 
masculinising the brain then its suppression by the mother’s immune system may 
influence the resulting child’s sexual preferences in later life. (Ridley, 2000: 118-120; 
Blanchard & Klassen, 1997) Similarly, geneticist Armand Marie Leroi relates a number 
of incidences where pseudohermaphrodites (those who superficially appear to be one 
sex but in fact have the reproductive organs of the other) find themselves attracted to 
individuals of what is apparently the same sex, but in reality the opposite sex of their 
‘hidden’ biological sex. His conclusion is that, all relevant factors accounted for, 
hormones must have some effect on sexual preference, although he is rather more 
equivocal than the devout gene-first Darwinists.26 (Leroi, 2005: 217ff)
All this is not to say that gene-first Darwinists are ignorant of the effect of 
environment, nor that they ignore the intricacies of genetic and biological interaction. 
Dawkins, in a retrospective endnote on the thirtieth anniversary edition of The Selfish 
Gene, actually asserts that such considerations are at the core of the gene-first 
Darwinian understanding of genetic evolution, and refers back both to his statements in 
26 Having a fascination with classical analogies, he describes the problem thus: ‘The causes of our 
various sexual orientations are so obscure that Aristophanes’ explanation is about as good as many 
others current today.’
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the original 1976 edition, and to the work of G. C. Williams in order to do so. (Dawkins,
2006: 271-272; cf. Williams, 1966) With regards to his work on language, Pinker notes 
that whilst there are isolatable sites within the brain associated with language, language 
as a whole does not reside in any one of them. (Pinker, 1995: 313-315) He also notes 
that finding a gene that disrupts a function when mutated does not mean that gene 
controls that function. (Ibid: 298) Furthermore there is strong evidence that there is a 
critical period in brain development which, if missed, can lead to an individual having 
little or no skill with language. gene-first Darwinists are keen to note such instances of 
biology-environment interaction in the development of a trait. Indeed, they hold them 
up as examples of the importance of interaction in the unfolding of human nature and 
the centrality of this viewpoint to their paradigm, even going so far as to militate against
the division between nature and nurture. (Ridley, 2004: 167-170) However we ought to 
note how the central role is reserved for the genetic component: this is what is meant to 
reveal something about a given behavioural or dispositional trait. The context is invoked
to explain how human nature fits in to the environment of the modern world.
Echoes of Evolution
Of course genetics is still only held to be a measure of innateness. The linking of
a gene with a trait only really demonstrates that that trait is part of our human 
inheritance. Gene-first Darwinism finds its completion in the appeal to the same 
evolutionary imperative that sociobiology was based on. This emerges as the notion that
the activity of genes – regardless of the proteins and higher phenotypic structures that 
they are ultimately involved in coding for – in ensuring their own replication is the 
driving force in evolution. This is the theory of the Selfish Gene, (in)famously put 
forward by Richard Dawkins, so called because it is based upon the principle that the 
only thing a gene – which is after all nothing more than a strand of DNA – can really be 
said to concern itself with is its own continuance. Not that what genes “want” will 
control what people want or the ways they behave in every situation, as they cannot 
form intentions or hold beliefs or desires. But as we shall presently see, gene-first 
Darwinists like to distinguish between what genes would find most agreeable and what 
we, their hosts, find most agreeable. But the premise underlying the theory is what 
matters: that underneath all of evolution, human or otherwise, is the imperative for 
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organisms to transmit genetic information to the next generation.
Gene-first Darwinian theorists base this premise in the first instance in the 
search for the stable elements of evolution. In other words, what they are seeking is 
those elements which persist through time and represent the most durable and consistent
entity involved. This is almost a metaphysical proposition, in that it involves the search 
for the underlying constants which anchor reality. The entity they put forward as 
fulfilling this role is of course the gene, and from this basis unfolds the logic of the 
gene-centric selectionism in particular, and their concept of the unit of selection more 
generally. (Dawkins, 2006: 12-13) The case for this claim comes from the idea that 
genes are ‘immortal’ whereas the organism that possesses them is a transitory unit. 
When organisms reproduce, their genetic material is divided and mixed so that each sex 
cell has one copy of the parent’s genes. Offspring organisms thus have a unique genome
assembled from two sources – hence the organisms themselves are not what Dawkins 
and others have dubbed “replicators.” The reproducing organisms do not replicate fully. 
They are only partially reconstituted in the offspring. Genes meanwhile, in the sense of 
sections of DNA which code for a protein, do get passed on intact. They are the 
particulate units that do not get blended, the copies in the offspring are the same as 
those in the parents, save that they exist in a differently-constituted genome. (Dawkins, 
2006: 21-25, 34-35) In asexually reproducing organisms the case is still the same – 
whilst the offspring will be identical to the parent, its genes are what matters (indeed, it 
is identical because it shares all the same genes).
On this basis gene-first Darwinians have made the claim that natural selection 
can be considered as acting exclusively on the genes, and any question of fitness is 
resolvable in how it benefits the genetic constituents of an organism or its species. 
(Hamilton, 1963; Williams, 1966; Cronin, 1993: 63-66) Which genes persist and which 
do not is determined by the evolutionary fitness of the phenotypes (in other words 
organisms) to which they give rise. Genes, as immortal replicators, are capable of 
copying themselves almost endlessly, so long as the phenotype that carries them 
survives and reproduces. Whatever that phenotype is, then, it is only by virtue of how its
natural history unfolded, and this is ultimately a question of the evolutionary logic, 
encapsulated in gene-centric selectionism as the process of selection acting on genes 
and genetic variation. Gene-centric selectionism thus provides us with a basic 
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framework for understanding human beings (or any living thing), which is to consider 
them as adaptation machines.
In an afterword to Dawkins’ The Extended Phenotype Daniel Dennett says: ‘I 
take this to be a philosophical discovery....’ (Dawkins, 1999: 268, emphasis original) It 
is this discovery that he expounds upon in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea and, to a lesser 
extent, Freedom Evolves. (1995; 2004) It calls into question the way we view the world 
as imbued with meaning and cosmological significance. The only reason we are what 
we are is because of a complex process working not on us but on our genes (in reality, 
the genes of our ancestors). Dawkins and his supporters like to thus characterise 
organisms as being ‘vehicles’ for genes. Any given phenotype is a temporary transporter
used to protect genes until they get a chance to replicate. This includes behaviours and 
patterns which manifest within groups, rather than purely individual organisms. Dubbed
by Dawkins ‘the extended phenotype’ these are complex social or environmental 
interactions which, whilst identifiably genetic in origin, are expressed at levels much 
higher than single organisms. (Dawkins, 1999; 2004)
Consequently our nature is that of vehicles designed to survive an evolutionary 
environment. This is essentially the same claim as sociobiology, and it should be clear 
that it is founded on much the same suppositions. The difference is that the 
interpretation is sparser and more focussed on the history of species – it does not require
complex notions of territoriality or economic exchange, but can argue that such 
behaviours are rooted in (epigenetic27) impulses developed in the distant past for the 
benefit of the genes inside such vehicles. Such a perspective informs the core of 
evolutionary psychology, and there is a lot of crossover between gene-first Darwinism 
27 Epigenetics just means phenomena immediately above genetics, including those processes by which 
genes are expressed, i.e. produce the proteins or chemical signals by which actually perform their 
role. What this actually implies is that there are levels above that of the gene in which genes (more 
properly, the products they code for) interact, some genes activate or suppress others, and various 
genes collectively contribute towards the formation of tissues and cellular and organ structures. 
Epigenetics is the source of differences between genetically identical individuals (including the same
individual at different stages of development); it is the actual unfolding and expression of genes. 
Some argue that this level of enhanced, complex interaction, enmeshed in the formation of basic 
biological structures but subsequent to (and “higher” than) the genetic level, actually plays a much 
larger role in defining the human being. They see the reductive habits of the gene-first theorists as 
truncating a host of complex processes in order to construct a simple picture of genetic function, and
that this complexity may introduce a much greater degree of indeterminacy and contextual 
sensitivity into human nature, or help explain its variety of forms. (See Carey, 2012; cf. Leroi, 2005; 
Ryan, 2002)
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in general and classical Evolutionary Psychology (EvoPsych). (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1995; Ridley, 2004: 247) EvoPsych is based on the idea that much of our psychology is 
geared towards enhancing a species’ chances of survival and proliferation. It frees itself 
from the need to constantly refer back to the genetic level by using “reproductive 
fitness” as a shorthand – the good of the gene is left as a background assumption, 
available to refer back to if needs be as well as making the findings of evolutionary 
psychologists easily accessible and adaptable for more gene-centric writers like 
Dawkins or Ridley. The core tenet of the paradigm is that capacities and patterns in both
body and mind can be traced back to the evolutionary process, at some time during 
which they were evolutionarily advantageous. The puzzle in understanding a trait, 
human or otherwise, is thus pared down to one of determining what possible role or 
function that trait might serve or have served. (Ridley, 2000: 103) For example 
language, discussed above, is presumed to have an evolutionary advantage, and can be 
easily thought of in terms of the ways it allows communication between individuals. 
Being able to coordinate the actions of multiple individuals during a hunt has obvious 
survival advantages, not only through increasing chances of success but also expending 
less energy on failed hunts or longer chases.28 A species with language, or more 
generally a method of communicating, will thus be at an advantage since individual 
members can exchange valuable information and thus jointly enhance their own fitness.
Society
Sociobiology appeared rather functionalist – the presumption was that there will 
be a genetic root to any given behavioural or dispositional trait, that each will perform a 
function. Anything might reasonably be described as the outcome of a species’ genetic 
heritage if we can fit it into an evolutionary narrative. Gene-centric selectionism and 
evolutionary psychology might offer gene-first Darwinists a better way of describing 
such phenomena and avoiding such a simplistic view. They argue that the behaviours 
that contribute to these phenomena must have been beneficial at one point, but there is 
no guarantee that they still are, since the context in which they are enacted has since 
28 We should note that this saved energy may be offset by the energy needed to build and maintain a 
brain capable of language and the requisite intelligence.
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shifted, as humans have moved first into towns, then into cities and have repeatedly 
changed their technological and political structures throughout history. (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990)
Trivially, we can see where the idea that behaviours and instinctual dispositions 
have identifiable genetic loci plays a part in the social sphere. Most, if not all, 
behaviours have some implications for society, and thus the idea that either a behaviour 
or its cause can be attributed to a gene-first Darwinian human nature does not have to be
adapted terribly much when we move into thinking about society. The main change is 
that we must broaden the scope both in terms how the behaviour plays out and how 
genetic triggers are activated. External stimulus is now considered as the interplay of 
different individuals rather than a simplified internal/external split. To be sure, the 
difficulty in simplifying the exposition of the role of genes whilst still retaining 
accuracy concerning their trigger conditions means that the move from the concept of 
gene-reading to its social implications is a rapid and organic one in most gene-first 
Darwinist texts. Wherever a characteristic such as behaviour or instinct is dealt with 
some consideration is usually given to what it means at both the genetic and 
interpersonal level (since we could make no sense out of such a trait outside of this 
context). 
Some of the implications are obvious. Being predisposed towards homosexuality
could have a variety of effects, depending on the circumstances. Gender norms may be 
“socially constructed” but if they are so constructed as to criminalise or morally 
condemn certain sections of the population then members of those sections are at a 
severe disadvantage. Having certain sexual proclivities or even varying from what are 
considered gender norms because of a chance combination of hormones can have severe
ramifications for the way an individual relates to society. The same could be said of 
those who do not relate to others in “normal” ways because of autism or other 
conditions. Any number of biologically originated dispositions might affect the way an 
individual interacts with their social environment. Those with some degree of autism 
may just have difficulty relating to other people. Others will have more or less trouble 
fitting in to society depending not upon their dispositions per se but rather on what is 
counted as normal in that society and how that relates to said dispositions.
Gene-first Darwinists therefore recognise a disconnect between the human 
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nature they describe and the world as it exists. This is particularly clear in EvoPsych, 
unsurprisingly so given that it is the main approach within gene-first Darwinism that 
concerns itself, as a matter of priority, with the behaviours and mental states of evolved 
subjects. Occasionally anomalous behaviour seems to defy explanation in terms of 
evolution – either it is not currently adaptive, or it does not seem to have any adaptive 
utility whatsoever. EvoPysch attempts to explain this by positing an environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA), a point in time at which we were adapted to our 
environment but which we have since left (through cultural innovation). (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990; Foley, 1995) We are, however, supposedly still saddled with the 
adaptations developed in the EEA, since culture develops faster than we can adapt to 
each new formation. Thus we might find ourselves influenced by pre-conscious 
dispositions which would have helped in another environmental context. A simple 
example of this might be a predilection for sweet or salty foods (typically hard to come 
by in the evolutionary past) when these things are in an unhealthy abundance, resulting 
in epidemics of obesity and hypertension. Alternatively the faculties which we use in the
modern world might better reflect the pressures and priorities experienced in the EEA. 
We view the world in a way that would have been advantageous to facing challenges 
which are no longer as relevant as they once were. (cf. Diamond, 2012: 415-7; Teehan, 
2010: 46) Apparent pathologies or abnormalities can thus be understood as the result of 
an interaction between human nature and the modern society it finds itself in.
The Basis of Society Itself
There is another problem that presents itself to gene-first Darwinists, which is 
how society (and thus culture) is possible to begin with. They cannot simply assume, as 
cultural anthropologists seem to do, that society is a given. Furthermore society seems 
to extend as networks of cooperation and identity far beyond what ‘models in 
economics and evolutionary biology’ would predict. (Boyd & Richerson, 2000: 160) 
The key to this problem is cooperation – cooperation implies using one’s own resources 
to benefit another. From the perspective of gene-first Darwinist evolutionary theory that 
implies the reduction of the comparative fitness of one individual in order to increase 
that of the other. Why would any organism sacrifice the means of its own survival to 
help another organism to survive unless it was getting some direct benefit? The laws of 
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evolution and natural selection would be stacked against such behaviour and genes that 
encourage it would be eliminated. (Cronin, 1993: 253, 274-277) Any environment bar a 
post-scarcity society should conceivably select against an individual or species which 
squandered its limited resources on another.
This is the main problem with altruism as gene-first Darwinism sees it. Altruism 
represents the primary problem with explaining the cooperative impulses necessary for 
social interaction in complex organisms.29 It relies on organisms sacrificing their well-
being to help others, with little or no consideration for reward or pay back. Fortunately 
gene-centric selectionism provides a ready framework through which to understand the 
phenomenon. The explanation is much the same as that used for language, in that a 
disposition towards altruistic acts, like a capacity for language use, increases the overall 
fitness of the genes responsible by making their vehicles better at navigating and 
surviving in a social environment. Altruism, however, does so in a different way, it 
increases fitness by allowing members of a species to pool resources.
To be clear, as far as gene-first Darwinism is concerned, altruism is not thought
to come about through selection for species, through comparative fitness differences 
between different species. Any apparent selection at this level is, like all selection, 
actually taking place at the level of genes. Altruism is explained as originating through 
the advantage it confers to the genes that reside within a particular phenotypic vehicle. 
However there is also the potential for inclusive fitness via kin selection – animals are 
likely to help their family members, and members of their group or tribe who probably 
share the same gene pool. When they help one another they have a good chance 
(lowering slightly the less related the recipient of altruistic acts is to the actor) of 
improving the fitness of their own genes – the copies of those genes that reside within 
the recipient. Genes which encourage altruistic or cooperative behaviours benefit 
themselves only through encouraging their organism to aid and assist other organisms 
which are likely to share these same genes. This would fulfil the main purpose gene-
first Darwinists attribute to all genetic effects: to ensure the perpetuation of the genes 
themselves. Genetic level participants that encourage phenotypic level cooperation 
improve their own survivability and likelihood of spreading by encouraging the 
protection of copies of themselves in other individuals. Genes that reside on the same 
29 Social insects are not such a problem, since they are often directly influenced by pheromone signals 
and act almost as a single organism.
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DNA section, but which do not encourage their hosts to act altruistically, will likely be 
outcompeted since their overall inclusive fitness is less than that of alleles that do. 
(Cronin, 1993: 253-255; Dawkins, 2006: 88ff) 
But what of genes that are not involved – even in a thought experiment – in 
encouraging altruism? They can also benefit so long as they do not compete with genes 
that do, nor impair their function in some other way. So genes that reside at the same 
point on the chromosome as “genes for” altruism will likely die out, out-competed by 
altruism genes which ensure their hosts help one another. Likewise, genes whose 
proteins interfere with those produced by altruism genes will likely suffer as their hosts 
are not involved in altruistic behaviour (having interfered in some way with the 
expression of this aspect) or are not viable as organisms (the protein interference being 
enough to radically distort the development of the physiology). The logic is generally 
applicable to higher levels, by which I mean that whereas a group-selectionist might see
an altruistic population being able to out-compete or out-survive a less altruistic one, the
gene-first Darwinist will point out that this is a result of the average genetic 
composition of the respective groups. Were they to interbreed (presuming this to still be 
possible) the process would likely begin again as an intra-specific dynamic, identical in 
almost all respects to that just described.
The account is complicated by the idea that some individuals may cheat, and 
by the fact that altruism is more widespread than just between kin. Here gene-first 
Darwinists can rely on the concept of reciprocal altruism – that we will cooperate and 
form bonds because they benefit us in the long term. This is potentially why we form 
societies rather than just small bands of close family members. The concept is indebted 
to the work of Robert Trivers, who offers the paradigm a way of explaining cooperation 
between non- or distantly-related organisms that side-steps the difficulties gene-first 
Darwinists identify in group-selection theories. (Trivers, 1971) Altruism of this kind is 
made possible if it is likely to be repaid – we will cooperate and not take advantage of 
one another because we are aware that if we cooperate now, our partner will be likely to 
cooperate again later. This is clearly an instance of an iterative prisoner’s dilemma 
model. On to this is added a number of other human faculties gene-first Darwinists 
reason are necessary for (and probably also connected to) the emergence of social 
cooperation. Most notably these are related to intelligence and reasoning abilities crucial
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to recognising and keeping track of other individuals within the group. How else would 
such an iterative game work if the players could not keep track of who had cheated and 
who was scrupulously honest? (Cronin, 1993: 255-259; Dennett, 2004: 213ff; Dawkins, 
2006: 202ff) Furthermore, emotion may well be co-opted to provide motivation for 
following a policy of reciprocal cooperation – animals cannot grasp game-theoretic 
concepts (which have only been recently developed, relatively speaking) nor rationally 
calculate relative payoffs, but they can experience revulsion or anger at being “cheated” 
or considering cheating themselves. (Dennett, 2004: 262-265) It seems logical that any 
highly-evolved social species will develop faculties such as these quite early on.
Society may even play an explanatory role as the source of some behaviours, not
just the patterns and features of our social activity. Sexual selection is used to explain 
why apparently disadvantageous traits will proliferate through a population despite 
reducing their possessors’ fitness. The argument goes that whilst such traits might 
impede an individual or cause them to expend energy on apparently pointless tasks and 
physical appendages (the male peacock’s tail being the classic example) their fitness can
in fact be enhanced if such behaviours or appearances make them more attractive as 
mates to members of the opposite sex. (Cronin, 1993) Here selective pressures are seen 
to be not just environmental but also social.30 The essentially arbitrary preferences of 
one sex might shape the behavioural strategies or physical attributes of the other over 
several generations.
The Social Order
There are, as we have begun to see, a few simple features of human nature which
impact on human society in the gene-first Darwinian account. Humans have evolved as 
vehicles: “designed”, so to speak, to benefit their genes. The majority of their actions – 
perhaps even the entirety, when looked at from certain angles – are geared towards 
serving this purpose. Human beings can be assumed to maximise the fitness of their 
genes, which tie them to their kin but create only loose affiliations with others. For the 
most part they can be regarded as serving their own interests. 
When it comes to the actual structure of society, gene-first Darwinists have 
somewhat modest ambitions; in many ways they accept the status quo as a given. (See 
30 In general, society can be regarded as part of the environment, especially more recently (cf. Ridley, 
2004). Here “environmental” means part of the wider ecology, but excluding the organism’s species.
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de Waal: 2002 for discussion.) Some gene-first Darwinists have even gone so far as to 
explicitly interpret their findings as supportive of a pluralist and democratic society. 
They point out that each human being will be in some way unique, as a result of their 
specific genetic and social heritage. (Ridley, 2004: 256-260, 267-269) It is natural for 
different human beings to display individual personalities, quirks and preferences; 
however they still share the same essential traits by virtue of their shared evolutionary 
heritage represented in the human genome as a whole. Human beings have intrinsic 
social instincts which lead them to seek out human companionship and yet also express 
their individuality in the group – we both seek to conform but also to establish ourselves
as unique. (Ridley, 2004: 256ff) Furthermore what is universal is a need for esteem and 
a desire for some kind of power in the social group (or perhaps simply a resentment of 
‘tyranny’ on the part of others). These factors make the democratic mode of organisation
a perfect fit for our human nature, as far as Pinker and Ridley are concerned. (Pinker, 
2003: 296-8; cf. Ridley, 2004: 199-204) 
Here we encounter our first major problem with gene-first Darwinism: the 
prospect that their reports of human nature are not as impartial as they presume. I would
furthermore argue that this will be a danger present in any attempt to locate the essence 
of human nature in algorithmic rules. Inadvertently or not, those making such attempts 
may be introducing prior opinions and expectations, warping their interpretation of the 
material. There are, of course, a number of factors which cast doubt upon the specific 
story told by Pinker. The historical period he concerns himself with primarily covers 
1950 to 2010, when nations were disarming from a world war and yet also intensely 
paranoid as the Cold War ground onwards – significant western disarmament (Pinker’s 
proof that democracy fosters peace) occurred in accordance with periods of détente with
the Soviet powers, and thus may have had little to do with the particular qualities of 
representative democracy. Additionally, democracies tend to be tied economically to one
another, and so material loss (via war) could reasonably be expected to occur rather than
any gain, although Pinker regards this as strengthening his case since representative 
democracy is, to his mind, intrinsically linked to free trade. (See Pinker, 2011: 285-287) 
The result is a hagiography to classical-liberal ideals – democracy via representative 
government and liberalised trade arrangements – the success and superiority of which 
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he later attributes to their relation to human nature. (Ibid: 571ff)31 In effect Pinker 
endorses the present political system based on its supposed record of ameliorating the 
worst excesses of human nature and promoting its positive potential, but does so via an 
analysis which overlooks elements of the contingent specificity of the historical trends 
to which he appeals. (See conclusion for full discussion.)
Some Issues With Gene-First Darwinism
This is not the only problem with a perspective that tries to treat human nature 
as the outcome of an algorithm. Gene-first Darwinism’s critics have argued that genes, 
and biology in general, play a much less important role that its proponents think. Of 
course few, if any, of these objections will apply to all evolutionary theories or natural 
selection models; and certainly not to those theories which, for whatever reason, do not 
take up the idea that evolution is a key constituent of human nature. These objections 
concern only the gene-first Darwinists’ approach to human nature. 
Principally, according to these critiques, the role of society – in inculcating 
norms and values, in fostering and transmitting beliefs and so on – is much more 
profound than any influence that might come about through genetic or even epigenetic 
rules. On this view, biology simply has very little causal power (or else it cannot be 
separated from the myriad possible causes) in determining human thought- and 
behavioural-patterns. Observed traits are hard to pin down to specific causal factors, 
even with genetic sequencing. In order to ground their arguments critics have identified 
areas of gene-first Darwinist thought which are contentious, often highly so – often 
areas which are presented with little or no acknowledgement that the contention might 
possibly exist. However the criticisms are not without flaws, the chief of which is the 
tendency of the most ardent critics to over-simplify the claims of their gene-first 
Darwinian opponents. They do not quite build straw men, but they come close.
31 However, often it does not appear that the elements of liberal democracies appealed to in order to 
satisfy this supposition are unique to liberal democracies – in particular the social inter-
connectedness which guides the increased expansion or exercise of empathy. Such 
interconnectedness is present in more close-knit and tribal societies, and whilst Pinker is happy to 
write off appeals to such societies as indulging in the myth of the “noble savage” (Pinker, 2011: 692)
he may have missed the point that these are cases some anthropologists and social theorists think we 
can learn from rather than simply emulate.  (cf. Barclay, 1990; Diamond, 2013)
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The critics of gene-first Darwinism, or at least those motivated by political 
concerns, are vociferous and uncompromising. At times they seem to use scientific data 
as a blunt instrument to support their political agenda, laying their objections down and 
presenting the presumed refutation of gene-first Darwinist reduction as fait acompli.32 
Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and Leon Kamin use the (rather self-serving) depiction 
of themselves as fire-fighters putting out the infernos of ‘genetic determinism’, and 
Richard Lewontin returns to this metaphor in an article for the New York Review of 
Books in 1994. (Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990: 265; Lewontin, 2000: 203) For their 
part, gene-first Darwinists take up a defensive and obstinate stance, at times seeming to 
resent what they see as an impugning of their professionalism. Dawkins describes 
Midgley as ‘someone called Mary Midgley’ and takes up an injured and derisive tone as
he dismisses her original philosophical objections to his use of the concept of 
selfishness in genes. (Dawkins, 2006: 278) Ridley attributes the rejection of the 
paradigm – from Wilson onwards – to the fact that ‘human beings do not enjoy seeing 
themselves removed from the centre of the universe.’ (2004: 244)
The arguments are often vicious and rarely very helpful. As physiologist Denis 
Noble notes ‘[o]ne of the problems is that the debate has been so polarized, and so 
finely balanced on meanings of words, that one sometimes has the impression more of a
medieval debate than of a modern scientific one.’ (Noble, 2008: 15) Ullica Segerstråle 
has pointed out that the vituperative rhetoric (and the obvious ideological motivation of 
some critics) has done more harm than good. (2000: 101) Nevertheless, the objections 
often have some relevance, and in many cases they are taken up and improved by more 
sober writers who have not staked so much of their professional and public reputations 
to one side of the argument or the other. It is these arguments and objections which 
reveal more general issues that might be applicable to the algorithmic schema in 
general.
Causal Complexity of the Gene → Phenotype Relation
Virtually all gene-first Darwinian assumptions are based on the idea that genes 
can cause things to happen, from the development of the body to attitudes to social 
32 See (Charlton, 1999) and (Anderson, 1999) for observations on Steven Rose’s critique of genetic 
determinism. (Rose, 1997) It is interesting to note that Anderson objects to Rose’s critique of 
reductionism on the ground that it is itself reductionist.
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circumstances. Some writers have challenged this view, pointing out that the issue of the
causal power of genes undermines the explanatory role genetics can play. Genes only 
ever lead to the development of phenotypic structures as part of a group. Hox genes do 
not individually specify which vertebrae will form ribs, but rather that specification 
relies on precisely which combination of such genes are activated. Genes that contribute
to Broca’s area must do so in collaboration with the myriad other genes which 
contribute to the structure and function of the human brain. Gene-first Darwinists are 
well aware that the phrase “a gene for” is merely a shorthand – but this raises the 
question of whether it is even a useful shorthand.
In our understanding of biological development we are often confronted with 
the non-linear and iterative processes by which our bodies and minds are formed. 
(Leroi, 2005: 126; Fox Keller, 2010) When it comes to locating genes or other factors in
development we often have to rely on quite obvious mutations. Gene polymorphisms 
(different “versions” of the same gene) usually lead to similar results, and so the only 
way we can locate which genes are causally involved in development is through finding 
drastically different polymorphisms which occur in conjunction with drastic differences 
at higher biological levels – mutations. Leroi’s Mutants is predicated upon locating such
abnormal development in order to identify covarying genetic abnormalities/mutations, 
and thus trace a causal connection between the normal manifestation(s) of the gene and 
its role in development. He seems under no illusion that this shines only a partial light 
on the role of any particular gene, especially since a single mutation can have multiple 
effects (so it is not a mutation which causes cyclopia, but rather a mutation which 
causes a protein’s function to be impaired, which can lead to various problems in the 
development of a foetus’ geometry (Leroi, 2005: 74-76)) or similar abnormalities can be
caused by different factors.
However our understanding of the causal contributions of genes is further 
complicated by their interaction with the environment.33 Different environments can 
trigger genes in different ways or to different extents, in ways we may not even know 
about. When discussing a given trait, therefore, we will have trouble disentangling the 
relative contributions of the environment and genetic factors. (Fox Keller, 2010) When a
33 Causal complications abound within gene-first Darwinism, and even the base assumption – that 
genes are the “true” level of selection – is not immune. Okasha, for example, believes that debates 
about levels of selection are partly philosophical issues about causality, and hence not resolvable 
purely by empirical scientific inference. (Okasha, 2006: 79-80)
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trait is dependent upon both genetic and environmental influences their effects will be 
intricately linked. Evelyn Fox Keller takes as one example the effects of diet on the 
intelligence of two individuals who differ with regards to a single genetic mutation. The 
difference in intelligence cannot be attributed to genetics or environment because the 
two are entangled – the diet affects how the gene behaves. (Ibid: 5-7, 53-54) This is 
brought out more starkly by Lewontin, who highlights that there is in fact a third factor 
at work here, that of interaction. Genes and environment interact and the relative 
differences produced in a given character may not be traceable to either, even in 
principle, since the interaction cannot be measured. (Lewontin, 2011) As gene-first 
Darwinists fully recognise, context often plays a major part in how genes are expressed. 
It thus becomes difficult to justify both their attributing causal power to a gene and their
description of evolution itself as acting for the benefit of genes. (cf. Okasha, 2006: 168, 
170-171)
The issue is then how we are to resolve the causal links between human nature 
as it actually is in the world, and the fundamental rules from which it is supposed to 
flow. There are various intermediary steps between a gene and the trait it contributes to: 
first it must be “read” by the machinery of the cell, which produces a protein, which in 
turn may be used for various purposes involved in the structure of cells or the function 
of the organs of which they are a part. These steps also interpose themselves between 
our nature and the rules of evolution – we may be endowed with evolved traits but these
are the results of evolutionary forces working on distant ancestors. Human nature, as 
instantiated in individuals today, is not necessarily subject to these same pressures as 
greatly as it is to more immediate, contingent influences.34
Translations and the “Levels” of Human Nature
Can we really derive anything from these universal sources of human nature? 
There is confidence that we can find genes associated with behaviours, and perhaps 
learn a bit more about how such behaviours are acquired by species and become 
manifested in individuals. But does this actually say anything new about human nature? 
34 There is also some controversy over the EvoPsych notion of “massive modularity”, which posits 
mental (and corresponding brain) modules which could serve as an intermediary step as modular 
competencies are acquired and new ones layered over the old. The existence of such modules is 
unlikely, however, and the issue sheds little light on the more general problems attendant to an 
algorithmic human nature theory.
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Does it discover any new behaviours? It does not appear to be so. To take an example 
previously considered, finding genes for homosexuality might help to naturalise it, but 
such genes – and knowledge of precisely which ones are involved – have not previously
stood in the way of the claim that people are simply “born gay”. Such discoveries might 
help the cause of gay rights35 but could not be said to have discovered homosexuality.
The same argument can be made for other traits, behaviours or dispositions. 
What makes the search for a “gene for altruism” possible is the observed instances of 
altruism at an ontological level higher than genes. It happens at a phenotypic level, or 
above even that, at the level of inter-organism relations (Dawkins’ own extended 
phenotype). Whilst the gene-first Darwinians may still insist that altruism is real, they 
do so in such a way as to reinforce the divide they see between the replicator and the 
vehicle and place the emphasis on the former. When it comes to other areas potentially 
of interest to human nature the paradigm is analytically useless. It offers explanations 
which may have a good deal of truth to them (though, where based in gene-centric 
selectionism, never free of a certain functionalist dimension, see below) but the analysis
of human nature comes from elsewhere. It cannot, for example, offer proof of a need or 
instinct for socialising in human beings, but rather only an explanation (a story or 
narrative, if you will) of how genes that promote sociability might flourish in certain 
species – an explanation which would merely be a modification of that offered for 
altruism. These explanations might even true, but behind the rhetoric of being able to 
“read the genome”, or of possessing a “universal acid” which dissolves more mythic 
explanations of our essential humanness, they are rather uninteresting. It seems unlikely 
that the gene-first Darwinian paradigm will ever shed any real light on issues such as 
sexuality or gender, save to show that there is nothing unnatural about any of the 
potential proclivities, or that there is – for example – a slightly increased statistical 
likelihood of second sons being homosexual. Useful ammunition for gender theorists if 
they care to look for it, but there is very little there on which to theorize a concept of 
human nature.
Before locating a trait genetically – that is, locating some genetic loci involved 
in its expression – that trait is first defined, usually with reference to some 
35 To the dismay of certain opponents who, as Ridley notes, attacked even the possibility of such 
evidence on the grounds that it ‘gives leverage to homosexual rights organisations.’ (op. cit. Ridley, 
2000: 116)
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environmental function, or even just to the other systems of the organism. (cf. 
Lewontin, 2011; Noble, 2006; Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990: 272-282) Regardless of 
any other issues attached to the idea of genetic determinism, it could be argued that a 
genetically focussed theory of human nature does not tell us anything that is not 
tautologous. To discover that excessive empathy or aggression covaries with a gene 
requires us to first have an idea of empathy, aggression or whatever else we are 
measuring. This implies that any innate tendencies are genetically based, but cannot tell 
us anything particularly new about them when we then read the genome. It is akin to 
translating a passage written in one language into a second, and proceeding to translate 
it back. We might be generous and agree with Ridley in saying that some of our 
discoveries have revealed that human beings are fundamentally similar, and yet each is 
individual, but this is more an observation about the implications of genetic science for 
a theory of human nature than the substance of a genetic theory of human nature. In 
addition to this, there are also value-laden terms being read into the genetic level. 
Although gene-first Darwinists are aware of the problem of the naturalist fallacy, their 
theory seems to read certain principles into human nature as a matter of course. We have
already dealt with the two most obvious examples of this: altruism may exist, but it is 
caused by self-interest at a lower, more “fundamental” level; aggression and obstinacy 
is inherent in human kind, necessitating liberal democratic government.36
There seems to me to be a problem inherent in locating the meaningful aspects 
of human nature in this realm of ultimate universality. It thus seems reasonable to argue 
that human nature is operating at another level or levels. If we are identifying aspects of 
human nature at some more proximal point then they ought to be treated as existing at 
that level, rather than given a superfluous connection to genetics or the cosmic logic of 
evolution. This is akin to what Don Ross and James Ladyman call ‘real patterns’ in their
naturalist metaphysics. Perhaps somewhat ironically, the idea is credited to Dennett 
(1991) who proposed the idea in relation to beliefs in the philosophy of mind. A real 
pattern is one where the total information used to describe a phenomenon is less than 
the total information required to describe the underlying workings of said phenomenon. 
For example it is easier to treat a planet as a single point mass than to tabulate the 
36 This latter viewpoint, incidentally, invokes another narrative which the anthropologist Marshall 
Sahlins claims has been the predominant one of “western” concepts of human nature for nearly two 
millennia – that of a hostile nature which must be controlled by a more enlightened human culture. 
(Sahlins, 2008)
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location and mass of each atom in it, and from there to work out the total gravity and 
orbital trajectory.37 (Ladyman & Ross, 2007: 258ff, 289; cf. Cohen & Stewart, 1995: 
280-282) This principle can be applied to human nature. It is reasonable to suppose that 
our dispositions – whether they be aggression, empathy, an aesthetic sense or similar – 
are real in themselves, and may be better treated as such rather than as surface 
appearances of deeper, more fundamental objects. Rose, Lewontin and Kamin gestured 
towards a similar principle in the final chapter of their critique of early gene-first 
Darwinism, where they attempt to offer a positive exposition of their own position. 
They describe the principle of what they call a ‘unitary phenomenon’ – a nexus of 
biological and environmental influences – and offer their perspective as being an 
alternative to the reductionism of the gene-first Darwinians and the grand systems of the
holistic viewpoint. (Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990: 278-282)
Perhaps this is why much gene-first Darwinist writing on society necessarily 
relies on these higher levels. Pinker, for one, is heavily indebted to a classical 
enlightenment concept of self-interest – mingled with and reinforced by Darwinian 
concepts of advantage and pay-offs – and assumptions about the nature of altruism. His 
analysis takes place upon a background of a quasi-scientific framework that deals with 
humans as an evolved species (of which gene-centric selectionism is an integral part), 
but the genes do not form the core of the analysis, rather they are the naturalising agents
which ground behaviours in a purportedly objective realm; in turn, adaptation itself is 
taken as an assumed principle rather than a litmus test of the primacy and relevance of 
human impulses.
This should serve to illustrate the notion that human nature operates at some 
level(s) other than simply that of the genes, and whilst I would argue that analysis and 
translation between the level of human being and that of genes is useful in the medical 
sphere, for example, it is less so in telling us something about human nature. But does 
this affect the narratives of EvoPsych? I would argue that it does, since it also raises the 
question of what constitutes human nature. If, as Lewontin and Fox Keller illustrated 
above, traits come about through the interaction of genetic and environmental causes 
then human nature in general must also. An individual’s nature must in some way 
37 Thus the planet and its orbit can be considered real, even though it is possible to describe them in 
terms of the detailed arrangements of more fundamental structures, since it is more informationally 
parsimonious to think of them as such.
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accommodate both the innate qualities of their existence as a member of H. Sapiens, and
their life experiences. EvoPsych attempts to synthesise something like this, but phrases 
it in terms of deeply ingrained, biologically imprinted dispositions – “modules” which 
our species acquired, newer ones augmenting the old – which are frustrated, enhanced 
or are simply not adapted for the present social and material environment of the 
individual. However to truly incorporate the concept of causal complexity, as well as the
multi-levelled quality of human nature, we would need to go further, in order to 
examine how we come to express human nature in the first place, since it does not 
develop in a vacuum, only then to become exposed to modern society. This is the 
characteristic of the third schema, which we will turn to presently. 
A Conspiracy-Theory of Human Nature
The philosopher Mary Midgley draws our attention to a kind of grim 
inevitability encapsulated by the logic of the selfish gene itself. Here there is a fatalistic 
agent – an ‘active oppressor’ – the abstracted notion of rational self-interest itself. 
(Midgley, 2010: 3) Nearly all critics charge gene-first Darwinism at the outset with 
being too focussed on a narrow, atomised individualism, wherein the fundamental unit 
is the individual and its activity can be described in terms of personal gain, hostility and 
competition. (Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990: 5-6; Midgley, 2010: 2-6) In light of the 
previous sections, Midgley’s critique could be regarded as perhaps more stable. She 
focuses more on the ramifications of gene-centric selectionism and gene-centric 
selectionist-inflected evolutionary psychology, and the philosophical climate that 
informs their background suppositions. (It bears noting, however, that Midgley herself 
brings a number of her own suppositions to this, namely the presumption that a kind of 
metaphysical meaning and ethical/agentiral significance must be present in the world.)
The premise of gene-centric selectionism, as outlined above, can be distilled into
a question asked by Dennett, and which gives rise to the title of this subsection: ‘cui 
bono?’ Dennett introduces this question in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea and returns to it in 
Freedom Evolves. (Dennett, 1995: 324ff; 2004: 175-176) What makes the question 
tantamount to a declaration of a conspiracy is the unspoken assumption behind it: that 
for every event or phenomenon, no matter how apparently accidental, there must be 
someone who benefits from it. In the case of gene-centric selection theory, that 
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“someone” is the genes themselves. To illustrate this we can return to the explanation 
gene-first Darwinists give for the occurrence of altruism. Altruism, and the cooperation 
necessary for a functioning society, is problematic from an evolutionary point of view – 
it requires expending energy for little or no return, in fact it seems to benefit other 
organisms who are presumably in some form of competition with the altruistic actor. 
The solution, as we saw, is to regard the benefit in this scenario as accruing to the genes 
themselves – their inclusive fitness includes the copies of themselves in other 
organisms, and can be enhanced by ensuring as many copy-bearing vehicles survive as 
possible.
This works as an explanation, but has the disadvantage of portraying altruism 
as a tenuous and uncertain occurrence, constantly embattled by a self-interestedness 
which is posterior to and more forceful than it. The argument assigns a more primal role
to self-interest than may actually be the case, both in the sense that it is portrayed as an 
older instinct and as ontologically prior to altruism. For all that figures such as Pinker 
(2003) repeatedly insist that we are not solely selfish, such insistence is almost 
invariably followed by a caveat to the effect that our altruism comes from the 
selfishness of genes. This is the first half of the narrative which underpins gene-first 
Darwinism, the more metaphorical half, which insists that self-interest must be located 
at some point within the activity of evolutionary participants. It is this narrative that 
Midgley believes is most central to gene-first Darwinism, not scientific objectivity. She 
argues that it is an interpretation of evolution that is heavily indebted to a wider 
intellectual tradition which emphasises self-interest over cooperation and rational 
calculation over emotional impetus. (Midgley, 2010: 17-20, 35ff) Self-interest, as well 
as the notion of a radically detached or atomistic agent, is rooted in a Hobbesian and, to 
a lesser extent, Nietzschean tradition of ‘heroic individualism’, doctrines which Midgley
claims were necessary at the times in which they were written38 but should be 
recognised as historically situated. The mistake of gene-first Darwinism is that it 
presupposes some rational, self-interested entities (or entities which can be treated as 
though they were rational, given that ultimately we are presented with non-conscious 
candidates for this role), which it traces to the genes. This is made explicit by Dawkins 
himself, who claims ‘selfishness is to be expected in any entity that deserves the title of 
38 Personal attachment to abstract political causes in the case of Hobbes, the ‘nihilistic’ character of 
Christian quiescence for Nietzsche. 
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a basic unit of natural selection.’ [Emphasis added.] The gene is ‘therefore the 
fundamental unit of self-interest.’ (Dawkins, 2006: 33) Midgley observes that this 
stance, contra to what Dennett (1995) claims, in fact reintroduces a purpose to the 
universe, or at least to the biological elements of it – the evolutionary process exists to 
further the interests of genes.
Gene selectionist theorists often appeal to notions or metaphors of contract 
theory to illustrate how the whole arrangement is supposed to work. (See for example 
Pinker, 2003) However, genes cannot make contracts or agree to truces or come to 
arrangements about how to cooperate. Nor can they actually be selfish in the proper 
sense, since they lack the ability to form goals or intentions. These theorists know this, 
and stress that they are not actually imputing to genes any kind of sentient capacity, but 
rather illustrating a process they see as taking place at the genomic level. This raises the 
question, however, of what exactly gene-centric selectionism is supposed to be doing. 
As Samir Okasha observes ‘[p]roponents of gene's‐eye thinking have been guilty of a 
certain ambiguity. Sometimes they present their view as an empirical thesis about how 
evolution happened, sometimes as a heuristic perspective for thinking about evolution.’ 
(Okasha, 2006: 146) If, as Dawkins’ claims in the preface to the second edition of The 
Selfish Gene, it is more than merely another way of understanding the same phenomena 
and is instead a better way of doing so (Dawkins, 2006: xv-xvi) then it does not appear 
to be merely a heuristic device but the basis for a paradigm.39 (cf. Noble, 2006: 14-15) If
this is so we would expect it to dramatically affect the thinking of gene-first Darwinian 
theorists, which it does and which Dawkins himself, again in the preface to the second 
edition, foresees and approves of. The concept of self-interested genes competing with 
one another is not even restricted to the more “popular” literature in which gene-first 
Darwinists encapsulate and promulgate their ideas. One paper in an academic journal 
portrays the activity of genes within the same genome as an all-out war: ‘The 
mammalian Y chromosome is thus likely to be engaged in a battle in which it is 
outgunned by its opponent. A logical consequences is that the Y should run away and 
hide....’ (Amos & Harwood, 1998: 182) The geneticist Leroi also uses this terminology, 
39 It follows from this that if it is the former then gene-centric selectionism is supposed to be a 
scientific theory, and if so it fails on Popperian grounds. Gene-centric selectionism is unfalsifiable: 
there does not seem to be an experiment that can be performed where the results cannot be 
interpreted as the confirming gene-centric selectionist position. However if it is merely a heuristic 
device then it is arguably a distorting one – it relies on a metaphor that is unhelpful and evocative of 
an overly-specific and normatively charged set of systemic relations.
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although in his case it appears to be as much in the interests of lyrical continuity with 
his allegory of the tango than solely in service to the metaphor of a war within the 
genome. (Leroi, 2005: 230-231) However what is most interesting is when he, 
elsewhere and in similar instances of chemical competition, uses the metaphor of 
calculation – a mathematical allegory, which implies that Hobbesian metaphors are not 
as central or necessary as is often portrayed. (Ibid: 82ff)
However perhaps more damning than this reading of metaphorical selfishness 
into the fundamental groundwork of our human nature is what this does to the analysis 
produced. Evolutionary theory comes under the larger umbrella of sciences referred to 
as “natural history” and it bears noting that, just as with any other form of history, 
narratives are at best problematic. Gene-first Darwinism is no exception, relying as it 
does on a number of narratives, variations on the same theme – that all traits can be 
assumed to be adaptive; that all adaptations can be assumed to benefit the genes; and 
that genes are responsible, at bottom, for any particular given trait. Inevitably we find a 
certain functionalist logic, as the purported purpose of a given trait or gene is eventually
located within some narrative framework. Whilst this leads to an over-simplification, it 
does not necessarily lead to an ignorance of the complex processes underlying the 
surface account, which is what is imputed in the causal complexity argument. (The logic
is, after all, flexible enough to incorporate any number of intermediary steps between 
the gene and its higher-level expression, as the concepts of inclusive fitness and the 
extended phenotype attest.) Even Steven Jay Gould, a critic of gene-first Darwinian 
thinking, was in theory supportive of the notion of an evolutionary psychology: 
‘Humans are animals and the mind evolved; therefore, all curious people must support 
the quest for an evolutionary psychology.’ However he observed that the real trouble 
here lies with the reduction of all evolutionary accounts of human behaviour to the 
postulation of some prehistoric environment in which curious behavioural traits would 
have been adaptive, whereas today they are not. (Gould, 2007: 452-454) This is not only
philosophically functionalist, he argued, but poor science: it is unfalsifiable, and 
therefore, we might add, fails to live up to Popper’s standards for a theory to qualify as 
properly scientific.
This is the second half of the gene-first Darwinian narrative: the attempt to 
connect any given trait to the presupposed adaptive advantage all traits must confer (and
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with regards to politics we should be especially concerned with 
behavioural/dispositional traits). Thus, for all that recent gene-first Darwinist theory 
manages to affirm a role for environment and “nurture” in forming human nature, it 
retains a functionalist aspect. There is always assumed to be some core element to 
human thought and behaviour that had some evolutionary utility, even though it is 
realised through and mediated by a complex human culture. Ridley is perhaps being 
hyperbolic when, in talking about mental plasticity, he says ‘[t]hese are, if you like, the 
genes for nurture’, but it is an accurate summation of gene-first Darwinian assumptions 
about biological cause-and-effect. (Ridley, 2004: 167) 
The viewpoint is also summed up by Wilson in a retrospective on 
Sociobiology:
To grasp human nature objectively, to explore it to the depths scientifically, 
and to comprehend its ramifications by cause-and-effect explanations 
leading from biology into culture, would be to approach if not attain the 
grail of scholarship, and to fulfil the dreams of the Enlightenment. (Wilson, 
2000: vii)
Note that explanations run from ‘biology into culture’ – human nature runs in a linear 
sequence, flowing from the genes and the regularities governing evolution. Its 
indeterminate elements are conceived as being open-ended terms – a variability of 
outcomes – rather than a result of the unfolding of a reciprocal relationship.40 This same 
directionality is present in EvoPsych, sociobiology’s successor. (See Derksen, 2007: 
192ff)
We thus reach a limit of gene-first Darwinian human nature. There is a logic at 
work which is at once functional and circular. Having described humanity as in 
possession of certain features, and proposed an adaptive explanation for all such 
phenomena, human nature becomes a matter of discerning the adaptive background 
behind this or that particular human trait. In knowing that background we are presented 
with a revelation of how it, in conjunction with the originally proposed process of 
adaptation, leads to human beings as we encounter them today. In reality this tells us 
40 However biological systems are not linear – cause and effect runs in loops that encompass systems 
on a variety of levels. Wilson is aware of this, and argues that the sociobiological perspective is an 
interactionist one – it is the way that genetic influences interact with higher (most notably social) 
levels that is of interest. Nevertheless it is rife with simplistic narrative accounts and assumptions, 
and later iterations of gene-first Darwinism place an even heavier importance on the logic of 
reductionism in an attempt to ‘correct’ (to use Dawkins’ term) an emphasis on group selection.
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very little about human nature or its significance to our politically laden day-to-day 
lives.
  Yet this is not simply the consequence of some perspective specific to gene-
first Darwinian ways of thinking. Instead it is the result of adopting what I have termed 
an algorithmic human nature theory; of looking for some definitive, law-like rules that 
govern human nature. It should be clear from the above that when gene-first Darwinism,
or any similar conceivable algorithmic perspective, looks for human nature, they are not
in fact looking at human beings themselves. Instead their preoccupation is with what 
they have deemed eternal or immutable, in this case the logic of evolution and the 
replications which serve as its axioms. How could any human nature theory, once it has 
posited the existence of fundamental, eternal rules from which human nature flows, not 
spend an inordinate amount of time showing how each aspect of human nature actually 
reflects the unfolding of these rules? 
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2: The Motive-Bearer
The second type of human nature theory takes a different tack. Theories of this 
kind locate the stable, reliable aspects of human nature lie somewhere closer to the 
“surface” of human action and experience. This, I feel, draws us closer to some 
workable starting point for a theory of human nature. Such approaches are involved in 
what Midgley refers to as ‘taking motives seriously’, in that they take motives and 
choices as somehow revealing or indicative of certain facets of human nature, rather 
than as phenomena to be explained, as I have argued the schema of the previous chapter
does. We can thus describe this as the “motivationalist” schema, given that theories that 
fall within it will place their main emphasis on dispositions towards certain actions and 
preferences, as well as the capacities required to pursue these dispositions (or simply to 
exist as human beings). This leads to some variation within the schema – at least with 
regards to the disciplines and paradigms used as examples here – between those who see
human motives as exceptional in some way and proper only to humans (be it through a 
capacity for reason, sheer complexity or some other quality specific to our species) and 
those who see many, if not all our dispositions and capacities as extensions of ones we 
share with other animals, particularly close evolutionary kin. 
Nevertheless, both sides can properly be said to belong to the same schema 
according to the criteria I have identified; namely the locus with which these 
thinkers/disciplines concern themselves when it comes to human nature, and the 
epistemic priorities revealed by their methodologies. This principally involves a focus 
on nature as it is instantiated in the activity of actual agents – in this case, human 
activity and the psychology underlying it as revealed by the behaviour of individuals, 
either alone or in groups. These individuals are not in themselves the totality of human 
nature, but rather examples, from which a fuller picture of some behavioural or psycho-
social phenomenon can be inferred. Here I discuss how this is done by a number of 
disciplines whose adherents could be (as a general rule) collected under the heading of a
motivationalist schema. Through such a discussion we should get a better picture of the 
relative merits and limitations of locating human nature within the sphere of human 
psychology and (immediate) action.
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As before, it is necessary to sketch out the content of this schema, but in doing 
so the aim is to reveal something characteristic about the means by which this content is
developed. Thus I intend to identify some (but far from all) of the most salient aspects 
of the understanding of human nature identified by those falling within this schema, in 
order to demonstrate how they come to examine and understand these aspects.
Noticeably there is also some strong affinity and continuity between the 
approaches examined here and those of the previous chapter. This is a conscious choice 
intended to draw contrasts and comparisons between differing deployments of 
naturalism – in the first, general instance – and evolutionary frameworks – in a 
secondary instance more specific to a subset of disciplines considered here. Both sets of 
examples place an emphasis on a certain kind of naturalness on the part of humanity. 
This includes the idea that human beings have evolved and that therefore evolution 
naturally provides and constrains the range of possible forms an organic, naturally 
occurring species’ nature could take. However for the human nature theories examined 
here the process of incorporating evolutionary insights rests on the crucial difference 
between this and the previous schema: the aforementioned centrality of motive and 
behaviour. Motive assumes centre stage as critical indicator of human nature, rather than
an artefact of external forces (evolutionary, cultural or otherwise). In fact it plays a key 
role in interacting with these external forces (the connotations of “interaction” also 
serving to acknowledge a degree of plasticity to how these motivations play out). 
Certainly, within the theories here considered, evolution is taken as important to fully 
understanding both motives and the behaviours elicited by them; hence the affinities 
with evolutionary psychology, of which some theorists cited here cite in their turn. (See 
de Waal, 2002) However in EvoPsych a motive is treated as something to be explained 
in terms of an evolutionary heritage, often through disjunctive relationships with an 
environmental context it is not adapted to. Here a motive forms the nexus of a 
multifaceted analytical framework intended to fully elucidate the place of that motive 
within the psycho-social ecology of an individual (and, in the case of ethology, of a 
species).41
41 This is particularly clear within developmental biology and ethology, where evolutionary 
explanations are encapsulated within two of the “four questions” originally posed by Niko 
Tinburgen. One question is that of why a species’ trait evolved – what adaptive advantages it gives. 
Another is how that trait evolved – why it takes the form it has now. A third is how it functions – its 
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Consequently in the current chapter a good deal of consideration is given to the 
way humanity’s status as an animal is incorporated in many such conceptions of human 
nature. The reasoning is that if there is a human nature – and if that nature has evolved 
along with the species itself rather than being mystically invested in it – it seems 
probable that H. Sapiens’ place within the other species and phyla will have some 
bearing on its nature. Of particular importance to this facet of the present schema is the 
idea that examining the similarities and differences between human beings and our 
closest ancestors (as well as other social species) can lead us to better understand certain
aspects of ourselves. What we might term “comparative ethology” or “evolutionary 
anthropology” can affirm or refute the idea that certain propensities or tendencies are 
“natural” or innate. Here we might pause to consider philosopher Philip Kitcher’s 
remark that ‘in any evaluation of our evolutionary history you can emphasize the 
continuities or the discontinuities. I think little is gained by either emphasis. You do 
better simply to recognise what has endured and what has altered.’ (de Waal et. al., 
2006: 139) For Kitcher the main virtue of such analysis is the ability to note changes 
and continuity; the argument over whether we are unique or not is simply a side issue.
Other examples used to elucidate this schema directly observe human beings in a
variety of ways. Research in cognitive psychology, to take one case, particularly when 
aimed at understanding social competencies, reveals interesting things both about the 
way we think and the ways we interact with one another. When applied to child 
development, such research allows us to better grasp the workings of some of our core 
social competencies, not to mention the ways that they develop over time. A good deal 
of this research is devoted to understanding how much of their surroundings infants and 
young children comprehend. Moreover, some scenarios are aimed at discovering what 
kinds of activity such children are inherently motivated to do (in other words, without 
prompting). The idea is that we can get a truer picture of – and understand more about –
our nature by contemplating the behaviour of those members of our species with little or
no experience of the acculturation process.
mechanisms. The fourth is how traits develops through the lifecycle of an individual member of the 
species – like the third question this can also relate to how a characteristic relates to the 
environment. As commentators have noted, this results in a ‘comprehensive, multifaceted 
understanding of a characteristic, with answers to each question providing complementary insights.’ 
(Bateson & Laland, 2013: 712; see also de Waal, 2002)
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Ambiguity and the Flexibility of Expression
As much of the foregoing will suggest, what is mainly of interest to those within 
this schema are capacities and dispositions – they take motives seriously. These theories
are more concerned with the ways that human beings think and feel, and the ways in 
which these thoughts and feelings influence their actions. They are not overly concerned
with deducing a set of rules which could be said to adequately describe human nature, 
nor is behaviour ever more important than the underlying dispositions it reveals. As 
primatologist Frans de Waal observes: ‘It’s impossible to follow what’s going on in a 
chimp community without distinguishing between the actors and trying to understand 
their goals.... The literature of biology [is] of no help in understanding the social 
manoeuvring, due to its aversion to the language of motives.’ (Midgley, 1995: 114; de 
Waal, 2005: 32-33; 53) Consequently, throughout this chapter I shall endeavour to speak
in terms of "innateness", "dispositions" and “capacities”, and avoid in all but the most 
general usage the somewhat mechanistic phrase "instinct", since whilst evocative there 
is not a particularly strong consensus on what this latter term precisely refers to. An 
instinct may be regarded as a dispositional state, or a tendency to make certain 
classificatory distinctions (such as in-group/out-group, or natural kinds) or even a 
certain behavioural tendency (although this latter usage is thankfully and rapidly 
disappearing from talk about all but the "lowest" and least complex species). As a 
conceptual term, instinct can tend to cause confusion. Thus human nature, under this 
schema, can generally be treated as dispositional and as certain capacities amenable to 
normal human functioning.42 
Incidentally, the complexity of human culture is invoked to account for many of 
those aspects by which humans diverge from animals (although it is not always 
considered to be the source of our humanity) – that element whereby what are quite 
often seen as ancient or even atavistic dispositions are reconciled with the kind of 
42 At its most basic this functioning simply means survival (and so in this respect the similarity with 
the previous schema still stands). However since this survival is enhanced by group living it follows 
that abilities that facilitate and enable the human being to navigate and act within a social 
environment – including those meant to secure individual advantage from such an environment – are
just as important as capacities such as locomotion or digestion. Human beings (or rather, their 
ancestors), in evolving a survival strategy that involves inter-organism cooperation, necessarily 
simultaneously evolved the abilities to facilitate this survival strategy/way of life. This is discussed 
below in relation to cooperation and altruism.
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“sophisticated”, reasoning entity we consider human beings to be. Culture is the arena 
in which human beings act and as such it influences the ways in which our dispositional
and motivational states are expressed. Our openness to this culture is, in a limited sense,
itself partly a function of our nature, since culture is largely a sphere populated by 
various kinds of norms and human beings can be considered to be inherently receptive 
to such norms (a capacitive characteristic which can interact with other potentially 
innate elements, such as territorialism, empathy, or in-group/out-group distinctions). 
However the primary reason that human nature is not thought of as a rigid, fixed 
thing under this schema is that it undergoes a degree of development as individuals 
acquaint themselves with the world (social and otherwise) around them. In some cases 
this happens in a predictable pattern, resembling not so much openness to cultural affect
as directed mental development (which is entirely in keeping with the biological and 
neurological complexity of the human being). This directed development is referred to 
as canalisation, a concept that plays a recurring role in a number of these paradigms, 
and I adopt its use for the sake of uniformity of terminology. To say a characteristic 
(mental or physical) is canalised means that, given the initial biological material, there 
are a number of potential paths for development, with the potential for subtle variations 
in the precise results. The particular sequence or path of development is dependent on 
subtle variations in the environment. Trivially: think of how a frog’s genome contains 
different sets of instructions on how to develop the embryonic frog into a tadpole, based
on such external variable as temperature. The result is the same (a frog) but the path is 
subtly different, taking into account the rates of biochemical reactions that might change
in response to the external variables. The rate and order in which we develop the 
abilities crucial to understanding one another’s mental states are a more concrete and 
relevant form of canalisation (see below).
Other occurrences are rather more varied, resulting in diverse social forms which
may reflect – and so also encourage – some parts of human nature more than others. 
This is a more radical kind of canalisation; more like conditioning, in that one a set of 
possible outcomes exist and the individual can be directed towards one or another based
on environmental cues. In this sense there is another kind of continuity with another of 
our schemas, although in this case it is the one we shall be examining in the next 
chapter. This continuity consists in a contextual element in which individuals’ natures 
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are shaped by their social circumstances.
Taking these two points together – the dispositional approach and the socio-
cultural influence recognized by the present schema – we can talk of an inherent open-
endedness to many of the aspects of human nature that this schema identifies, and to the
resultant picture of society its adherents hold. We shall consider some examples in the 
course of this chapter, but it is worth mentioning at the outset that one particularly 
pertinent point to bear in mind is the extent to which these capacities, internal to the 
human being, interact with one another. Being open to mediation does not just mean 
having a contextual component relative to the environment, but suggests an inherent 
ambivalence within human nature itself. Whether or not the coincident societal 
contingency is an outcome of or a contributing factor to this ambivalence is a technical 
question that falls outside the matter currently at hand. However this plasticity plays an 
important part in the way that some of the viewpoints I shall be considering relate 
human nature to society, and so it is doubly important to outline the ambiguous 
character of human nature under the motivationalist schema. 
Many of the writers and researchers that I shall cite in this chapter make explicit 
comments on the reality of tension or conflicting elements in human nature. For 
example the way that the anthropologist Christopher Boehm thinks about hierarchy 
relies on positing conflicting forces within individual human beings, not just them. 
Meanwhile the constant tension between self-interest and gregarious generosity is a 
reoccurring theme in de Waal’s observations of chimpanzee and bonobo populations.43 
This kind of ambiguity is central to the social psychology of Jonathan Haidt, who holds 
that human beings are largely motivated by emotional affect, whilst also having a 
plurality of emotional cues and biases. (Haidt, 2001) He also thinks that this plurality is 
expressed in differences between people and their interpretation of the world and 
important events. If this is so, he argues, then it may go some way to explaining why 
party politics becomes so entrenched – neither side can appreciate the priorities and 
values held by the other, at least not at the same level that their opponents do. 
Furthermore it casts doubt on the possibility of creating a political consensus which will
keep all participants happy all or most of the time. (Haidt, 2012) Midgley articulated 
43 As is the difference in the balance these two species strike between their competing impulses.
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something similar in her argument for a more rounded approach to humans’ status as 
animals. In asserting that humans and animals are much closer than contemporary 
philosophy and society typically believe – whilst simultaneously rejecting what she 
views as the excessive reductionism of gene-first Darwinism – Midgley argued that 
individuals’ natures encompass a diverse range of motives. (Midgley, 1995: 55-57; 161-
162) This does not always lend itself to easy resolution: like a number of the 
philosophers whose views we shall discuss in more detail below, Midgley thinks that 
part of our moral nature stems from human nature as such (specifically dispositions 
rooted in sympathetic moral emotions, but also encompassing our natural reason), but 
that at the same time much of what creates “evil” in the world also stems from that same
human nature. (Midgley, 2011) 
Certainly the ambiguous character of human nature will frequently emerge in the
form of apparently straightforward oppositions – the desire for power versus egalitarian 
dispositions, or self-interest verses the needs of others. However, these dichotomies will
be played out against the background of a much wider "psychological ecology" of 
desires (dispositions), motives and capacities. For instance there is a widely observed 
tendency for social species – including human beings – to distinguish between those 
belonging to the "in-group" and the "out-group". This might well lead to xenophobia 
and tensions between different groups of people, but at the same time it might play a 
role in the creation and maintenance of cohesive moral communities. Similarly, the 
striving for dominance may in fact be facilitated by being sensitive to the desires of 
others and a sense of fairness or "justice". Below we shall discuss examples of this 
relationship between dominance strategies and social sensitivity, but for now we can 
easily identify its importance in the human context by recalling many of the 
recommendations found in Machiavelli’s The Prince, and its ubiquity throughout human
history demonstrated by the satirical trope panem et circenses.44 That such occurrences 
are conceived of as complex dynamics, involving diametrically opposed dispositions 
and capacities (for example creating communities verses “othering”, or self 
aggrandisement verses empathic affect), speaks to one of the possible strengths of this 
schema. The focus on dispositions and capacities means that a “motivationalist” view of
44 De Waal even relates an incidence where a dominant chimpanzee male would routinely take 
possession of any meat acquired by the troop and dole it out, cementing his power through the 
distribution of a favour food source.
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human nature focuses on multiple psychological dispositions, rather than attempting to 
identify the one true and underlying source of those dispositions (whether this be 
evolution, universal consciousness or some other demiurge).
These comments should also be taken to serve as a cautionary note: whilst the 
following section is laid out in a ‘laundry-list approach’, enumerating the most common
areas I feel theorists of this persuasion identify, each aspect is intimately interwoven 
with many of the others. For the sake of intelligibility each is discussed in turn, however
the nature of the phenomena being discussed and the ways they are approached make 
this compartmentalisation inappropriate without some forewarning that it is merely a 
methodological convenience. Indeed the fact that this perspective treats its object as an 
interleaved whole is perhaps one of the more obvious strengths of this approach to 
human nature. (cf. Boehm, 1999: 230-231) Many of the connections will be readily 
observable, and I shall seek to draw them out explicitly as we move through each 
aspect.
Aspects of the Human Animal
Cooperation and Altruism
The first feature commonly identified by an innatist theory of human 
nature is that of the human capacity for cooperation and of altruism. This is also a 
suitable place for us to start as it has several points of contrast with the approach 
examined in the previous chapter. This will allow us to more readily define the relevant 
features of these competing frameworks (which after all both make strong appeals to the
concept of humanity as an evolved creature) and the way they treat the coordination and
interaction of individuals’ natures.
One issue in this area is that altruism can be described in a variety of different 
ways. Bowles & Gintis (2011) succinctly sum up such descriptions in the two 
definitions of altruism they identify and use. The first is a standard biological definition 
– that an altruistic act is one in which the actor benefits another at their own expense. In 
evolutionary terms, they enhance another’s fitness whilst diminishing their own. The 
second definition is dispositional – it concerns intentions or preferences – according to 
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which an action is regarded as altruistic if the actor carries it out with the intention of 
benefiting someone else but not him- or herself (even, or rather especially, if they are 
aware that this will negatively impact their own well-being). Notably these two 
definitions are not necessarily dependent on one another. If the recipient of a beneficial 
act feels compelled to reciprocate then by the first definition – which considers only 
outcomes – the act was not really altruistic in a biological sense. However there is 
nothing to stop the agent or their behaviour from being altruistic in the second sense, 
due to the fact that they incorporated a preference for another’s well-being into their 
decision-making procedure. They valued the outcome for someone else as much as, or 
more than, the outcome for themselves. (Ibid: 201-202; cf. Boehm, 2012: 9) In their 
discussions of altruistic feelings and dispositions this is the definition that is most often 
(if sometimes tacitly) referred to by proponents of this kind of theory of human nature. 
The biological definition is not ignored, of course. In fact it is the underpinning of 
almost everyone’s explanation of the evolutionary origins of the social sentiments. It 
manages to clearly illustrate the plausibility of the evolution of genuinely altruistic 
dispositions, since within a group these can mutually boost the overall fitness of those 
with altruistic motivations, even whilst the results of their actions are not formally 
altruistic in the biological sense.45 
The proponents of psychologically-centred, innatist theories of human nature are
arguably better at separating these two definitions – of taking both the long-term and 
short-term views of human altruism. Whilst this perspective accepts the validity of both 
definitions, the focus when talking about what human nature actually is is mostly 
directed towards the psychological view (that is, towards the dispositions that most 
immediately affect an individual’s motives); the other is not taken to encapsulate some 
more fundamental truth about altruism or cooperation more generally, but has an 
analytical role in telling us about the (evolutionary) development of such activity. The 
mere fact that our “good intentions” are in some way evolutionarily beneficial does not 
mean, as it is sometimes portrayed in the gene-first Darwinian narrative of the 
reductionist paradigm, that we – or some “deeper” motivational mechanisms – are 
tricking ourselves when we act and think in altruistic ways. De Waal makes a similar 
point, drawing upon Mencius (and sentimentalist early-modern Europeans), by 
45 This can also apply to relative inter-group fitness, whereby a group of altruistic co-operators can 
have a higher overall fitness than that of another, less cooperative group.
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reminding us that when an individual sacrifices themselves for another it is the result of 
an emotion, not a complex thought process. The experience is immediate, and this 
would appear to rule out ulterior, selfish motives as the “real” causes of an actor’s 
choices – that explanation, he suggests ‘seems to grossly overestimate human 
intellectual powers, let alone those of other animals.’ (de Waal et. al., 2006: 50-52) Thus
the majority of our altruism (or at least spontaneous altruism) is considered genuine, 
and motivated primarily at the level of affect.46
There are two arguments which are commonly appealed to in order to assert the 
innateness of psychological dispositions towards cooperation and altruism – or indeed 
any dispositions – often but not always deployed in tandem. One is an argument from 
ubiquity, whilst the other grounds the claim of innateness in cooperation’s emergence 
prior to the organism/agent’s exposure to any strong culturing influences. The former 
expands our attention beyond the sphere of human nature, and encourages us to view 
humanity as an ethological subject. Its main point of reference is the existence of 
patterns of helping mutual aid dispositions, or capacities for empathy, outside of our 
own species and yet markedly similar to our own. The classic examples are those where 
an animal takes a risk that confers benefits upon others around it – the individuals who 
act as lookouts or who give warning cries when a predator approaches. Similarly there 
is some experimental evidence which suggests that given the choice between securing a 
benefit solely for themselves and securing one for themselves and one for a partner, 
chimpanzees (one of our closest primate cousins, but not the most prosocial) will 
actively choose the option which benefits another. (Horner et. al., 2011) The contention 
of the innatist perspective is that such instances are alike in kind to many human 
behaviours. Since this is how helping and cooperative behaviours work in non-human 
societies, it stands to reason something similar is happening in human activity (unless 
we wish to contend that humans have supernatural origins).
Mere correspondence between human and animal forms of altruism is certainly 
not the entirety of the connections made by those interested in this aspect of human 
nature. Connections are sought by those working from the opposite direction: by 
theorists reaching outwards from within more hermeneutic disciplines. Observed 
46 Hence de Waal’s insistence on ‘the primacy of affect’.
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similarities regarding the ways that humans and animals treat one another are used to 
ground moral theories such as Peter Singer’s concept of expanding circles of morality. 
(Singer, 1981; Joyce, 2006; Kitcher, 2011) Interestingly, de Waal offers a broadly 
similar idea, illustrating that any such expansion should be explicitly recognised as 
context-sensitive. According to him, Singer’s expanding circles are in actual fact a 
‘floating pyramid, viewed from above.’ (de Waal et. al., 2006: 163-165) The ‘buoyancy’
of the pyramid is determined by the available resources – altruism and its related moral 
practices are applied to the inner circles (our family and kin, for example) of our 
commitments first, and to the outer circles (the nation, humanity as a whole, or other 
species) on the condition that the inner circles are taken care of (remain “above the 
waterline” of the resources in which the pyramid floats). There is an imminent 
dependency involved in this altruism. In times of adversity or scarcity we may adjust 
our moral accounting depending on which circle or level of the pyramid we perceive 
others to occupy relative to ourselves. (de Waal, 1996)47
Accordingly, altruism is said to constitute one of (but only one of) the core 
contributing factors or “building blocks” of modern humanity’s moral psychology. 
Whilst kin selection and the evolution of reciprocal altruism are (alongside group 
selection) thought to be the plausible paths by which this form of activity arose, altruism
itself acts according to its own particular remit rather than being tied to whether the 
recipient is kin, or believed to be likely to return the favour.48 Its effect is to encourage 
individuals to value the benefits to their group, rather than simply themselves. (Bowles 
& Gintis, 2011) But whilst this pattern of behaviour(s) can be compared between 
animals and humans, what guarantee is there that there is a similar innate or internal 
disposition towards altruism in humans – who may just be ideologically inculcated and 
induced to sacrifice themselves – as there is in animals – who lack the cultural 
framework to be indoctrinated in such a manner? This is where ethologists and 
psychologists, not to mention the philosophers who draw upon both, can meet and 
exchange ideas and data. For instance Michael Tomasello cites a number of studies – 
47 Both de Waal and Singer argue that currently in the west we have such an abundance of resources 
that we should extend our moral sensibilities to the outer-most reaches – to include not just all of 
humanity but also animals – perhaps illustrating Joyce’s contention that an evolutionary/naturalistic 
perspective on morality does not cause it to become irrelevant. (cf. Joyce, 2006: 224ff)
48 For some this still raises questions about its place in the evolutionary development of species, but 
these questions are not considered to be casting any kind of implicit doubt on the reality of altruism, 
as appeared to be the case in the previous chapter where we observed a need to explain altruism in 
order to situate it.
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many of which he was involved in running – in which young infants are seen to freely 
help an adult with a simple task such as fetching something (‘instrumental helping’). 
(Tomasello et. al. 2009: 6ff) There are, he says, a number of reasons to thus believe that 
certain basic forms of altruism and helpfulness are innate. The first is their age, since 
the children studied were only a little over one year old. Not only this, but rewards did 
not appear to affect their behaviour – in fact Tomasello cites a study in which he and his
colleague Felix Warnecken found that rewarding young infants appeared to undermine 
their readiness to help in subsequent tests where a reward was not forthcoming. 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2008)49 Interestingly, the opposite appears to happen in cases 
where resources are being divided up – younger children (ages three to four) do not 
seem as good at sharing as older children (ages seven to eight). (Fehr, et. al., 2008) 
Nevertheless, when given the option to acquire rewards for only themselves or for 
themselves and another, very young children chose the latter option over the purely 
selfish one. (Ibidem) Tomasello suggests that this may indicate that there are two types 
of altruism – one connected to helping accomplish a task, the other involving the ceding
of access to desired objects to an other, which emerges in middle-childhood.50 
(Tomasello & Warneken, 2008; see also Spelke’s contribution to Tomasello et. al., 2009:
149-172)
 Inherently connected to the concept of altruism is that of cooperation. Both 
require an individual to expend effort towards securing the well-being of an other or 
others. Cooperation, of course, is somewhat different since it almost always involves 
simultaneously securing one’s own well-being and involves acting in conjunction with 
others. Cooperation is also a good way of covering those acts which appear altruistic to 
some within this paradigm, but which may not be considered altruistic by others. Many 
philosophers such as Joyce will tend to regard an action as psychologically altruistic 
only if the individual enacting it is capable of considering the outcome for both 
themselves and the recipient. For them an emotional impetus to aid another is not in 
itself sufficient to consider certain animals as having the required motivating reasons to 
count as altruistic (or, indeed, selfish), since reasons are bound up with beliefs and 
49 This has parallels with some ancillary findings concerning chimp prosociality in Horner et. al. 
(2011)
50 For which there may, or may not, be evolutionary reasons based on an infant’s ability to secure 
resources, or possibly the emotional-cognitive framework available.
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deliberation. (Joyce, 2006: 14; cf. Boehm, 2012: 9) Cooperation offers a wider range of 
activities which could be thought of as falling within its definition. One of the 
foundations for thinking that human cooperation is unique is that it involves a great deal
of planning, mental representation, intent and communication on behalf of (in some 
instances) large numbers of individuals. Other forms of cooperation, meanwhile, are 
much more contingent and immediate. For instance chimpanzees on a monkey hunt do 
not necessarily have pre-arranged roles that each animal fills, nor do they arrange a hunt
ahead of time, with prior intent. Instead they will tend to spontaneously form a hunt 
when prey has been located, and will fill roles (such as chasers or blockers) depending 
on the flow of the hunt and their placement relative to the prey and one another. Those 
who argue for a degree of human exceptionalism, as Tomasello or Joan Silk do, see this 
as the primary form of cooperation amongst primates, whilst the former, more 
intentional form is unique to humans. Although a detailed exposition of the differences 
between these two schools of thought – the “continuationists” and the “exceptionalists” 
– would be tangential to the wider analysis presented here, it is useful, especially with 
regards to cooperation, to deal with it in the process of discussing this core feature of 
the nature and social lives of both humans and animals. In particular I believe it 
illuminates the character of human nature as it is seen by this perspective. In some ways
it even throws light upon the similarities between the two schools. Perhaps the most 
relevant and commonly identified aspect of cooperation – not to mention a significant 
similarity – is an innate capacity to coordinate with others to achieve a joint goal or 
mutual benefit (sometimes referred to as conspecific mutualism).
Once again, resources play a role in the analysis of our behaviour. However in 
this context they play an active role in explanations about just how and why cooperation
is thought to be so natural and central to our existence. They feature heavily in the 
question of what capacities are revealed by cooperative behaviour. Within one’s group 
resource sharing is perhaps the most fundamental form of cooperation we take part in. 
This, so the argument goes, is even more evident in groups where resources are harder 
to come by: early hominids, “primitive” tribes and our primate cousins. The difficulty of
obtaining a primary source of food – hunted prey – requires that it be acquired through 
group effort.51 Said difficulty lies at the heart of conceptualisations of cooperation such 
51 This is not to say that the sensations and experiences associated with hunting and sharing food are 
identical to or responsible for those that drive and govern cooperation today. Such an imputation 
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as the stag hunt model proposed by Bryan Skyrms – the greatest benefit, both for one’s 
group and one’s self, requires coordination. (Skyrms, 2004) In such models the origins 
of inter-group cooperation and coordination are explained via the necessity of securing 
food, which can only be done through not only working together but also by ensuring 
future cooperation. Thus those who take part in the hunt (and perhaps even those who 
do not) share in the spoils, whether or not they secured or brought down the prey. (This 
in its turn presumes that co-operators can remember who is likely to help, a point 
touched upon later.) Not only is a certain disposition towards cooperative behaviour 
required for this to be possible, so too is a capacity to formulate goals in relation to the 
activity of others. The presumption is then that other forms of cooperation – including 
those complex forms engaged in by modern, highly developed human societies – also 
require such capacities. Those capacities, being so crucial to the simpler forms of 
cooperation, are thus innate capabilities which make contemporary life possible – or at 
least give it part of its particular character. Such models can be leant a concrete 
foundation through the experimental researches of the more empirically-driven 
disciplines within this schema. Similar to the infant helping experiments referred to 
above, experiments can be conducted which reveal both an animal’s preparedness to 
cooperate and the ways they go about doing it.
Many such experiments conducted on chimpanzees follow a general theme – 
two (or more) individuals are required to cooperate in order to get a reward, the reward 
being placed upon a moving board or platform. The participants can only pull the board 
towards them by simultaneously pulling on each end of a single rope looped onto the 
platform. There are a number of variants of this experiment. Some offer unequal 
rewards, or have a single undivided reward, to test what influence the reward has on 
participation. Others test different animals – elephants, for example (Plotnik et. al., 
2010) – and increasingly researchers will structure their experiments so as to allow the 
animals to choose whether to take part or not, and with whomever they wish. This latter 
helps test their memory of who cooperates and who doesn’t, and subsequent willingness
to interact with poor cooperators. (Melis, Hare & Tomasello, 2006) Such studies give 
would resemble the “stone-age skulls” paradigm associated with the perspective analysed in the 
previous chapter. Instead, such activities and practices are believed to be the origins of the innate 
impulse we have towards cooperation and the capacities which make it possible. Meanwhile their 
continued prevalence amongst less technologically advanced cultures, as well as other mammals, 
reinforces this interpretation by illustrating how central cooperation really is to these practices.
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reasons to suppose that the animals tested not only have a disposition towards 
cooperation, but also a deep understanding of the ways in which their actions are 
dependent upon those of others. In the elephant-based experiment cited above, 
experimenters concluded that: 
Our own study shows that elephants not only (i) cooperate successfully in a 
coordinated pulling task but also (ii) recognize the need for a partner by 
waiting if the partner is delayed. Elephants perhaps also (iii) recognize the 
necessity of their partner's actions, given that they discriminate between a 
partner with or without rope access. (Plotnik, et. al. 2010)
This could strongly suggest that cooperation and the capacities associated with it have 
natural roots, a supposition which can be lent more weight by similar experiments using
human children as subjects.
Some – such as Tomasello – consider animal cooperation to be emblematic of 
the way in which human cooperation is likely to have evolved, however in their view 
the human form involves a set of different capabilities such as trust, mental 
representations and understanding the intents of others. (Tomasello, et. al., 2009: 24-27, 
54ff) For analysts such as these the key difference is our capacity to form joint or group 
goals. To approach one’s aims in terms of what “we”, rather than what “I”, wish to 
accomplish. (Ibid: 62-64; Tomasello, 2007) Investigations into this facet of cooperation 
– and the wider field of human nature – often focus on the mental underpinnings 
required to take part in complex social activities. In particular their experiments are 
focused on how young children and infants are able to spontaneously (although not 
always perfectly) identify with the aims of others and construct a form of group self. 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Rakoczy, 2008) Whether or not these capacities imply 
that human human forms of cooperation are unique (since opinion within this 
perspective is divided) their existence, revealed through studies of child sociability and 
cooperation, has obvious repercussions for how we view human nature. On the present 
view we are not solely driven to secure our own benefit, and even when we are we often
do so in conjunction with others. This means not only being oriented towards 
cooperating but also being able to share others’ perspectives and even take part in 
creating a group identity.
It is also interesting to note the way many of these studies demonstrate a change 
in the capacities studied, often over a relatively short period of time. Given the young 
age of the children involved we can legitimately construe these findings as revealing 
82
innate aspects of human nature. However the nature they reveal is not one of reflexive 
instincts but instead consists of a range of possible forms and outcomes – canalised to 
some extent but not linearly determined. There are isomorphic similarities between 
children’s helping behaviour and that of adults, although the the former do not 
necessarily place the same kind of caveats or conditions on their cooperation as adults 
might. Early social and interpersonal interactions have a strong effect on the ways in 
which certain capacities develop or “unfold”.52 A crucial part of the formation of human 
nature is not just epigenetic, it may also be postnatal. Hence in the following sections 
we shall discuss the ways in which empathy and representation form part of our nature, 
as well as how our capacity for making judgements (especially about other people) is a 
nascent but emergent complement to, and modifier of, these capacities and dispositions.
Empathy and Theory of Mind
In the previous chapter we saw how altruism was conceived of within the 
algorithmic schema as the mechanism by which our genes could get us to increase their 
overall chance of replication. Whilst this genetic benefit is not ignored by many 
working in the motivationalist schema, as we have just seen our cooperative side is 
studied as a thing in itself rather than simply a means to an end. On this view working 
for the benefit of others – especially in altruistic activities – does not require that we 
fool ourselves into believing our motives are unselfish or other-regarding. This is 
largely due to our tendency to value the interests and well-being of others. (Tomasello 
et. al., 2009: 120) As was suggested above, altruism relies on empathic concern over the
feelings of others, whilst cooperation requires an awareness of what the other party 
desires. Indeed for some, such as de Waal, a great deal of what makes altruism and 
cooperation interesting is what it reveals about the underlying capacities necessary for 
such behaviours or tendencies to be enacted. Innate cooperative dispositions can 
themselves be decomposed to reveal something about the way humans act and think. 
This is one of the primary reasons that so much effort is put into studying it empirically, 
and why it is of interest not only to psychologists but also to philosophers and ethicists.
Beyond cooperation – beyond even empathy – knowing, or believing one knows,
52 Brownell et. al. (2012) gives a good example of this. 
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what is going on inside the heads of others can be viewed as an important part of what it
means to be a member of a social species. Many social activities (including, as we shall 
see in a later section, inculcation into communal systems of belonging) require such a 
capacity. We regard its absence, such as autism, as akin to a pathology.53 Subscribers to 
the perspective(s) considered here hold that this is a deeply engrained core capacity, 
often with a traceable evolutionary pedigree and developmental vector. Here we find a 
range of capacities which appear to be strongly innate. Not only is it hard to imagine 
how such things like intuiting the intentions of another person could be taught, but 
research into primate and infant behaviour suggests that from a very early age we have 
these capacities, which we share with our closest relatives.54 
The more conceptual or hermeneutic readings of human nature included within 
this perspective – not just primatologists like de Waal or Jane Goodall who attempt to 
write for a wider audience than their normal academic papers reach, but also those 
philosophers and ethicists who seek to understand their subject through some form of a 
naturalistic lens – seem to agree with and draw upon the more naturalistic examinations 
when they assert that understanding the inner world of others is a core component of 
certain human activities. For example when Richard Joyce talks about the evolution of 
morality, he mostly deals with cooperation and helping, but still counts understanding 
the psychology of others as crucial to group belonging which in turn helps facilitate 
complex forms of cooperation. (Joyce, 2006: 41-42) It also appears to lesser or greater 
extents in his treatment of motivation. (See ibid: 222ff; Joyce, 2002) Meanwhile Philip 
Kitcher underlines the importance of the role played by sympathy in a number of 
Humean and Smithian accounts of ethics and the possible, provisional, vindication of 
such accounts through considering the evolutionary pathways of empathy.55 For him 
ethics is an ‘extemporised solution to instances when our ‘limited altruism’ fails us. (de 
Waal et. al., 2006: 124-131; cf. Clavier, 2012) Note, of course, how the focus remains at
a level where dispositions and capacities play the key role, over and above an abstract 
principle or socially-sensitive relativism.
53 Although those with such pathologies are often able to intellectually understand the inner worlds of 
others.
54 That said, although it cannot be taught this ability is acquired during early infancy and childhood. 
Some behavioural pathologies, in particular sociopathy and psychopathy, may have their roots in the
impeded development of empathetic faculties.
55 Which he argues is accompanied by a much greater enlargement and mental abstraction in ethics and
in humans more generally – resembling Smith’s impartial spectator – which forms a discontinuity 
alongside the continuities identified by de Waal. (de Waal et. al., 2006: 133-135)
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Of course, there continues to be a strong empirical strand to this line of thought 
for such ruminations to draw on (and critique). As Gould observes in his foreward to 
Goodall’s In the Shadow of Man, ‘[m]eticulous and unobtrusive observation must be our
method if we hope to grasp the complexities of true history.’ (Goodall, 1988: viii) Field 
research amongst our closest relatives implies that spontaneous identification with 
another’s situation exists beyond our own species, and can inform the actions of those in
which it is found. In an anecdotal vein, for example, de Waal describes a recurring 
incident at the San Diego Zoo, where a dry moat in the bonobo enclosure had a chain 
that allowed the apes to climb in and out, so they wouldn’t become trapped. In such 
incidents a younger male would pull up the chain after the alpha male had climbed 
down. (de Waal, 2005:182) He would then look down at the alpha with an expression 
primatologists recognise as ‘the equivalent of human laughter....’ The alpha, Vernon, 
was not always stuck for long – another bonobo would arrive and help ‘by dropping the 
chain back down and standing guard until he had gotten out.’ As de Waal points out, 
‘[b]oth observations tell us something about perspective taking.’ Not only must the 
juvenile prankster have been aware of the significance of the chain – its potential use 
and relevance to the context – but also how its use relates to the situation of an other 
who is not itself (one who is actually experiencing the context in which it gains its 
particular use). The "helper" (a female called Loretta) must also have grasped this 
significance and its effect on the "victim", and must crucially have also experienced 
some form of affect leading her to reinstate access to the chain to allow the adult male to
escape.
A number of such observations look directly at the emotive aspect – that is, the 
naturalness of empathy and empathetic affect within our closest evolutionary relatives. 
Some hands-on researchers have observed what appears to be consoling behaviour 
amongst chimps. When two chimps get into a fight the loser will understandably be 
upset, even if they are not physically hurt. This loser will often seek out or otherwise 
elicit the attention of another member of the troop and the two will engage in some 
social contact which appears to comfort the individual who lost the fight. (Palagi, 
Cordoni & Tarli, 2005) Usually this takes the form of simple physical contact or perhaps
grooming. Other studies have shown such consolation apparently being offered 
spontaneously. (Romero, Castellanos & de Waal, 2010) Significantly, such observations 
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note a relationship between the willingness to offer this “consolation” and previous 
instances of grooming behaviours. The suggestion is that apes are more willing to be 
kind to their “friends” – to those that they have had a lot of contact and social exchanges
with. Similar findings were found when studying non-primate mammals, such as 
elephants. (Bates et. al., 2008)
De Waal (2005; 2009) gives a number of further examples gathered during his 
and others’ field researches and time spent working with animals. I am also tempted to 
suggest that similar emotional mechanisms are at work in those anthropological 
observations of social pressures such as ostracism that Boehm (1999) and Barclay 
(1990) cite in their treatment of social cohesion and egalitarianism (anti-hierarchy), 
which we come to examine in a forthcoming section. For his part, de Waal is keen to put
forward what he sees as a formative (certainly for himself) set of observations from as 
long ago as the 1970s, in the work of primatologist Emil Menzel. Menzel was interested
in the cognitive capacities of apes, in particular the way they navigated their 
environment. But this also involved understanding the ways that apes communicated – 
how they shared knowledge (even unintentionally) and how they might interpret 
“meaning” in one another’s movements, gestures or attentive cues. (Hopkins & 
Washburn: 2012) His work ‘laid the foundation... for many contemporary research 
topics in psychology and primatology including non-verbal and gestural 
communication, theory-of-mind (before this was the fashionable term), and behavioural 
economics.’ (Ibid) One notable observation was of two chimps, one of whom knew the 
location of some food. This “knower” would often inadvertently allow the other to 
guess the location of this food, which he would promptly take. In order to do this the 
thief (Rock) had to be able to infer – from the knower’s body language and taking cues 
from where her attention was directed – where the food was. This resulted in a game of 
cat-and-mouse as the knower (Belle) learned that Rock would often take the food she 
had located. ‘If Rock were not present, Belle invariably led the group to food and nearly
everybody got some.’ If Rock was around, Belle would be more hesitant. ‘The reason 
was not hard to detect. As soon as Belle uncovered the food Rock... took it all.’ (Menzel,
1974: 134-135) The contention is that both chimps were able to intuit (albeit not to the 
same extent as we see in everyday human interactions) the intentions and goals of the 
other.
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These are not trivial points, but rather the backbone of field research, amongst 
both apes and humans; however de Waal acknowledges that this forms a methodological
problem: ‘the most striking examples of empathetic perspective-taking... concern single 
incidents.’ (de Waal, 2009: 103) This is why primatologists and ethologists engage in 
the kind of experimentation seen in the previous section. These allow them to set 
contexts and goals, and to see whether or not their subjects are capable of meeting their 
goals, how they behave in the attempt, and to consider what these observations mean. 
As we saw, such experiments directed at looking at helping behaviour often describe 
participants’ ability to know who is likely to cooperate, in some ways indirectly looking 
at this present element, but there are also some which explicitly concern themselves 
with an actor’s capacity to understand the other. Instances of this more directed 
experimentation aim to create situations that elicit the same kinds of behaviours as those
observed by Menzel (amongst others), under controlled conditions. An experimenter 
might hide food in sight of a subordinate chimpanzee, and then watch what happens 
when this subordinate has to interact with a dominant member of their community. 
(Hare et. al., 2000; Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001) If the dominant had not seen the 
food, the lower-status animal would approach it more freely than if the other had seen 
where it was hidden. In such competitive circumstances the chimps showed a limited 
capacity for understanding what others see and know about their surroundings. (cf. 
Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003)
These experiments typically attempt to explicitly test the ability of individual 
subjects – in this case apes – to understand one-another’s mind, rather than the actions 
of the experimenters, reducing the interference of the human observer as much as 
possible. However the ability to control the parameters of the tests impinges upon this 
neutrality – this role of the inert observer, the view from nowhere. Passive observations 
of captive and wild populations typically get around this, but as we saw they do so at 
the expense of replicability. There is thus a tension between the injunction against the 
researcher overly imposing themselves on the object of their study and the necessity of 
high-fidelity to the truth of the matter (the “reality” of nature as it exists apart from the 
presuppositions of human researchers). This is perhaps why both are given alternating 
precedence, by which I mean the overall view of the subject is synthesised from field 
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reports on the one hand and in-depth, expert-led studies involving structured tests.56
To my mind these approaches show that within this perspective it is almost taken
for granted that the nature of any given social species involves, at the very start of our 
analysis, capacities involved in orienting the individual within their social environment. 
(Hence my earlier, coarse-grained characterisation of this as a “surface level” approach.)
As a consequence, much research revolves around how far and in which species certain 
capacities can be found. Hence those instances when the debate within the schema turns 
to the question of to what extent there are continuities or discontinuities between 
humans and animals. (see Kitcher, 2011; Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003; de Waal et. al., 
2006) Indeed, many of these aspects – and thus the nature as a whole – cannot be 
understood without reference to a social context. But for our purposes we have further 
to go.
For present purposes establishing how social capacities manifest specifically in 
human beings falls to comparative and developmental psychologists. These researchers 
have devised tests and experiments to test competency in what is called theory of mind 
(ToM). ToM can be thought of as the ability to know, explicitly, the intentions and 
motives of others; it is the ability to intuit what they are likely to know or believe about 
the context they are in. (Carpendale & Lewis, 2009) To examine how this capacity 
works researchers can ask subjects, usually young children, a series of simple questions 
– neutrally phrased so as to avoid leading the participant towards expected answers – 
aimed at discovering what they understand about the internal mental states of characters
in a fictional scenario. Trials such as these show that not only do children have these 
abilities, but also that the said abilities are consistently present across cultures. 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004; Tan-Niam et. al., 1998) Coupled with the youth of the subjects, 
the not-unreasonable theory is that this implies that ToM is a truly in-born human 
universal. However it is also important to note that ToM abilities do not arrive fully 
formed; studies often observe that the abilities being studied are imperfect in the 
youngest children studied, and that ToM competency increases with age. To confirm or 
test this hypothesis some studies involve testing their subjects at intervals throughout 
their development, tracking in what ways and how quickly the subjects’ abilities 
progress. (see Knafo et. al., 2008: 739-740) This is compounded by an asymmetry in the
56 Gary Fine and Kimberly Elsbach (2000) grapple with this same problem in relation to human social 
psychology.
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way that this competency develops – some children increase in aptitude faster or slower 
than their peers, despite sharing the same general background, social status and 
environment (which are, after all, the control parameters for these studies). Additionally 
the sequence of this development may display cultural variations in the way that a 
child’s ToM emerges; the ways in which the other’s perspective is understood can 
develop faster or slower depending on the implicit social context. (Lillard, 1998; 
Shahaeian et. al., 2011) Indeed, much of the research carried out presumes that culture 
can make a difference and in some cases the studies are precisely aimed at determining 
to what extent this is so. 
Although it appears that everyone eventually reaches the same level of ability 
before adolescence, these two observations demonstrate, for current purposes, that a 
certain degree of flexibility is incorporated into the motivationalist schema. The present 
perspective on human nature views developmental pathways, particularly in early life, 
as integral to the nature of the animal. What is given about the human being is, in 
addition to being heavily dispositional, also directional: it has to take into account the 
complexity of the organism’s world, a complexity which can only be confronted and 
realised57 through learning processes which are canalised by the combined structure of 
their dispositions and capacities in conjunction with their social context.
Judgements and Norms
We can see this developmental factor in the ways in which we make judgements 
about events. In fact, theory of mind tests form the basis of the work by Melanie Killen 
and her colleagues, looking into the phenomenon of moral judgement. In one study they
examined the competencies of children across two different tasks (rather than in similar 
tasks across intervals of time): the first was a ToM test, the second was an evaluation of 
a scenario where they were asked about the characters’ intentions and moral culpability. 
(Killen et. al., 2011) The results indicated that children who scored higher in ToM 
competency made more “correct” judgements about the culpability of the scenario’s 
characters, and did so because of the same reasons we would expect adults to make such
judgements. For instance they recognised that a character who threw away a bag 
containing an object (a sweet treat) valued by another character was unaware of the 
57 Confronted in the sense that the external world it encounters is complex; realised in the sense that 
the organism’s internal workings, which orient it within that external world, are themselves complex.
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contents, and therefore were less likely to rate them morally culpable or their actions as 
particularly bad. On the other hand, those participants who showed less proficiency at 
understanding what other agents know were more likely to assign blame to the 
‘accidental transgressor’ character who threw away the bag. These findings provided 
Killen and her team with the basis for what they call morally-relevant theory of mind – 
or “MoToM” – which connects the human ability to intuit what others know about the 
world to their ability to make normative moral and social judgements about their 
actions. All the children displayed some kind of propensity and disposition to make 
judgements – moral judgements – about the situations they were presented with. 
However those who were better at intuiting the worldview and intentions of the 
transgressor, and at integrating this intuition into their judgement-making process, made
what we would consider to be "better" judgements about culpability and the desirability 
of corrective punishment. (See Nobes et. al., 2009)
Clearly this relation could shed some light on the role that perception plays in 
ethical judgement, especially if one were interested in the development of the ethical 
self. However, in order to serve the present investigation, I wish instead to remain at a 
remove and focus on the overarching concern of human nature and the way it is 
formulated as a theoretical construct. In that respect I think the relationship between 
ToM and judgements further demonstrates something that has been touched on 
previously – the way that different capacities, abilities and dispositions interact within 
this particular schema of human nature theory. Human nature is – to the 
(motivationalist) philosopher and the ethologist alike – a complex and multi-tiered 
conglomeration of different aspects which interact and combine as a matter of course in 
many different ways.58 The schemas, as I have divided them up, are rather large and 
encompassing, so there are obviously people and perspectives subsumed under the 
motivationalist schema that vary in the degree to which they analyse and talk about 
human nature in this way – just as there are disagreements over how similar or 
dissimilar humanity is to other apes. However I would contend that a distinctive mark of
a motivationalist conception of human nature is some degree of sophisticated sensitivity
to this internal interaction.
The development of capacities for judgement over time – and what is more, the 
58 This was touched upon in the section on ambiguity at the beginning of the current chapter.
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way that theories within this schema accommodate and even embrace this development 
– also creates an interesting tension in the way that human nature is thought about. 
Rather than a set of instincts which come “programmed” into the human being, much of
human nature might well be developed in certain ways and show discernible patterns 
and commonalities, but it will emerge subtly different across individuals and crucially 
take time to emerge. (Nobes et. al., 2009; Cushman, et. al., 2013) This highlights how 
what is given about the human may not be readily apparent at birth, but instead be 
constituted by certain developmental pathways and a form of “directionality” over the 
early life time of the individual. As a side note, there is a sense in which this state of 
affairs might be expected, as plasticity and flexibility are not only desirable traits in 
themselves – allowing those who possess them to adapt to short-term challenges – but 
these developmental routes are also more efficient methods of ensuring a creature 
displays appropriate or desirable behaviours for its species. It would be biologically 
impractical and wasteful if certain activities were hard-coded into the genome of an 
animal, but dispositions that steer them towards certain situations, coupled with an 
ability to learn, would over time result in responses appropriate for that animal’s 
environment. A simple (if anecdotal) example of this is the idea that house cats and 
other felines are not born with the ability or knowledge of how to hunt, but instead are 
predisposed (“programmed”) to pounce on small moving objects – thus putting them in 
a position to learn how to hunt. This ensures that as adults they will acquire the ability 
to hunt through the possession of a set of impulses towards engaging in a particular 
behaviour, rather than a complete set of information that covers appropriate responses to
hunting situations. 
We can see another example of the interaction between innate components of an 
animal’s nature and its actual instantiation within the world, in respect to sensitivity to 
group belonging. This brings us to one of the most far-reaching kinds of judgement an 
individual might make, the capacity by which the said individual distinguishes between 
those who are a part of their community and those who are “outside” that community. 
Whilst previously I described how, within this particular perspective, human beings are 
seen as naturally cooperative creatures, there are other factors which it is believed can 
affect or alter the ways such beings cooperate and who they do so with. One such factor 
is this “in-group/out-group” distinction. This divides people according to certain kinds 
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of attachment or allegiance, and appears to have an effect on whether certain others are 
seen as fitting recipients of one’s altruistic acts or not. Rather than a hard rule that all 
organisms of a given type possess, the in-group/out-group distinction is more akin to an 
ability to divide the world into different kinds. Associating different individuals with 
these kinds has to be learned and appears to be context-driven. (Otten & Moskowitz, 
2000; cf. Durkheim, 1995) (Trivially, we might consider the idea of young animals 
“imprinting” on the first thing they see as an example of something similar to this.) 
Here we have an opportunity to see how some within the motivationalist schema
utilise a more hermeneutic - or at least less empirically-dependent - approach to the 
subject of human nature beyond the sphere of ethics (although ethics still makes an 
appearance). This is itself an interesting avenue of investigation since it revolves around
the idea that personal psychological impulses can be connected with higher-level socio-
cultural phenomena in a meaningful way. Specifically, some theorise that there is a 
connection between the in-group/out-group distinction and the communal social role 
played by religion. On this view religion serves as a guarantor of a number of necessary 
social relations, and a protection against exploitation by selfish manipulators.59 
(Henrich, 2009: 246-247; 253ff) Most important is the way in which it does so. 
According to philosopher John Teehan, religion does not exist as an autonomous, sui 
generis, cultural entity; but nor is it merely an emanation of human nature, some kind of
epiphenomenal expression of a deeper instinct (as early sociobiology held nationalism 
to be of animal territorialism). Instead it serves as a locus of communal activity, 
providing as it does a number of methods by which individuals display their belonging 
to a shared community. (Teehan, 2010: 43-45, 137-141; Atran, 2010) This interpretation
is connected to theories that explain religious observances in evolutionary terms - within
an evolutionary framework these activities appear costly, for little or no evolutionary 
gain. The hypothesis is that these observances - rituals, prayers, particular forms of 
dress and so on - are forms of "signalling"; they identify the practitioner as a member of
a certain community. (Ibid: 89-91, 129-131; Henrich, 2009) Teehan and others like him 
consider this approach to be useful in explaining the evolutionary utility and 
psychological value of religion. According to this view socio-cultural structures and 
conventions can be read with consideration to how they interact with an evolved 
59 Noticeably one such relation is one which we have already examined before: cooperation.
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cognitive psychology. (For example see Powell & Clarke, 2012) Religion connects with 
in-group bias by signalling allegiance to a particular (moral) community, which in turn 
is tied to our predisposition to aid those closest to us rather than those to whom we have
little or no relationship. In the absence of an abundance of disposable resources, religion
acts as a badge of belonging, part of a conceptual apparatus by which an agent judges 
whether another individual is worth cooperating with and likely to reciprocate altruistic 
acts directed towards him or her; they are worth the agent expending its energy and 
resources on, because they are viewed as "one of us". 
Such judgements are not automatically binary ones since, as we saw with de 
Waal’s concept of a ‘floating pyramid’, it is sensitive to context. We might, for example,
aid someone in the out-group if we have sufficient resources and/or do not feel 
threatened. This is what distinguishes the floating pyramid from Singer’s expanding 
circles – it includes an element of feeling and perception rather than strictly utilitarian 
calculations and resources. Such distinctions are also sensitive to learning; most notably
in that young children often have to learn the types and categories by which they assign 
belonging to others. The tendency or capacity to make in-group/out-group distinctions 
may be natural, but the contents of such distinctions are often conventional, the most 
easily made ones obviously being the clan, tribe and faith (moral community).60 Others 
are more transitory and quasi-arbitrary (here I am thinking of things such as cliques in 
schools, allegiance to a sports team and their fan base, as well as, perhaps, race and 
ethnicity, insofar as they are deployed to indicate community membership). Hence 
Richard Joyce, in his metaethical work on The Evolution of Morality, notes the 
importance of emotion in our motivational psychology, whilst simultaneously making 
the point that innateness ‘must not be thought to imply inevitability.’ (Joyce, 2006: 226-
8)
Of course, as mentioned above, these distinctions do not always spring unbidden
from our genetics or neurobiological makeup. Instead they are subject to external 
stimuli and standards – religious gestures and dress, for example, are not biologically 
determined; likewise a person may convert (most noticeably in comparatively modern 
religions less connected with a specific tribe or location) and thus become part of the 
60 These three are likely to be intimately connected in any case. In early man it would be almost certain
that any group living together would share the same set of spiritual practices, making the link 
between tribe and ethical community organic and almost inseparable.
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shared moral community. (See Teehan, 2010: 130-131) In addition we might also note 
how the capacity to make distinctions between different things we see is subject to a 
training effect. We can see how this is investigated by returning briefly to child 
developmental psychology. Within this field some researchers have identified what they 
call the “other-race effect”, a term used to describe the supposed difficulty members of 
one ethnic group will have in distinguishing between different individuals of another 
ethnic group. Of note, however, is the presence of what is called a “training effect” in 
this situation. One team of researchers found that the other-race effect was not observed 
in three month old infants and that repeated testing showed no development of this 
effect. (Spangler et. al., 2012) They speculate that repeated exposure to even just a 
limited sample of faces from another ethnic group was sufficient to retard the 
development of the other-race effect. In essence the other-race effect represents an 
acquired simplification or limitation of the means by which individuals distinguish 
between others they encounter. (Ferguson et. al., 2009) This suggests that if skin tone or
some other noticeable physical feature is radically different what what the perceiver has 
come across before they appear to have a tendency to make this a crux of their 
differentiation between individuals, and those that share this (perceived) radical 
variation get lumped in to one large subgroup. On the other hand, if such a variant 
feature were regularly encountered in the perceiver’s development it would be 
automatically incorporated as one among many different variations (of skin tone; ear, 
nose or mouth shape; hair colour; or any other such feature) by which that individual 
differentiated between the people they know and meet in the future.
Other cognitive research shows how such distinctions can alter an agent’s 
perception of the world. These categories seem to have a deep, intuitive, affective 
relationship to how individuals view and assess the world; rather than being rational 
categories into which a reasoning agent sorts other beings. For instance, Adam Waytz 
and Liane Young (2012) investigated people’s perceptions of socially- and morally-
relevant attributes such as responsibility and “group mindedness”61 when assessing 
different kinds of group. Their results indicated that in many cases respondents would 
61 Waytz and Young use two terms: ‘group mind’, meaning a perceived tendency on behalf of a group 
to act, make plans, etc. as an entity itself; and ‘group-member mind’, meaning the perception of the 
level of mind (/individuality) on behalf of the members of a group.
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attribute less individuality to members of highly cohesive groups (although this could 
vary depending on the nature of the group in question). As the authors observe this 
tendency could ‘[shed] light on the psychology of dehumanization.... The inverse 
relation between group mind and group-member mind suggests that perceived group 
cohesion should predict a willingness to dehumanize individual members of that group.’
(Ibid: 84) Whilst it seems simply common sense and a self-evident fact to assert that our
treatment of others can be altered by our perceptions of their group-identity, elements 
within this schema often look into precisely how these socio-cultural distinctions tap 
into our core emotive and affective capacities. (Cuddy et. al., 2007: 643-5) 
Victimisation of an out-group, or inclusion of an out-group as a subset of some other, 
larger in-group, may be just as related to the specific affective responses elicited by 
different group allegiances in the human individual as they are to political or social 
expediency (the need for a scapegoat, etc.). 
We can in turn think of this in terms of the ways in which philosophers such as 
Joyce or Jesse Prinz emphasise the interrelated roles of emotion and motivation within 
ethical theory – within this schema there is a strong belief that emotion and disposition 
are bound up with an agent’s affective world. Owen Flanagan makes a similar case 
when arguing for the psychological reality of ethical virtues:
A virtue, if it is accurately ascribed, names a real and reliable pattern among
relata (normally comprised of states or processes in things – in a person and 
the world).... A virtue does play a causal role, and it is mostly inside the 
person. But it is not totally inside the person, and it is not a thing. Instead a 
virtue, like all other character traits (if there any [sic]), is a reliable habit of 
the heart-mind. (Flanagan 2009b: 60-1)
He argues that ‘the ascription of a virtue or a vice is normally an ascription of a 
disposition that reliably activates the desired sequence [of ethical affect and action].’ 
(Ibidem)
Thus, for Flanagan, virtue is both something that depends on psychological 
dispositions and which can be both culturally contingent and in need of cultivation. I 
interpret this to mean that we may have certain sensitivities, but we do not always react 
to them reliably, or in ways that a historically specific culture deems appropriate.62 He 
notes that different schools of thought have their own opinions on what the virtues are – 
we are, for example, disposed to obey “purity norms” to prevent contagion, but what 
62 Or perhaps we react to them in a way that our culture deems appropriate, but that is not altogether 
healthy from a psychological point of view.
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counts as contagion or impurity might vary over time and context. Thus it is possible to 
argue that a number of types of virtue ethics can be understood in the light of how the 
virtues they identify relate to innate dispositions and ways of thinking (Flanagan, 1991; 
2011) and Flanagan has even gone so far as to say that a naturalistic understanding of 
the self can aid in the attainment of a modern version of Eudaimonia. (Flanagan, 2009a,
2009b) Likewise, for Prinz the expression of moral sensibilities is similarly linked to the
interaction between ‘embodied emotions’ and their socio-cultural stimuli. (Prinz, 2003) 
Although an empiricist, Prinz’s line of thought can thus be thought of as a kind of soft-
nativism when it comes to emotions.
To give one more example of this “openness”: the anthropologist Christopher 
Boehm is interested in the ways that cultures have interacted with what he considers the 
varied set of dispositions innate to their constituent members.63 Whilst he generally 
adopts a position similar to that of many of the gene-centrists – in that he feels that 
evolution has endowed us with an strong disposition towards ‘egoism and nepotism’ 
rather than widespread altruism – he nevertheless sees ‘extrafamilial generosity’ as a 
real and definitive part of human nature in need of careful analysis. It is not just a 
phenomenon that can be explained using the logic of brute Evolutionary Psychology to 
ground it in the genetic interests of the individual acting generously; nor is it a cultural 
artefact, something used as a corrective to a corrosive human nature. Human nature 
does not flow from the cold programming of evolution and genetic interest, though 
evolution plays its part in creating it. Instead this generalised altruism is taken by 
Boehm simply to be fairly weak when compared to other, more self-serving impulses, 
but nevertheless on a par with them. (Boehm, 2012: 7-11; 54-57)
He considers this to be illustrative of how human nature and culture intertwine. 
Much like Teehan, Boehm believes that certain cultural artefacts and practices reinforce 
some behaviours and can diminish others, by providing outlets for conflicting and 
ambiguous human dispositions. The innate inclinations of individuals are canalised by 
their social environment towards certain typical human ranges.64 In the case of altruism 
this is accomplished with the culture’s morality, or ethical code, which reinforces their 
63 And this will tie in to the comments on the incorporation of flexibility made in the section 
immediately preceding.
64 Within these ranges, of course, there is a high degree of variation between cultures, say between 
highly communistic and highly autonomous societies or between rigidly hierarchical and very 
egalitarian ones.
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altruistic dispositions to the extent that their society becomes a cohesive whole. 
(Boehm, 2012: 235-236) This socialisation occurs in what he characterises as 
‘predictable’ periods of development (i.e. the early months and years of life in which 
those child psychologists previously cited find regular, repeated patterns of 
development), and in fact represents the refinement of those faculties which make 
society function.
Boehm theorised that a similar arrangement explains much about our tendency 
to form hierarchies (and to resist them). According to him humans encapsulate 
dispositions that lead them to dominate others, to be (or at least appear to be) 
submissive towards social dominants but also to resent their domination. He attributes 
these tendencies to our human nature but describes hierarchy – and what he terms 
“antihierarchy” – as part of our political nature, distinguishing between those things that
can properly be attributed to human agents and the socially instantiated relations they 
generate. On this view, the ambiguous social dispositions that all humans have result in 
a variety of possible social forms. Thus both hierarchical and egalitarian societies are 
equally natural, as they are both based in Human Nature. (Boehm, 1999: 10-13; 38-41) 
Subordinate members of a group can use social ostracism, gossip and ridicule to 
undermine their leaders when they try to exert too much power, and will also deploy the
same social techniques to penalise “upstarts” who try to set themselves above other 
members of the group. Unsurprisingly, Boehm concludes that egalitarian societies are 
achieved not through the elimination of hierarchy, but through the constant, active 
rejection of dominance, as a mediation of Human Nature. (Boehm, 1999: 72-81; 2012: 
246-250; cf. Barclay, 1990)
This may have even had consequences for our evolutionary ancestors. Boehm’s 
theory is that dominant alphas – our chiefs, kings and other leaders – can be essentially 
reinterpreted as bullies since they very often secure their power at least in part through 
the submission of others, as well as accruing to themselves rights over access to sexual 
partners and food. In response the lower status individuals may band together to depose 
(and often kill) the bully and reopen a more favourable access to desirable items within 
the community that were previously monopolised by the alpha. The result of this is the 
lessening of the alpha’s reproductive advantage (or even the complete cessation of 
reproduction) and thus the potential lowered prevalence of "bully genes" which promote
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the desire to dominate, and a converse potential increase in the spread of dispositions 
towards hierarchy-attenuating and/or cooperative activities necessary to a) depose 
bullies and b) guard against the rise of bullies. Boehm and his colleague Jessica Flack 
argue that historically this created evolutionary niches where egalitarian dispositions 
could thrive and become part of the possible range of human social relations. (Boehm &
Flack, 2010; Boehm, 1999) These niches are created more by selecting against certain 
members of a population (bullies) rather than for any particular trait. This is the 
consequence of a recursive relationship between what happens at the cultural level and 
the level of population genetics. Thus over (evolutionary) time a commitment to 
egalitarian cooperation may become not just a beneficial survival strategy, but a highly 
common and widely preferred one. The upshot is that human nature, as we find it, 
consists of hierarchical and anti-hierarchical dispositions – both with their intertwined 
evolutionary pedigrees – existing in tensions intra- and inter-individually. Consequent to
this we find, across a subset of differing human cultures, socio-political practices and 
tactics deployed to limit the power of group leaders and to prevent any one individual 
accruing sufficient prestige or power to dominate the rest (and in other cultures, 
hierarchies ranging from loose to incredibly rigid). These are the cultural mediations by 
which these tensioned dispositions find their equilibria. 
Limitations
The preceding elements of human nature just identified should not be confused 
with the kind of modular view of the psyche espoused by EvoPsych. Although there are 
similarities in the historical character of their explanations for the origins of the human 
dispositions and capacities identified, the thinkers in this schema understand those 
elements as a gamut of interacting parts that result in complex inter- and intra-
personal(/-organism) relationships. That is the defining characteristic of the schema 
which they represent. The (evolutionary) history which gave rise to this human nature 
(if it is invoked at all) simply stands to give a fuller, more rounded analysis. 
Many such elements are themselves understood to be the result of simpler 
processes (processes that many of the experimental papers cited here attempt to 
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penetrate and understand) or dispositions – such as empathetic intuition – which cut 
across a number of the capacities examined so far. As we saw at the start, ethics and 
morality are seen as being themselves evolved aspects of our nature, but are not 
isolatable as specific behaviours, and certainly not as single “instincts” or regions of the 
brain. Of course, attempts to understand the ways in which we think and act, and the 
reasons that we do so in those ways, could fruitfully pay attention to the evolutionary 
context in which they arose. But this is in addition to the cultures and traditions in 
which thinking and acting takes place. Furthermore ‘it is equally necessary that [we] 
should be capable of dealing with the foreground – of abandoning the long perspective 
and looking directly at the motives of individuals.’ (Midgley, 1995: 135, 149n.10) 
Hence motivations, interactions between individuals and a limited incorporation of 
context are all central to a “motivationalist” concept of human nature. (Of course in the 
perspectives that, in this chapter, act as ciphers for the whole schema there are two 
contexts: the social and the evolutionary.)
It should be clear by this point that a notable feature of this schema is the focus 
on a kind of sociological quasi-individualism or hybridism. That is, individuals and their
activities serve as the crux of the analysis, whilst simultaneously there is a recognition 
of the role of social dynamics “built-in” to it. A recognition of how, in Scott Atran’s 
words ‘people are predominantly social actors rather than individual performers....’ 
(Atran, 2011: 35) I would argue that this kind of socially-situated-individualism is a 
strength, since any coherent theory of human nature would have to tackle the idea that 
that nature is instantiated across a variety of unique, diverse individuals acting under 
their own power but nevertheless in strikingly similar ways and with a markedly 
sophisticated understanding of their relations to one another. For instance we might be 
able to say that humanity is cooperative in nature; but this is so because of (and revealed
in) the pro-social dispositions of individuals, canalised and mediated by their (innate 
reactions to) experiences of group belonging (see above).
Those writers and researchers who might be grouped under this schema tend to 
locate human nature in the emotional and psychological dispositions underpinning the 
actions and choices of individuals and their interactions with one another. Even the 
anthropological materials we have considered (rather briefly, for the sake of brevity) are
concerned with how individuals and their culture interact: how culture reflects or 
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reinforces certain human dispositions which are strongly linked to individual agency, 
and yet are universal (if not exactly uniform, and not necessarily thought of as innate) 
across human individuals. Evolutionary anthropology could thus be understood as 
analogous to the in-depth and long-term field work amongst wild ape populations that 
considered in the section on empathy, whilst the developmental psychology studies I 
examined previously correspond roughly to the same kinds of experimental tests carried
out on apes’ cognitive and social competencies. My contention is that this makes them 
even more amenable than is already suggested by their sharing a common scholarly 
object (humans and their competencies/abilities), since there is the same possibility for 
synthesis and cross-comparison as exists in the treatment of other species.
However this same quasi-individualism may also lead to a limitation.65 As Dan 
Sperber notes, we can draw a distinction between level and scope when talking about 
social ontology, and this seems true of human nature also (especially since we might 
consider human nature itself to be part of that social ontology). (Sperber, 2011: 67ff; cf. 
Thigpen & Downing, 1987, De Sardan, 2015: 133ff) If we attempt to untangle level and
scope in this situation, we can start to further distinguish some of the areas of overlap 
between this and its neighbouring schemas. When discussing altruism and cooperation I
made note of the higher level of focus “motivationalist” researchers have taken – 
focussing on our psychological regularities and commonalities, with the evolutionary 
mechanics relegated to a supporting role. At the same time the scope is widened in 
many places, notably in experiments where human or primate subjects are tested in their
interactions with others (mostly of their own species), and in philosophical reflections 
on what such research tells us about traditional concerns within ethics and cognition.
Yet there is still a question of how much of an extension of scope this really 
represents. A number of the spheres of existence treated by this schema are also shared 
and examined by the schema to which we shall shortly come. The major difference here 
is again scope; the motivationalist schema appears to cover some of the interpersonal 
and social levels that are distinctive to the contextual schema. However it might be a 
fair objection that it does so in a limited or selective way: that its “scope” is limited. The
motivationalist schema incorporates an understanding of the socially situated character 
65 Further to this: when we examine an empirical subject we are looking at – and when discussing 
hypothetical subjects, positing – individual instances from which we are attempting to extrapolate 
the generalities and regularities which are the substance of human nature. Here I am suggesting this 
kind of ethological/anthropological individualism has an advantage in doing this explicitly.
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of human nature, especially in those enquiries concerning the social competencies of 
apes and humans, as well as those more anthropological investigations just considered. 
However these still take in only a limited aspect of the social context: researchers 
consider small-scale interactions, over discrete (even if extensive) periods of time, often
with a specific scenario in mind.
Some of this limited scope will be readily apparent in some of the disciplines 
that constitute this schema. Primates tend to live in small groups, and thus this is what 
our ethological observations have to deal with, and although they take part in collective 
hunting and grooming, when researchers devise structured tests of their capacities they 
most often focus on one-on-one interactions. Similarly, child psychology and cognitive 
psychology experiments typically study social groups much smaller than the culture-
wide social group (and sub-cultural subsets) in which their subjects live their day-to-day
lives. In addition, as has been mentioned briefly above, in many experimental scenarios 
researchers are looking at one or two specific characteristics, tendencies or capacities 
rather than the totality of human experience.66 This is a limitation based partly on the 
methods of investigation used by these particular disciplines but there is something 
similar happening in the more philosophical aspects of this schema. Ethical philosophy 
attempts to understand this kind of nature in terms of how it relates to our morality and 
metaethical concerns about realism and anti-realism, whether it approaches the issue 
from a more reserved basis such as the emotion-based morality of Prinz (who we should
remember disputes the idea that human nature makes us what we are, but nevertheless 
holds that we can ground ethics in a naturalistic emotional repertoire), or utilises a more 
elaborate system which directly connects evolution, social group dynamics and moral 
psychology together, such as Joyce. Whilst ethics thus seems to be working with a more
concrete or day-to-day aspect of human existence, its scope can still be construed as 
narrow since it only examines this one particular facet.67 Ethics is far-reaching but not 
all such ethical theories necessarily try to relate the subject to politics, culture or even 
economics (although virtue-based theories will almost certainly have ready relevance to 
66 Again, this is a limitation rather than a criticism. Few, if any, such researchers pretend they are doing
otherwise. Many of the papers cited in this chapter either conclude by raising questions about the 
further implications of their findings, or else attempt to synthesise such findings based on previous 
research into a more complete picture of their human or animal subjects, either as review articles or 
using new, more complex experimental scenarios.
67 Metaethics is especially narrow and hence difficult to reconcile with the more practical aspects of 
human life.
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such topics), and thus limit their scope in terms of how many of the aspects and 
activities of human nature and society they encompass. As Jared Diamond notes: 
‘[a]nthropology, education, psychology and other academic fields have their own 
ideologies, which at any given time focus on a certain range of research topics, and 
which impose blinders on what phenomena are considered worth studying.’ (Diamond, 
2012: 174) Even certain aspects of the anthropological contribution are, it could be 
argued, somewhat narrow. For example Boehm and Flack’s work on hierarchy is highly 
focussed on a few key factors surrounding hierarchy and antihierarchy, although it bears
remembering that the work is synthesised from more extensive anthropological 
investigations undertaken by themselves or others, and the wider context is drawn in 
when comparing the particularities of hierarchies in different cultures.
Nevertheless, we should also keep in mind Diamond’s observation that modern 
western society differs so greatly in scale from traditional societies that it radically 
alters certain contextual elements. He notes, for example, that western societies have 
different perceptions of strangers than traditional societies since we tend to come into 
contact with unknown individuals, whom we may never meet again, on a regular basis. 
Similarly, we are used to the idea that friendships can be transitory and not always with 
people we will interact with on a daily or even weekly basis, whereas such friendships 
would be quite alien to many traditional societies. The mechanisms and interactions – 
such as loyalty or cooperation – may not change much, but how friendships are formed, 
and with whom, do. Anthropologists like Diamond believe such comparisons are 
important and interesting, since even the best designed psychological surveys carried 
out in the “west” will be skewed towards WEIRD68 participants, although he cautions 
against taking direct normative inferences. (Diamond, 2012: 6-9, 174-176; Henrich, 
Heine & Norenzayan, 2010a; cf. Lillard, 1998; Henrich et. al., 2006) 
Yet whilst these researchers do draw upon and use studies that examine whole 
cultures, these cultures are typically rather small – they lack the global context and 
internal complexity of what we tend to think of as “contemporary” society. Indeed this 
observation might be pushed to the limit and used to claim that such societies cannot 
possibly tell us anything about humans in the “modern” world since, for example, they 
can be thought of as representing a pre-historical stage of development. But to make 
68 i.e. Those from White, Educated, Industrial, Rich, Democratic cultures.
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such a claim seriously would require claiming that such people are thus of a very 
different kind of being when compared to other humans, a claim which few would wish 
to make even if it were sustainable. Furthermore, if taken as one component of a wider 
intellectual tradition (as I do here and as is the case at certain interdisciplinary 
conferences) it can be seen that such anthropologically-centred accounts are situated 
within a group of viewpoints making similar, connected claims. 
The result of this is that someone might claim that some element of the human 
experience is a part of our nature because it is simultaneously present in our nearest 
evolutionary cousins, in different human cultures who live very much like our ancestors,
and in the very young offspring of our own species and society. Recalling the criteria 
established in the introduction, such an element could be considered both regular, in that
it reliably occurs across a range of contexts, and pre-cultural. However whilst a 
motivationalist human nature theory of this stripe has undoubted advantages in 
approaching what is natural and innate about human beings, and the regularities it 
identifies are located closer to our everyday, lived experience, it is still not able to 
encompass the entirety of our complex social environment, much less the totality of all 
possible or extant social environments which people find themselves in. A full, 
comprehensive account only emerges as part of a synthesis of multiple different 
viewpoints within (and without) the schema presented here – motivationalist human 
nature cannot be complete in and of itself.
Nevertheless, or perhaps in part because of these considerations, I consider this 
to be an exemplary starting point for a theory of human nature. It presents us with 
something rooted in individuals and therefore (potentially and ideally) within the actual 
individuals encountered in our empirical and everyday experiences. Yet at the same time
these are just the indicators of something we collectively share: each individual acts 
both selfishly and selflessly, but they do so because it is part of their shared humanity; 
each culture has its own customs and values, but these retain their primordial role as 
part of the way we demarcate belonging and kinship (the intrinsic connections between 
these individuals). We are prompted to dig deeper into these various instances to 
discover the unifying continuities and how they come to be expressed differently in 
subtle and less subtle ways. What we want is a fuller accounting of the role of mediating
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agents in this variation of expression.
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3: The Context
If the problem with the human nature theories examined in the preceding 
chapters was that they did not make sufficient account for the way in which their subject
is interrelated with its context, then the present schema embraces this factor in the way 
we actually encounter human nature. The key feature of this schema is the dual 
character of its human nature. In one aspect human nature appears as a core or “kernel” 
which appears as the fundamental, innate component of our humanity. But this nature is 
not static, it is instantiated in a variety of structures and processes; so deeply that it 
cannot be understood outside of them. In short, human nature is transformed by its 
context, and so human nature, properly understood, must be the outcome of that 
transformation, not merely the core. Consequently theories that fit within this schema 
do not view human nature as synonymous with some innate properties nor of natural 
facts-of-the-matter. They do not, necessarily, deny that there are some universal 
consistencies between human beings, but such aspects are not assumed to be the 
principle factor in shaping what it means to be human. Rather, human nature can only 
be fully considered in relation to the context in which humans find themselves, either in 
terms of early experiences or in the ongoing structuring of their lives. The emphasis is 
very much on the way that human nature is what we find human beings to be, and that 
the environment they find themselves in has a crucial role to play in governing what that
will be.
I would contend that a great many contemporary theories fall into this category: 
a set of attributes set the scene, but these are not enough for the theorist to flesh out 
what it means to be human, nor does it reflect how they think and act as humans. Such 
an approach has a great deal of merit: in discussing human nature we want to consider 
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the “finished product”, not just the raw material.69 This can only be done by a 
consideration of the social and/or political sphere.
Given how general this structure can be it would be difficult to give a fair 
hearing to every single paradigm within even a broadly representative sample of 
disciplines. Instead here I propose to expound on the characteristics of this schema by 
looking at two foundational thinkers who – whilst outside the historical frame of the 
other chapters – have impacted on the intellectual climate of the twentieth century in a 
variety of disciplines. These are Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Both have proven 
influential to a range of fields within sociology, political philosophy and critical theory. 
As such they are fitting exemplars or representatives of a more general approach. Both 
can be characterised as seeing the human essence as a matter of processes. Their human 
nature blurs the line between the natural and the political, given that whatever is natural 
is always-already mediated by an individual’s experiences (usually either of the culture, 
or of their socialisation).
Thus the emphasis is robustly on the context, and we can call this variety of 
human nature theory a “contextualist” one. There may be some mild controversy on this
point, in that Marx appears to repudiate the idea of human nature in emphasising the 
role of socio-economic forces in human life. However I think his nascent conception of 
human nature actually reveals itself in the way he deals with the transformative process 
undergone by consciousness. In fact Marx and Freud could be said to represent two 
poles within this particular schema, of how sparse or full the core or kernel might be. In 
Marx’s case it is rather loosely defined, a position in keeping with his assertion that 
human beings are first and foremost historical beings. Freud provides a much fuller 
conception of what underlies human nature in the form of a psychological cosmology of
structured form and desires, attempting to explain how this inner world is in turn 
transformed as the individual matures and becomes socialised into their culture.
The central characteristic of this schema, however, is the transformative aspect: 
69 Another way of thinking about this is that we are considering the ways that the raw material is being 
transformed. Think, for example, of the perspective described by Abu Bakr Ba’askir to Scott Atran, 
considered in the introduction. There human nature is an inherent property, ‘an innate propensity to 
[tauhid/oneness with God]’ but one that can be changed or distorted by the conditions under which 
we live. According to Ba’askir only living in accordance with Islam can this nature (fitrah) remain 
unchanged and intact. (op. cit. Atran, 2010: 14-15) Many religions have paradigms within them 
(dominant or otherwise) which propose similar human nature theories, or theories in which human 
nature can flourish under the correct conditions. Unsurprisingly they tend to claim only their religion
provides these conditions.
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the notion that human nature is a synthesis of a being and its world.  In essence the 
nature of a thing, in this case a human being, can subtly shift depending on the situation 
it finds itself in. However elaborate or minimalist their idea of the core may be, thinkers 
who fall into this third schema will be characterised by the way they relate human 
beings to their context; for them human nature can only be analysed in situ. As such our 
discussion shall retain a strong focus on the role of these transformative processes.
Marx
This general perspective can be manifested in Marxism and Marxist approaches 
in quite significantly different ways. One interpretation is to simply claim that human 
nature has no “natural” component worth speaking of, and that the essential 
characteristics of human beings are all provided by the particular culture said humans 
find themselves in. This is certainly the position taken by Louis Althusser: 
Let us recall the Sixth Thesis [on Feuerbach]: ‘The essence of Man is no 
abstraction inherent in the isolated individual. In its reality, it is the 
ensemble of social relations.’ In the history of Marxism, this brief dictum 
has met and continues to meet, every day, the most edifying and the most 
absurd fate imaginable. Calling it obscure and unintelligible could create a 
scandal. Everyone considers it clear - because it is comprehensible. Not only
does Marx say, in black and white, that man is not abstract, is not an abstract
essence of which ‘the isolated individuals’ would be the subjects (in the 
Aristotelian sense) but he says something that ‘rings true’: the human 
essence is the ensemble of social relations. (Althusser 2003: 253-4)
Althusser goes on to argue that, in the passage he quotes, the term ‘Man’ does not refer 
to “a given individual” – in fact he takes issue with the term itself as misleading (as not 
what Marx really intended to say), given that it is very open to interpretation – but 
instead to a generality embodied in human society.70 (Ibid: 254ff) For Althusser what is 
problematic with Marx’s Sixth Thesis is not the assertion that human beings are socially
determined, but the invocation of an essence which might be thought of as residing in 
human beings themselves, even if Marx’s intent is to disprove such an essence. It is 
somewhat distasteful, in his view, to talk about individuals in relation to the basic tenets 
70 Much of Althusser’s The Humanist Controversy is devoted to purging the foundations of Marxism of
any vestiges of such “idealist” concepts as individuals and subjectivity.
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of Marxian theory, since they have no bearing on what he feels to be the most important 
insights of Marx’s “scientific” historical model.
However this is not the only, much less the definitive, interpretation of Marx. It 
does not necessarily follow that there are no universals in Marx’s theory of human 
nature: on the contrary, for Marx there are definable universal structures and laws which
govern the formation of the socially-determined human being. These can be divided into
two parts. The first is the way that the mode of production governs the formation of 
human identity (consciousness) whilst the second is the dialectical, law-like 
development of history itself.71 This development is, for Marx, primarily about the way 
in which humans produce things within their society: the historical progression of the 
mode of production. This in turn is based on Marx’s assertion that humanity reproduces 
itself, or produces the means of its own subsistence. (Marx, 1994: 80-1, 123-5) At its 
simplest this means furnishing oneself with the bare means of survival through 
agriculture and tool use (as opposed to foraging, for example), but it also incorporates 
all the trappings of civilisation which are constituent of Marx’s and our own societies. 
In terms of technological and industrial advances – as well as innovations in trade and 
financial tools – these more sophisticated expressions of this idea represent an increased
efficiency in the way that human beings reproduce themselves. Throughout history the 
methods by which human beings have secured their existence – through food, shelter 
and so on – have become increasingly sophisticated and efficient, in turn affecting the 
ways that people live their lives. (Ibid: 148ff; cf. Sayers, 1998: 50-3) This effect on 
people’s existence is so pronounced that the idea that they reproduce themselves extends
even to social and cultural practices – not merely their physical bodies. The social and 
political structures which spring up around these increasingly sophisticated modes of 
production are themselves continually replicated and maintained by the productive 
process. This process, after all, furnishes the material base for their existence: a modern 
state could not exist in a subsistence farming culture, nor would it have any reason to. 
Similarly it conditions the consciousness of the population: a monarchic system would 
make more sense to the inhabitants of a feudal world where “organic” productive 
relationships constituted by tithes are the norm; whilst the nation state with 
71 Here I shall mainly focus on the former, since this is the main factor in describing what human 
beings are in terms of the history that unfolds via the latter dialectic.
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representatives and waged civil servants seems to reflect a capitalist mode of production
predicated on piece-work and payment in symbolic currency.
From this it might fairly be said that for Marx human individuals are not the 
bearers of their own nature – that job falls to their (historically determined) culture. 
Peter Loptson describes this in terms of a collective human nature: that human nature is 
not something imbued in human beings per se but in humanity in general. (Loptson, 
2006: 125-6, see also Fromm, 1966:49) For Loptson this means that Marx is best 
described as an “organicist”, since human individuals are not formed by their society (a 
social-constructivist account of human nature in which human beings would be mere 
ciphers for their culture) but are instead inextricably bound up in their social relations 
throughout their existence. 
(Minimalist) Human Nature as Production and Creativity
We should pause here however and note that there is a positive assertion about 
human nature contained within this system. Marx definitively views humans as 
producers of their own existence. In his earlier work this was subsumed under the 
philosophical notion of human beings as ‘species beings’. This was a more specific 
notion of humanity as being something that produces in a universal manner – in other 
words human beings produce things which are usable by any given human being, not 
just the producer for their immediate need. For the “early Marx”, in its fullest 
development, species being would entail being conscious of this fact – human beings 
would be aware of their full potential (and thereby be fully realising it). (Marx, 1994: 
90-3, 172-3) This realisation of our species being thus relies on our freely producing the
means for human existence in the sense that we not only create objects where the end 
user is interchangeable, but where we are also conscious both of this universal nature of 
the objects and of the connection this implies between us. In his later writing Marx 
ceases to talk about species beings; leading some, such as Althusser, to posit a break 
between the young Marx and the old Marx. (see Lewis, 2005: 568; Althusser, 1979) 
Instead this positive element is pared down to the simple fact that human beings 
reproduce themselves. It remains, however, a transhistorical universal element since this
assertion simply refers to the way in which humans secure their own material existence. 
(Stevenson, Haberman & Wright: 2013: 197; Sayers, 2003: 107-8) The mechanism 
109
through which human history proceeds and culture changes over time – the mode of 
production, the means by which this existence is secured in a given historical context – 
is outside of human beings themselves. As such, in order to understand this explicitly 
stated aspect of Marx’s concept of human nature, we really only need to consider human
individuals to be the producers of their own existence, and to construe their existence 
sufficiently broadly to encompass their contextual world, not just their physical being.
This leaves Marx’s approach to human nature in a somewhat unusual position. 
Given this initial grounding his perspective appears very similar to the schema I 
outlined in the first chapter – that a fairly simple fact-of-the-matter about how the world
works can account for the way that human beings are. In that chapter it was a set of 
rules about how evolution worked (and in EvoPsych, how that evolution is supposed to 
have driven our early adaptation), here it seems that an account of human beings as self-
producing takes on this same algorithmic aspect. On the other hand, his stress on the 
development of the means of production, and thus of social life more generally, is often 
taken as validation of the view of human nature as a cipher. As a result some take Marx 
to be a source from which to argue that humanity is a blank slate ready to be turned into 
whatever capitalism or socialism would make of it. However, Marx’s main assertion is 
that the material basis for life determines the cultural and mental life of individuals, and 
thus it is here that the nuances and complexity of his position on human nature are to be 
found. The nearest thing to an innate and transhistorical element to human nature may 
be incredibly minimal, but human nature as a whole does not flow inexorably from it. 
Instead depth is added to this nature by regular and identifiable (exogenous) patterns of 
determination. Neither element constitutes the totality of human nature: instead, Marx’s 
‘concept of human nature is a dialectical composite of essence and existence.’ (Tabak, 
2012: 3)72
It might seem strange to talk of human nature in this way. In a folk-
psychological understanding of the term, Marx’s human nature might appear to be 
simply that element which first leads us into this arena of sociological determination – 
i.e. our habit of reproducing ourselves and the simple fact that this involves interacting 
with the material world. The rest would seem to suggest that human nature is 
72 A similar approach is taken by Rose, Lewontin & Kamin (1990) when articulating an alternative to 
gene-first Darwinism in the final chapters of Not In Our Genes, itself a work heavily indebted to 
Marxist critique and politics.
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overwhelmed by culture; or that human nature is so changeable and ephemeral as to be 
meaningless, both as an actual phenomenon and a theoretical concept. All it takes is a 
technological change of sufficient scale and enough time for that change to initiate 
subsequent social restructuring to significantly alter human nature. However Marx 
insisted that individuals can only be considered in their “concrete” state, rather than 
some “abstract” (i.e. contextless) state, since no actual individual ever conforms to this 
latter, hypothetical picture of what a human being is. Sean Sayers (1998) outlines this 
position as one in which human nature can be considered to be real and yet transient. 
There is something constitutive of the human being, but given the great deal of socially 
determinative input involved this something changes throughout history. This is no less 
real than some kind of “fixed” or transhistorical concept of such a nature since there is 
still a generally stable “nexus” of determination – a thing being determined – in the 
sense that in whatever historical period and under whatever economic structure 
individuals live human beings still exist, they still have similar kinds of relationships 
with the world: they have desires and needs; they have methods of perceiving, 
understanding and interacting with it. These relationships vary depending on socio-
economic circumstance, and so human nature, for Marx, varies accordingly in relation 
to those patterns of determination alluded to previously.
Chief among these patterns are those which impinge on the way in which 
humans experience their world. Notably this involves the way they relate to one another
and to the process of production (indeed, it involves the way they relate to one another 
through the processes of production and exchange). For Marx these relations often 
consist of misattributing permanence and reality to what are actually abstract historical 
contingencies. Because certain things about the way we live our lives are so ubiquitous 
in our culture and so central to the way that the current system works we mistakenly 
interpret them to be necessary conditions for existence. Property relations and methods 
of exchange lose their contingent character. In reality they are only necessary because 
they constitute the mechanisms by which the current system operates. (Marx, 1994: 
124ff; 177-9) One of the best known examples of this is probably his concept of the 
fetish and fetishism. In short, by treating our products as commodities to be exchanged 
we lose some sense of our own power. Products are not made to be used, but to be either
sold or exchanged for an agreed upon wage (and so even a person’s labour can be 
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considered a commodity to be exchanged). The human mental and physical activity that 
went into making an object becomes secondary to that object; commodities and the 
means used to produce them become fetishes imbued with illusory power which 
actually belongs to the people who made them. Thus in modern cultures – particularly 
with the development of capitalism – humanity experiences a world in which it is in the 
thrall of impersonal forces that, Marx argues, only have their power because their 
human origins are obscured. (Sayers, 2005: 613-5) Not only that, but their relations with
one another are mediated by these products and by the money used to trade for them. 
Human sociability itself becomes operationalised in terms of value and exchange. The 
end result of commodity fetishism is a world in which people produce goods but do not 
recognise those goods as the result of their own capacities and creative potential. Instead
individuals’ activities are directed towards an end dictated by the product to be made 
(and ultimately exchanged for something else), not themselves. Humanity thus finds 
itself in a world where objects – and the process by which those objects are produced – 
appear to have power over it.
Human nature is therefore completed or concretised by the relationships 
humanity has with its material world, in accordance with predictable and identifiable 
patterns.73 The particular human nature that Marx describes is of nineteenth century 
capitalist society. He presents it in the process of analysing the economic relationships 
between individuals and the way that objects mediate (and so obscure and direct) those 
relationships. (Graham, 1994: 68-9) Thus much of Marx’s concept of human nature is 
identical to – or identifiable through – the sociological and economic foci that served as 
Marx’s main area of analysis (since, apart from his transitory attempt to outline our 
species being, Marx does not give an explicit account of any kind of human essence). 
This concept of human nature is almost entirely historical, legitimised by the fact that 
human attitudes and actions – basically, human consciousness – vary throughout history
in ways that are concurrent with changes in the socio-economic systems within which 
they are enmeshed. This is the sense in which human nature is a collective property, not 
something within or constituent of individuals, since it is only realised within the socio-
historical context, experienced alongside other human beings. Consciousness – people’s 
‘modes of thought and outlooks on life’ – are governed by shared socio-economic 
73 I have focused here on Marx’s idea of the fetish, but there are others.
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circumstances. (Marx, 1996: 56-7) In the form that Marx analyses, it expresses itself as 
an exploitation of disenfranchised workers with still unfulfilled bourgeois and upper 
classes (since these latter still experience life mediated by objects which are not their 
own, they merely have more of them and a greater illusion of control).74 
Teleology, Potentiality and Consciousness
There is an Aristotelian element – or at least interpretation – latent in this 
formulation. Throughout Marx’s work there is a tension between the way things are and 
the way they could or should be. Humanity finds itself disenfranchised, in an imperfect 
world. However Marx’s theory of history purports to explain how, through the logic of 
exchange, capitalism arose and how it can be replaced by a more satisfactory social 
form (communism). It appears as if there is some potentiality to this human nature 
towards which history is proceeding; a form of society in which the productive 
processes which characterise human existence (including of course humans’ production 
of themselves and their own subsistence) are developed to their fullest and most 
universal extent.  Like Hegel’s concept of history this state of affairs comes about via 
the internal inconsistencies of the great historical epochs, whilst like Aristotle’s pursuit 
of eudaimonia there is also an intra-level dynamic between social agents and the 
historical situation they find themselves in. This ties into Loptson’s characterisation of 
Marx’s conception above as a collective human nature. History is the process by which 
we collectively learn (about ourselves and the world) and reveals our true potential.
Going back once again to Marx’s earlier writings, the source of this 
directionality is much more obvious and the teleological component much more 
pronounced. It is simply part of our species being to produce freely in such a way that 
the human end of the product is clearly visible, not obscured by commerce, vast 
production chains, and wages. If we can do this we will have proven to ourselves our 
essential humanity and our free existence in the world. As such, species being provides 
an ever-present measure for the state of society, as well as acting as a catalyst in the 
historical development of humanity. The human experience of the world is 
74 Arguably, human consciousness is identically determined in each historical age – the variation 
between individuals within that age is attributable to each person’s position within society and their 
relation to the productive process, i.e. by their class. The class structure is itself a kind of 
epiphenomenon of the economic ordering of that society; the determination of consciousness is 
similarly skewed even though this determination happens in the exact same fashion.
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unsatisfactory, brought about by a consciousness left malformed by people’s alienation 
from the product of their labour and from one another: a thwarted expression of species 
being. The development of this consciousness reveals the unsatisfactory nature of socio-
economic reality in general – the cruel contradiction that whilst humanity has become 
more productive and therefore finds it easier and easier to support itself, most or all of 
humanity actually lacks control over this productive capacity, becoming trapped. For the
Young Marx species being, finding itself frustrated and imperfectly expressed in this 
way, due to the economic relationships of previous ages, drove the progression of 
human history forwards through this build up of disaffection, leading to revolt or 
revolution. (Marx, 1994: 48-50; 165-8) Inevitably this process, he believed, would 
cause us to realise the impoverished state of humanity under capitalism and rebel, 
leading to a social form (communism) in which our species being could find its true 
expression. 
In his later works a similar picture still remains, however the condition of our 
mutilated consciousness is further revealed by the introduction of a mature concept of 
fetishism. Additionally, much of the progression of history is now located in the socio-
economic structure itself, in the form of internal contradictions which, when resolved, 
supposedly lead to a restructuring of society. Such is the power of this process that the 
Communist Manifesto actually praises the role capitalism and the bourgeoisie play in 
the unfolding of history, as the immediate precursor to Marx’s classless utopia and the 
destroyer of feudal property relations. (Marx & Engels, 1959: 46-52) Capitalism itself 
will be superseded, however, as its own internal inconsistency creates fractures in 
capitalist societies. Whilst it increases the productive capacity of the economy as a 
whole, it also concentrates the capital proceeds into the hands of a small minority. 
(Marx & Engels, 1906: 685-9; 691-701; Cohen, 1978: 306-7, 309ff; Graham, 1994: 79-
80)
This is not to say that there is no felt element to this process – that the entire 
driving force of social change is situated in the mechanisms of the economy and this 
disconnect between the wealth produced and the number of people to whom it accrues.75
Humanity will still feel frustrated at the impositions of an inhuman system. The 
75 The apparent problem of how to explain why the functional and systemic features of capitalism 
should prompt their own overthrow is explored by Andrew Chitty (1994). He tries to address this by 
reconnecting the “functional” and “phenomenological” strands via the idea of the worker’s frustrated
sense of self.
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sentiment that human potentiality is being denied is reiterated in The German Ideology, 
when Marx expressed it via the declaration that people ‘must overthrow the state to 
achieve [the] fulfilment of their personality.’ (Marx, 1994: 172-3 [emphasis added]) 
Subsequently, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels went on to condemn the 
‘monotonous’ character of labour under capital and point out that working life ‘has lost 
all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman.’ (Marx & 
Engels, 1959: 54) Human agents will, they argue, feel a deep disconnect with their 
world, brought about by the realisation that value and wealth are continually being 
created but few actually experience the benefit of this growth. The task for 
revolutionaries like Marx and Engels is to organise the dispossessed and help them 
realise the connection between their sense of alienation/frustration and the structure of 
society – in other words, to realise that they are alienated, and that this alienation stems 
from the very basis of contemporary economic life. The alternative they offer, 
communism, is itself a social system, like capitalist democracy, and thus realises in its 
constituent members a certain kind of human nature. However the version of human 
nature communism realises is more positive – it realises a supposedly more consistent 
freedom, bringing an end to domination of man by man and of man by capital, thus 
allowing individuals to fully express their potential and creativity. This might be 
regarded as a form of flourishing, in that living in this way we supposedly realise our 
full potential. In order to make this claim we require a standard by which to judge the 
resultant human natures present in a given historical period, which itself implies an 
abstract notion of what humanity ought to be. (cf. Trigg, 1999: 130-2) One can of 
course argue that Marx is simply describing how progressively higher forms of society 
and sociality arise out of the contradictions of the current social order, and that the 
possibility of former gives us grounds for critiquing the latter. (Sayers, 1998: 117-123) 
However this merely defers the problem, since it then implies there must be some 
standard for valuing progress – for describing one form as more advanced than its 
predecessor and simultaneously more desirable because of it. Sean Sayers suggests that 
this may be the development of needs and capacities, which represent ‘a growth of 
human nature, of human powers and capacities’; something he freely admits lends Marx
a further Aristotelian inflection. (Ibid: 134-7; Fromm, 1966: 49-50; see also Sayers, 
2003: 119)
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Taken in this way, Marx’s human nature presents itself in the form of a 
resistance to the fetishism and lack of control (autonomy) endemic within the capitalist 
system. Alienation is not merely a description of the state of the world but is something 
which is experienced, the evidence for which Marx finds in the rise of workers’ 
organisations and unions. (Marx & Engels, 1959) Furthermore it is holding us back, 
tying us to a specific historical context we have the potential to outgrow. There is some 
aspect of humanity which is not fulfilled – some creative potential not being exercised –
which can only be properly expressed in a society either where such alienation has been 
overcome, or our potential capacity as such can be given free rein. (Schecter, 2007: 11-
7; 181, Loptson, 2006: 138; Stevenson, Haberman & Wright, 2013: 197) Even with the 
possibility of a “break” between the Young Marx and his later writings we can find 
continuity in this aspect of realising some human potential currently strangled by the 
contemporary context. (op. cit. Fromm, 1966: 75-6) Within the tension between the way
things are and the way they should be we thus find a somewhat fuller account of what 
humans are, already bound up within Marx’s socio-political analysis (just as he himself 
argues that humans are always already bound up within that socio-political context). 
(Tabak, 2012) Abstract or otherwise, the measure by which capitalism is judged to 
confound human freedom and warp human nature/consciousness, and by which 
communism is judged to correct these deviations, can only come from some core76 
around which historical conditions accrete and give rise to a certain form of (historically
contingent) human nature. 
We thus arrive at an understanding of what the structure of Marx’s human nature
looks like. Human beings as productive beings who exist within a certain relationship to
the material world from which they gain their sustenance and create their lived world. 
Attached to this productive nature is a degree of creativity and an implied sociability 
which, although not the primary determinates of human nature, nevertheless interact 
with the realities of social existence to produce discord or contentment in the 
individuals of a given historical period. This second feature seems to point towards a 
fairly sparse psychology of inclination and expectation: ‘If human beings cannot be 
happy, feel fulfilled, feel that their lives have meaning or occasions of creative joy, 
76 A core comprising certain ideas about the fidelity of consciousness and one’s relationship with the 
realities of material existence.
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without having work in which they express themselves, that will be a psychological fact
about human beings, a matter of a certain kind of psychic need....’ (Loptson, 2006: 133 
[emphasis original]) However any such psychic needs will be intimately bound up with 
the material conditions inherent in a society: 
In the social production of their lives men enter into... relations of 
production which correspond to a specific stage of development of their 
material productive forces. The totality of these relations of production 
forms the economic structure of society, the real basis from which rises a 
legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond specific forms of
social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the
social, political and intellectual life-process generally. (Marx, 1996: 159-60)
There is no reason to suppose that these observations cancel one another out, or that one
is prior to the other.77 Instead what is “conditioned” by the relations of production is this
minimal set of precepts: that humans beings produce; that they are capable of having a 
psychological connection with/to the object of their work (and hence to the work itself);
that the nature of such connections necessarily affects their view of the external world; 
and that these connections and this view in turn mediate their relationships with one 
another and any sociable dispositions we may reasonably suppose them to have. 
Marx’s concept of human nature is therefore less bound up with the natural or 
ontological origins of “humanity” and instead involves a more theoretical philosophical 
anthropology. Insofar as Marx does consider humans naturalistically it is in order to 
situate humanity within a material context, as opposed to the Hegelian idealism to 
which he was simultaneously indebted and critical. He repudiates Hegel with the 
argument that since ‘man is a corporeal, actual, sentient, objective being with natural 
capacities [this] means that he has actual, sensuous objects for his nature as objects of 
his life-expression, or that he can only express his life in actual sensuous objects.’ 
(Marx, 1997: 325, emphasis original) Thus humanity’s existence as a corporeal entity 
necessarily entails its existence as a historical entity, bound up as it is with the context 
of its mode of production.
The Core and (Human) Needs
77 Although much of the prior discussion reveals that in terms of a Marxist analysis, interrogation of 
the social reality will take precedence and priority, as this is the element most given to change; both 
in terms of the present subject, human nature, and Marx’s main interest, social and political 
experience.
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Much of Marx’s work is concerned with unravelling the effects of social, 
political and, especially, economic systems on human existence. Aside from the concept
of species-being – which is absent from his later work and which he effectively 
repudiates in his theses on Feuerbach (Marx & Engels, 1976: 5-6) – the possibility of an
innate component, what I have referred to as a kernel or core, is relatively unexplored. It
might be that such a core consists solely of the tendency to produce, and yet, as Peter 
Loptson points out, much of the normative content in Marx’s work suggests an implicit 
affirmation of a (limited) range of ‘psychological fact[s]’ and ‘psychic need[s]’. 
Sayers (1998) for one is prepared to take up the idea that there are innate natural 
aspects of humanity, particularly in the form of needs. However initially these needs are 
fairly minimal – food, sleep and other metabolic requirements – with additional and 
more sophisticated needs being furnished over the course of human historical 
development. These later needs are no less real than their innate physiological 
counterparts, but they depend for their existence on the extension of human capacities 
and desires entailed by the advancement of our collective productive forces and 
techniques, not on ingrained physical or psychological dependencies characteristic of 
our species. They are not objective requirements for survival, but felt, psychological or 
experiential states. Such needs constitute conditions which must be fulfilled or states 
which must be attained in order for the individual to gain a degree of psychological 
satisfaction (or, arguably, completeness) within their socio-political context. This is 
equally true for the humanist Erich Fromm, who sees in such needs a bleakness 
characteristic of capitalism. (Fromm, 1966: 54-6) In the capitalist context many of these
needs have no reference to human capacities, they ‘are not expressions of man’s latent 
powers, that is, they are not human needs’ but synthetic, created wants. For Fromm this 
all comes from one source: ‘The need for money is therefore the real need created by 
the modern economy, and the only need which it creates.’ (Ibidem) Sayers, however, is 
prepared to acknowledge a more varied set of real needs, in particular the need to work 
and the need for leisure. (Work here understood as activity directed towards some 
socially productive end. Often this involves the creation of some physical product.) We 
need to work not only to secure money, but also because we are disciplined and 
conditioned to view constant productive activity as normal. The need to labour is not 
simply created by the need to secure money with which to purchase necessities, but 
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becomes a psychological necessity itself. 
Herein we can find room to question such a minimalist transhistorical core. 
Primarily this concerns what is included in or excluded from the core. By leaving the 
core so sparse, and much of its content78 only dealt with implicitly, we risk 
misattributing certain features or phenomena solely or primarily to the context rather 
than to a confluence of human and contextual affects. Sayers’ discussion of the need for 
work in capitalist societies, which he sees as the outcome of a particular mode of 
production, is one potential instance. Pre-capitalist individuals seem to have no such 
need to work – Sayers cites the opinions of early nineteenth century industrialists 
condemning their workforce for idleness, as these people were unaccustomed to the 
disciplined and regulated work habits that were expected of them. These industrialists 
derided the ‘indolence’ of their workforce, comparing it to the supposedly unproductive 
lifestyles of indigenous communities in the colonies. Meanwhile Sayers agrees that 
small-scale traditional societies are for the most part ‘idle’ (although not in the 
moralistic sense meant by the nineteenth century industrialists) and do not feel 
compelled to work nearly as much as modern capitalist citizens. (Sayers, 1998: 48-51) 
Conversely, individuals in a capitalist world feel compelled to work, or else feel 
unfulfilled. According to Sayers this is clearly shown by Marx to be the result of 
inculcating Hegel’s ‘habit of industriousness’ or Marx’s ‘general industriousness’ (op. 
cit. Ibid: 52) into the population (particularly the proletarian population). Whilst Marx 
sees this as being carried out under threat of coercion (revocation of wages, poor laws 
and most significantly the socio-economic structure of society where all conditions for 
life are subsumed under the capitalist productive model) he also considers its 
monolithic, all-encompassing character to have indelibly stamped human consciousness 
with the perception that this is a primary condition of existence; hence it becomes a 
need to work. As a result, here is a need clearly dependant on historical circumstance for
its existence, even whilst it is a felt psychological (almost phenomenological) feature of 
human existence. 
However, the ‘modern need to work’ may not necessarily be a qualitatively new 
‘historically developed need’ (Sayers, 1998: 53) but instead the expression of a need for 
activity, itself merely the aversion to lack of stimulus. We might consider the mental 
78 Creativity, productivity, socially-disposed, etc.
119
derangement experienced by both humans and animals when kept in confinement, 
especially when in isolation, as well as the aversion to ostracism in traditional and 
contemporary cultures. To be cut off from stimuli is deleterious, and we actively avoid 
it. “Traditional” or “Late-Pleistocene-appropriate” societies may well have more idle 
time, but they still find ways to fill it even if these ways do not involve “work” in this 
modern sense. Their time is filled – even if we discount such minor errands as light 
foraging, tool maintenance and fletching – with what we might ironically term “indolent
activity”: with gossip (critical to monitoring communal threats), keeping an eye on 
children, grooming, fire-tending, and numerous other social activities crucial to the 
whole community’s way of life.79 So Sayers may be missing something important: that 
these people are not so idle as his nineteenth century sources (with their derogatory 
label of “indolence”) believed. Although they are not working for as long or in as 
regimented a way as capitalist labourers, and do not appear to be producing any 
physical or intellectual products, these people are not as inactive as first impressions 
suggest. Perhaps this is what Johan Huizinga (1949) alluded to in his discussion of the 
play element of human culture – certainly he seemed to disapprove of the 
instrumentalised way in which play has come to be viewed in the past few centuries, as 
mere practice for other enterprises. 
It may be that there is simply an aversion to inactivity which prompts us to do 
things like socialise, tell stories and play games. If this were the case what has been 
historically and socially determined is the pattern in which this aversion has been 
structured in the modern world. Capitalist man associates working with keeping itself 
stimulated, of avoiding isolating inactivity, and from there develops a need to work (no 
less genuine than the same need as Sayers articulates it). Other activities, we have been 
79 According to Diamond some societies, during the night when we would expect people to be most 
inactive, regularly wake up and continue the discussions they were having earlier. (Diamond, 2012: 
248) He also relates an instance of two men exhaustively discussing the amount of sweet potato and 
how much everyone had eaten, and speculates that such apparently idle gossip in fact has an 
important function – it helps people to monitor their food reserves. (Ibid: 273-4, 299-300, see also 
290-2) Similarly Boehm has also described how gossip is a crucial tool, in some societies, for 
keeping the chief in line by subtly undermining their position, preventing them from becoming a 
bully.
I would hesitantly propose that the crass characterisation of gossip as a “feminine” activity may have
its roots in a practice, developed in early modern and Victorian polite society, of male dinner guests 
retreating to another room for brandy and cigars whilst the women sat separately for their own 
postprandial activities. Here the men folk could pretend to themselves that a discussion of current 
events interspersed with observations of the activities of absent contemporaries was something other
than “mere” gossip, whilst denigrating the social utility of the conversation of the “womenfolk.”
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told, do not really count as activity. Similarly, the need for leisure arises because there is
no enjoyment in this activity (i.e. it fulfils only one human need, a drive towards 
activity, and ignores others) and because it has been so over-structured. 
Elsewhere, Sayers himself offers another potential candidate: a Hegelian idea 
that human beings have an impulse towards ‘self-realisation’ – that we transform nature 
and thus get a better understanding of what we are, through experiencing ‘all [of our] 
practical activity which has an effect in the world.’ (Sayers, 2005: 612-4, see also 
Sayers, 2003) We express ourselves through our interactions with the environment, and 
capitalism regulates and directs these interactions. Capitalist work – and its disciplined, 
regimented character; the experience of it as a need – would thus be a contingent 
historical emanation of a deeper impulse (of which there is a higher and more complete 
development). Read in this way such a determination of human nature would thus beg 
the question: do we think of the core of human nature as a set of dispositions and 
aversions, or do we suppose there to be some characteristic feature of human beings that
can be either developed or realised, or is it something else? Furthermore if some facts 
excluded one or the other (or both) we ought to be obliged to drop it as a theoretical 
cornerstone and reassess whatever else relies on them.80 In essence: if we can show that 
certain theoretical systems do make assumptions about human nature then we can 
critique – and even potentially test – such assumptions. This in turn may complicate, or 
provide new tools for, said theoretical system(s), beyond the question of their 
philosophical anthropology.
However, regardless of which candidate for the core that we find most 
compelling, we still face the same problem. That this need for activity would have been 
conditioned by the historical context into becoming a need for work – i.e. the individual 
becomes accustomed to the increased amount of activity entailed by the capitalist 
conception of work – certainly supports the idea that human nature is historically 
determined, but to say that this is the sole or primary determinate – and that human 
nature itself is therefore historical – would require ignoring the underlying impulse/need
which has been thus transformed. I do not propose to provide a definitive answer here to
80 What I am implying here is that if Sayers (2003, 2005) is wrong – if there is no reason to suppose 
that human beings objectify themselves and their relationship with nature in their products – then we
should not only question the extent to which a need for work is uniquely historical, but also reassess 
the traditional Marxist explanation for the phenomena he believes it pertains to (i.e. our alienation 
under capitalism). 
121
the question of which, if any, of these determinates should be treated as primary, merely 
to raise an objection to the implicit attitude that the existence of one disproves the 
other.81 Both of Sayers’ accounts propose a core sufficiently content-full that a strictly 
context-based account becomes problematic. What is at stake is not the presence of a 
need for work (or leisure, or spiritual fulfilment, or self-realisation, or whatever) versus 
the absence of such a need, but a shift in emphasis onto a relationship between an 
anterior need/disposition and its context: a move to try and resolve what is being 
determined and how.82 This shift would require a more nuanced consideration of the 
relationship between universal, innate components on the one hand and their social 
expression as part of a totality of human nature on the other than the declaration that 
‘human nature itself has been transformed.’
Freud
Sigmund Freud presents a rather more clear-cut example of this schema. Not 
only does his work centre on the ways in which human psychology is affected by its 
experience, but Freud also presents a highly developed idea of the innate structure of 
that psychology, along with the “drives” or “instincts” which form the basis of his 
human nature. These drives mean that the kernel of Freud’s human nature is rich, 
especially in comparison with someone like Marx, whilst the clearly defined internal 
structure provides a relative determinateness to the way in which that kernel functions. 
In this process of transformation Freud also represents a contrasting approach, in that 
the focus is on the individual and his idea of human nature is more individualistic83 than 
81 This is reminiscent of one of the objections that can be made in response to Pinker – his “proofs” of 
the innateness of certain behaviours do not disprove any assertions that said behaviours are (also) 
determined by society, economic circumstances, cultural practices etc.
Nor is this objection strictly directed towards Marxism, but could conceivably apply to any thinker 
or school of thought that fits within this schema, or indeed beyond. We might, for instance, respond 
with nihilistic scepticism to vitalist claims that activity is the expansive expression of a metaphysical
inner life force and ask whether it is not simply a naturalistic fact of the matter about any sufficiently
evolved lifeform.
82 Within a strictly Marxist context, possible candidates already exist: Tabak (2012) sums up a Marxian
position which tries to elucidate a formal relationship between a human essence and human 
existence, whilst Olson (2013) tries to relate Marxist political theory to biological and 
neuroscientific accounts of empathy, emotion and ethical awareness.
83 Here I mean “individualist” in the sense that its referent is the individual, rather than necessarily 
involving the self-interest/-assertion of any given individual, although this does feature in Freud’s 
work.
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Marx’s collective human nature. This is hardly surprising given that Freud’s 
psychoanalysis involved studying individuals’ (pathological) psychologies, and so we 
might well expect that his idea of human nature has a similar emphasis on the workings 
of individual minds. This is not to say that he does not see particular characteristics and 
behaviours as symptomatic or emblematic of the way(s) in which particular kinds of 
society influence those who live within them. In this respect there are certain national 
characters, dispositions and degrees of civilisation which are dependent on common 
socio-cultural contingencies and therefore lend, if not a collective element, then a shared
one to Freud’s human nature.
Consciousness and Unconsciousness
Central to Freud’s work – and to psychoanalysis in general – is the split between 
the conscious and the unconscious mind. On the one hand we are aware of our world, 
are capable of making choices and of analysing and considering those choices; on the 
other, say the psychoanalysts, we also have a repository of unacknowledged and 
potentially repressed desires and impulses that we may not even be aware of. This is 
hardly unique, of course – in earlier chapters the idea that prior impulses influence an 
individual’s behaviour was taken as a given – however psychoanalysis seems to 
distinguish itself by considering the conscious and unconscious as two integral parts of 
a whole personality. In other words the latter is not treated as solely a primordial or 
originary source upon which specific desires or conscious thoughts are formed; it also 
serves as a repository of suppressed desires and experiences with which the 
consciousness is in near-constant interrelation. (Freud, 1991: 194ff) 
Furthermore these two parts need not be in total harmony. Much of Freud’s work
as a practitioner was based on establishing the causes of supposed rifts between the 
conscious and subconscious mind which in turn led to his patients’ neuroses and 
hysteria. Freud’s human nature is not always harmonious and rarely guaranteed to be 
stable. In fact pathology is not only accommodated but it is almost to be expected, at 
least in some individuals. This lends a particularity to our nature as human beings since,
although everyone shares the same basic psychological structure and primordial drives, 
contingent occurrences during upbringing or circumstantial obstruction of present 
desires can lead to peculiarities of individual personality. Extreme instances, of course, 
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lead to the aforementioned potential psychopathology. This variability and particularity 
is significant, inasmuch as – whilst perhaps not as context dependent as Marx’s view – 
Freud’s idea of human nature can only be completely thought about by incorporating 
external circumstances. This is the key feature of the present schema, and the division 
(and potential for opposition) between the conscious and unconscious mind 
simultaneously forms part of the basis for Freud’s context-sensitive approach whilst 
being a universal feature of human psychology.
Id, Ego & Super Ego
In addition to the differentiation between the conscious and unconscious 
elements of the psyche Freud divided human psychology into different arenas. This 
tripartite structure was the successor to the binary split between the conscious and 
unconscious, although it retained many of the key features, and Freud’s work on this 
subject retains the use of the terms conscious and unconscious in describing the general 
character of each part. Of particular note is the continuation of the idea that there are 
internal dynamics to human nature, closely associated with a similarly internal diversity.
Firstly there is a division of the personality into sections dealing with inbuilt drives, 
self-awareness and idealised normative standards; in turn there may well be disparities 
between the demands made by the drives and by the normative standards. As a result the
individual must mediate between internal and internalised impulses, and again this 
process may contribute towards an individual’s (i.e. a psychoanalytic patient’s) 
psychopathology.
Freud described the id (or the “it”) as the source of the internal impulses: 
essentially drives and desires. Largely unconscious, as the name suggests the id appears 
as an “other” – internal and yet seeming rather alien to our conscious awareness when 
its impulses make themselves felt. The id also contains the more primal and native 
elements of human nature: drives and instincts which are inherent parts of the human 
psyche by virtue of its constituent biological or vital basis. 
It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality.... It is filled with energy 
reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no 
collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the 
instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle. (Freud, 
1985: 105-6)
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As might be expected this implies that the id has a close connection with the human 
animal.84 (Sulloway, 1980: 364-7; Freud, 1991: 308-10) The id ‘contains everything that
is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution....’ (Freud, 1969:
5; 1991: 378) This also manifests in his appealing to the biological/physiological 
foundations of life at several key junctures. For Freud there is clearly a link between the
material substrate of the human being and its mental and psychological operation, even 
if he remains agnostic about the precise intermediary mechanisms involved. (Freud, 
1991: 316-323, 385-8; Sulloway, 1980: 13ff; see also Wollheim, 1991: 20-24; Sulloway,
1980: 421-2)85
The id is not, however, simply a repository or passive supplier of demands. It 
has a regulatory function, and in doing so works with the ego. Its primary motivation 
emerges from the ‘pleasure principle’, the requirement to lessen unpleasure (rather than 
simply maximising pleasure) through expressing certain drives (again, rather than 
reaching some maximum pleasure which it may not even be possible to attain). In 
pursuit of this the id itself has a hand in defusing or releasing ‘tensions’ created by the 
instinctual impulses it contains. (Freud, 1991: 387-8) As such even this underlying 
component, “hidden” from our day-to-day awareness, plays an active role in human 
mental life – in fact it plays a major part. (cf. Freud, 1973: 46) Crucially the foregoing 
also serves to highlight how Freud’s human nature is dynamic and spontaneous. Since 
the id not only provides a source of unconscious motivation, but is also involved in 
reconciling and expressing varied and occasionally conflicting drives, we can see how 
Freudian human nature is underpinned by something which changes over time, 
dynamically reacting to circumstance. In terms of psychoanalysis this might be thought 
of in terms of the deterioration of an individual’s mental health and, through the 
psychoanalyst’s treatment, the restoration of their psychological well-being. Such 
development also takes place naturally (non-pathologically) as the individual matures.
The ego’s function, on the other hand, is to act as the primary site of mediation: 
it attempts to reconcile the varied demands of the id, super-ego and external world. 
84  Although this is a distant cousin to the ethological treatment of said animal covered in the previous 
chapter. Freud tends to discuss the naturalistic underpinnings of his psychoanalysis in terms of the 
necessities of life and the expression of vital energies inherent in biological beings (which we should
also distinguish from the independent animating forces of vitalism).
85  At one point he appears to appeal to a Lamarkian theory of inheritance to bolster his ideas: ‘...when 
[experiences] have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in 
successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the 
impressions of which are preserved by heredity.’ (Freud, 1991: 378)
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(Freud, 1969: 5-6) As a function of this role it moderates the id’s attachment to the 
pleasure principle by acting in accordance with the ‘reality principle’, meaning the 
impediments, constraints and opportunities presented by the real world in which the 
individual finds itself. (Freud, 1991: 278-80) In this regard the ego can be seen as the 
centre of the personality, since it is the part of the individual which interacts with the 
outside world. However it bears mentioning that it develops: the ego becomes 
differentiated from the id through the early stages of life. (cf. Freud, 1973: 3) Thus an 
individual’s particular personality is also an emergent factor, unique to them and their 
situation (particularly, for Freud, their upbringing, although it also involves their 
cultural milieu). Given the centrality of the ego’s role, its developmental aspect and its 
mediatory function it becomes clear that Freud’s idea of human nature prohibits 
thinking of individuals in isolation from their context. Our conception of the human 
being is incomplete without acknowledging its gradual socialisation and the effects of 
maturation. 
This is simultaneously emphasised and complicated by Freud’s prominent 
interpreter and successor Jacques Lacan, for whom the ego is itself an illusory construct 
that gives a false sense of stability. In either case, the ego is the aspect to which people 
refer to when they say “I”.86 However for Lacan the ego is separate from one’s 
subjectivity. The former is largely conceived of in terms of a fixed entity (comparable to
the seemingly fixed and complete individuals surrounding the young subject as they 
develop), a conception reinforced by external cues, initially visual but subsequently 
verbal and semantic. (Lacan, 2006; cf. Bocock, 2002: 23-4) The emergence of the ego is
really the development of the subject’s self-image of itself as an ego. This is less true of 
Freud’s original conception; however his ego still needs to contend with the 
confrontation between the individual’s view of itself as a stable “I” and the myriad 
competing (sometimes conflicting) demands placed on it not just by the id and super 
ego but also by the external world. Regardless of which interpretation we opt for, this 
psychoanalytic human nature is eminently controllable – through the psychoanalytic 
process – despite the hidden, primal “driving force” contained within the id. Although 
there is a powerful wellspring of universally occurring (dynamic) drives, Freudian 
human nature is amenable to change: through therapy analysing the ego’s experiences 
86  Hence Freud’s name for it in the original German: ‘das Ich’.
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and traumas, therapist and patient are supposedly able to find the root cause of 
psychological disruption. From there they can devise methods for sublimating and 
directing repressed desires, “ironing out” some of the contradictions in human nature. 
Our nature is thus not “fixed” in the sense of being static or unbending, since there are 
higher-order functions which can regulate and, with effort, even understand and control 
our deepest unconscious impulses.
The ego, however, doesn’t simply need to accommodate the id but also the super
ego. In many ways the super ego represents the ideal self – in Freud’s system it 
represents the demands of morality, propriety and other normative standards. It contains 
a person’s “conscience”. Like the id, the super ego is an unconscious pressure; however 
given the influence of external cues, particularly from parents and other authority 
figures, it is much more particular and contingent. This is because the super ego gets its 
content from these external sources, as the individual identifies with and reacts to 
authority figures. (Freud, 1991: 370, 373-4; Bocock, 2002: 76-9) Over the course of 
development, as the super ego distinguishes itself from the id and ego, it internalises the
standards set by society and by these authority figures which permeate the individual’s 
world.87 (Freud, 1973: 60-3, 78-9) This role of the internalised voice of authority often 
makes the super ego domineering and repressive: its demands can be felt as 
overwhelming and excessively prescriptive. (Freud, 1973: 73; 1991: 376-9, 395-6; 
Critchley, 2008: 82-4) It will make demands and judgements which the ego, operating 
under the reality principle, cannot always fulfil or acquiesce to. Even if the ego does 
conform to these standards, if the super ego’s normative pressure cannot be redirected, 
sublimated or given a less toxic “ego ideal” then it will persecute the individual, 
subjecting them to violent feelings of guilt and anxiety. (Freud 1973, 68-70, 73-4; 1991:
392-400; cf. Critchley, 2008: 83)
Of course the positive role of the super ego should not be underplayed, 
particularly the role its normative standards play in encouraging consistency and moral 
development. However the main interest it holds here is how it highlights the way in 
which this schema can think of human nature as something flexible or mutable, even 
over the lifetime of the individual, and how this flexibility interacts with the outside 
world. The Freudian super ego is particularly significant since it highlights the reason 
87  In fact this internalisation effectively constitutes the emergence of the super ego.
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for Freud’s inclusion under this schema. Whilst the super ego represents the 
incorporation of contextual pressures, it also remains an internal factor in the 
psychological ecology of the individual human being. (Critchley, 2008: 87) The 
human’s openness or receptivity to contextual affects and influence is a component part 
of its personality and nature, as well as simultaneously playing a pivotal role in driving 
that aspect which Freud is especially interested in regarding human nature, i.e. its 
aberrations, its pathologies and the potential to treat them. Furthermore, outside sources 
do not regulate the individual; agents themselves have a crucial component which fills 
this role, created from internalised standards.
Eros, Thanatos, and Opposition Within Human Nature
Alongside this structural component we should consider some of the content of 
Freud’s kernel. At the core of this human nature Freud and his fellow psychoanalysts 
identified a range of primitive impulses, which Freud attributed to two general sources: 
the creative (or erotic) libido and the destructive death drives (called Thanatos, in 
counterpoint to Eros, by some of his later interpreters). (Freud, 1991: 380ff) The first of 
these covers activities and desires associated with positive/constructive action towards 
some kind of end88 such as continued survival and its necessary conditions, especially 
concerning sex – a notorious interest of Freud’s – hence its association with the libido. 
The second is associated with aggression and domination when directed towards the 
outside world, although Freud also attributed to it a role in the pathology of repetition in
neurotic and trauma cases, sometimes associating it with a seeking of symbolic or actual
death. (Ibid: 308-9, 311) These twin forces, mutually opposed to one another, form the 
general basis for the internal dynamics of an individual’s personality. They are, 
however, universal; it is the relationship between them and their interaction with the 
external world that are the source of individual specificity. As such they simultaneously 
represent the shared basis for human nature and play an explanatory role in describing 
the variability of individual natures. 
Thus both Eros and the death drives represent a primitive, innatist foundation for
human nature. Freud sees their origin as lying in deep-rooted instinctual influences 
inherent in living things themselves. However, whilst in his earlier work Freud connects
88  Although the outcome of such drives might not always be construed as “positive” in a normative 
sense.
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instincts with biological imperatives he later became more circumspect and cautioned 
against being overly specific as to the nature of specific, ultimate-cause instincts. Since 
we can only really know general psychological trends via the specifics of individuals’ 
experiences which have specific objects or goals as their focus these are what 
psychoanalysis must focus on. (Freud, 1991: 120-1, 179; see also Bocock, 2002: 37-8) 
Consequently Eros and Thanatos are not equated with specific or identifiable 
psychological imperatives which can be formally codified, but are instead general 
classifications of underlying impulses, only really glimpsed through their workings 
behind the scenes of a patient’s neuroses or repressions. Given that they are so deep 
rooted, Freud concludes that these libidinal and death-seeking drives are effectively 
indestructible. They are eternal and universal regularities; not only prior to culture but 
also resistant to it. However they are, in everyday life, variously repressed, suppressed, 
redirected and sublimated, leading to a variety of outcomes that may be either healthy or
unhealthy. This last point is a key factor in his therapeutic work – the treatment of 
various neurosis and fixations can be effected by actively sublimating or directing 
impulses towards more healthy outlets via therapy, particularly in instances where they 
have become intransigently fixated on certain objects, or have been turned in against the
individual itself.89 Nevertheless, these directing activities exist beyond therapy, even 
playing a role in the manifestations of religion, desire and morality, such that these 
innatist foundations suffuse human sociality in all its variety. (Freud, 1918; Lacan, 
2006: 578-80; cf. Critchley, 2008: 71-2)
Alongside and in contrast to the foregoing, the opposition between these forces 
is a key factor in the lack of stability inherent in human nature as Freud sees it, since 
individuals carry within them a crucial antagonism which can potentially disrupt their 
psychological equilibrium. The opposing forces of Eros and Thanatos can also help 
drive the tension between the ego and the id. In Freud’s writing the libido is often 
associated with both the id and the ego. (Freud, 1991: 308-14, 385-8) The erotic libido 
is transformed by its sublimation within the ego, via the ego’s drive to master both the 
pleasure principle (originating in the id and serving as the id’s own internal motivation),
and the reality principle by which it attempts to steer a path through the vicissitudes of 
89  As will perhaps be clear by now, there is a link between Freud’s therapy (as psychoanalytic 
practice) and his theoretical formulations (as psychoanalytic “science”). (cf. Wollheim, 1991) This is
all the more clear when we consider how he appeals to case studies – both his own and his 
contemporaries’ – as evidence for his theorisations.
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both the inner and external worlds. (Ibid: 75ff, 369, 386-7) This results in the 
‘desexualised’ constructive impulses such as love and attachment, although it also 
contributes to narcissism. “Thanatos” is normally a preconscious ‘conservative’ 
directionality leading towards death. This death instinct can also, like the libido, be 
directed by the ego, leading to aggression directed at the outside world. It even makes 
its presence felt in the super ego as well in the form of aggression directed inwards on 
the agent itself, often as guilt. (See Ibid: 381-2, 395-6, 418) Whilst this is not an exact 
mapping it nevertheless contributes to the dynamism of the human psyche, which in 
turn helps anticipate the possibility of variability between different human individuals.
However it is important to note that the opposition mentioned above is not solely
pathological. The aforementioned transformation and redirection of the two instincts on 
the part of the ego is indicative of the flexibility and spontaneity of human psychology, 
as Freud sees it, rather than an aberration. These contradictory forces are normal 
components of our nature and coping with them is simply a part of what it means to be 
human. It would consequently be misleading to suggest that opposition is necessarily 
harmful or even combative, a theme that extends into Freud’s more socially-oriented 
reflections. Opposition can be constructive and is even supposed to be crucial to the 
way the individual exists within their society.
The External World
This leads us to look more closely at some of the aspects of context only briefly 
touched on above, beyond the role of authority figures and normative systems in 
forming the super ego/ego-ideal. Most crucially is the opposition between 
society/culture and the more chaotic excesses of the primal drives. Society represses 
certain parts of the kernel of human nature as part of its own function. This is not some 
kind of imposition or problem, but is a beneficial and necessary occurrence. Freud, like 
others throughout history, saw a destructive side to human nature which the controlling 
forces of society help to contain.90 This containment makes cooperation and sociality on
any scale larger than a family possible – it is simply the role or function that society is 
“designed” to fulfil. Freud’s Civilisation and its Discontents (1973) lays out the idea 
that society works to direct aggression into socially acceptable avenues, but stresses:
90  The first world war was, for him, ample proof of this.
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[I]t would be unfair to reproach civilisation with trying to eliminate strife 
and competition from human activity. These things are undoubtedly 
indispensable. But opposition is not necessarily enmity; it is merely misused
and made an occasion for enmity. (Freud, 1973: 49 [emphasis original])
Additionally, conscience, guilt and fear of reprisals can all have a positive role 
to play in maintaining society, and socialisation is crucial to creating attachments and 
mutual identification (a shared sense of community). Thus, social conventions 
(internalised by the individual) place limits on inter-agent conflict and channel 
aggressiveness into socially constructive pursuits. ‘Civilisation,’ according to Freud ‘has
to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive instincts....’ (Ibidem) 
Civilisation (and religion) keeps order by channelling erotic instincts into “love” and 
other forms of attachment, and by placing limits on the satisfaction of certain desires 
(via guilt and/or conscience) in the form of injunctions and taboos. (Ibid, 18-20, 32-5; 
Bocock, 2002: 79-83; cf. Freud, 1918) Whilst this is not always healthy, and can induce 
neuroses in those who find the demands of civilisation too demanding or repressive, it is
nevertheless a critical factor in the emergence of modern society. This of course means 
that psychological particularities will emerge, depending on the social context and the 
precise taboos or injunctions (and the methods of enforcing them) employed by the 
individual’s society. Nevertheless any such social context will be contending and 
interacting with the same general forces that spring from humanity’s atavistic core.91 
(Bocock, 2002: 82-9, 107-8)
We can see now that, given the inclusion of external influences, it is not 
surprising that there is a good deal of space for variability between individuals. Indeed, 
much of Freud’s work relies on the potential for variance, given that psychopathology 
can be thought of as extreme variance – as existing at such an extreme edge of the 
possible range of personality and experience that such existence becomes unhealthy. 
This is also anticipated by much of the above since the involvement of external factors 
will help determine how the internal dynamics of id-ego-super ego play out and how the
competing demands of the libido and death drive are accommodated. As we saw when 
discussing the ego, what and who a person is changes over the course of their life, even 
if we all share the same basic drives. These drives act like a kind of energy which can be
91  It is worth noting, alongside this, that Freud’s pronouncements cover the generality of humanity, but
are developed from ideas he has derived from a very limited source (namely, his well-to-do, Austrian
patients and an assortment of his fellow psychotherapists’ case studies). (cf. Diamond, 2012: 174-5; 
Henrich et. al., 2010)
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harnessed: the kernel, as I have termed it, is a source of raw material, and the basis of 
Freud’s therapeutic technique is the idea that by understanding this material therapist 
and patient can use it to create the desired result (i.e. a healthier psyche).92 This is again 
somewhat more individualist than the inclusion of variability found in Marx. In that 
case variability tended to appear between historical epochs and socio-economic modes 
of production. Human nature varied on a group scale according to the cultural and 
economic development of that group. Freud’s human nature shows an increased 
variability between human beings, even though his description of the shared human 
kernel’s content is more explicit and extensive (and therefore might be presumed to be 
more determinate and constraining).
The question remains whether the kernel – that aspect which undergoes this 
socialisation and acculturation – is an entirely accurate account. Freud outlines what he 
considers to be the core of our nature in much more detail than Marx does, as evidenced
by his treatment of the internal structure of individuals’ psychology. However this 
treatment is highly speculative, and is based on only a small sample of humanity 
(usually middle-class Europeans).
Whether part of this schema or not, any specific claims which are, at heart, about
human nature, are hostage to the shifting grounds on which they are based. If a notion 
of human nature appeals to a core or kernel then, regardless of whether that kernel is 
supposed to be the emphasis of analysis or merely the raw, pre-transformation material, 
any new information which calls the contents of that kernel into question ought to be 
incorporated. If the resulting altered conception of the kernel no longer supports the 
higher-order claims made about human nature, its social significance or even society 
itself, then these too ought to be reconsidered/adapted where they depended on the 
original core for their foundation.
It is perhaps unfair to say that Freud does not revise his core concept of human 
nature at all. The transition from the unconscious/conscious divide to the tripartite 
model of the id, ego and super ego shows that he was able to develop his ideas and 
modify them in response to fresh information. However Freud retains a preoccupation 
with the libido – which he defines narrowly in terms of a sexual drive – to which he 
92  Although he is not above categorising types of (pathological) personality.
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appeals as an almost a priori principle.93 He also holds an attachment to a rigorously 
divided structure, with primordial, atavistic forces flowing from the id, tempered by an 
ego which looks for reassurance from a super ego. By contrast, in the previous chapter 
we saw human innateness arranged as a set of interpenetrated capacities and 
dispositions.
It might possibly be that sociological, anthropological and ethological studies 
explain much the same phenomena as Freud does using the superego – the inculcation 
of certain standards which create a group identity with notions of right or wrong action. 
However this does not necessarily mean that they support Freud’s articulation, rather 
they supersede it, using more stringent evidentiary standards and more data, just as 
oxygen-based theories explaining combustion superseded the phlogiston theory. 
Further Examples
This is not the limit of contextualist human nature theories, obviously. Other 
scholarly perspectives may describe similar conceptions of human nature through the 
articulation of some ahistorical (and not necessarily biological) essence which is central 
to the way that humans fit into and interact with their context. Here I focus on the idea 
that this essence is tied to our capacity for representing and communicating our ideas. 
Human nature emerges as the social-historical contextualisation of our kernel of 
communicative and/or linguistic competencies.
For Jürgen Habermas there is something about our deliberative and 
communicative capacities which characterises how we go about living in political 
communities. He argues that our speech is always directed towards the goal of mutual 
understanding (including, presumably, those instances when what we wish the other to 
understand is in fact untrue). We consequently have certain expectations of the claims 
made by others (that they be true, made honestly, and are “right”, i.e. normatively 
correct) which we must have since they are the basis of what Habermas thinks of as 
93 Although we don’t deal with him here, close contemporary Karl Jung diverged and criticised Freud 
on precisely this issue.
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communicative action – the basis of everyday discourse. (Habermas, 1987; cf. Moss & 
Pavesich, 2011) This has critical implications for reason and rationality, which assume 
paramount importance in his sociological theory. According to Habermas, human 
society depends on our capacity for giving reasons and being capable of recognising and
assessing the reasons given by others. 
His idea of rationality has been characterised as ‘a formally defined procedure 
of argumentation’ and ‘the use of knowledge in language rather than... [being] a 
property of knowledge.’ (Cooke, 1997: 38) As such what matters is our ability to 
understand and assess what matters within certain frameworks. We have what might be 
regarded as a communicative essence, a shared, universal capacity that underlies our 
collective endeavours and makes both society and rational discourse possible. What 
characterises the existence of human beings is the inherent structure of their 
interpersonal relations – a collective property – and insofar as this refers to anything 
internal to individual human beings it is to their ability to engage in these relations; their
ability to understand and make themselves understood. As such ‘this perspective 
suggests no more than formal specifications of possible forms of life... it does not 
extend to the concrete form of life....’ (Ibidem) The closest we get to a human nature, 
sans culture, is this raw capacity, this framework with which to engage in social life. All
content is “filled in” by culture; what makes us human is the capacity to use deliberative
reason and to act in such a way as to communicate our reasons and transport our cultural
mores; this intermingles with the ideas that compose society and culture.
Semoticist Paolo Virno serves as a second, similar such example. Virno affirms 
Chomsky’s idea that our natural language faculty provides us with a universal grammar,
but notes that there is no intrinsic linguistic content to it. He uses this as a starting point 
from which to argue for a human nature of possibilities. His social thought dwells on the
‘difference between language faculty and languages, inarticulate potentiality and well-
structured grammars, world and environment....’ (Virno, 2009: 99) The latter are 
specific instantiations, orderly and rule-abiding, whilst the former reveal the underlying 
potentiality of human nature. However Virno extrapolates from language to human 
nature more generally. (Virno, 2015a) Specific contexts and social environments give 
rise to particular instantiations of our human capacities – particular languages, particular
relational norms. However none of these are the actual capacities themselves, none of 
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them are the “actualisation” of our nature. ‘The [language] faculty is a generic 
disposition, exempt from grammatical schemas, irreducible to a more or less extended 
congeries of possible statements. Language faculty means language in potentia or the 
power of language.’ What defines us as human – what he terms ‘the biological invariant’
– is a lack of specialisation (an absence of adaptation to specific circumstances that 
characterises other species). (Virno, 2009: 96-7) Instead we are a constant well of 
alternatives and possibilities.
Moreover, Virno’s notion of human nature is not mute, nor a way of arguing that
our nature is so malleable as to warrant ignoring. Instead it interacts with society, and 
helps us understand what Virno calls our natural history – a kind of mingling of history 
and natural history as it is more commonly understood. (Ibid: 95) Indeed for Virno 
human nature has taken on a new significance in our modern, ‘post-Fordist’ world. For 
one thing, our inherent flexibility can be seen as a positive virtue with regards to the 
present social order. According to Virno, neo-liberal capitalism depends on the 
disposability of workers and the precariousness of work. Our flexibility allows us to 
adapt to this precariousness, but, crucially, this does not mean that capitalism is 
necessarily the logical result of this human nature, nor an ideal context for it. (Virno, 
2015b) Our characteristic potentiality means that things could always be otherwise, and 
there is no reason to presume that because capitalism puts our flexibility to use it is 
therefore somehow the realisation of human nature, let alone a good. In this way, Virno 
offers us a de-valorised human nature; human nature as a morally-neutral resource. 
What we see in Virno is a human nature that could never be complete in and of itself 
(since it can never be actualised) but rather depends on the particular, transient historical
environment for its expression. It could, in fact, be leveraged to critique and oppose the 
status quo.
Too Little Content?
Yet we still see the central issue emerging. If the previous chapter dealt too 
much with natural human proclivities and was unable to account for the full range of 
their social instantiations, this schema places all the emphasis on the context and leaves 
its kernel underdeveloped. The emptiness and lack of detail with regards to the kernel 
still raises questions. Recall the impetus of the motivationalist human nature. There are 
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internal dynamics to that human nature which are not considered here. We might have a 
communicative essence, but what if our communication, or the idea we are trying to 
communicate, is affected by other natural features, such as pro-sociality or cognitive 
bias? There is something unsatisfactory to this, as though relevant factors were being 
left out for theoretical simplicity94 – in order to proceed to the important work of 
contextualising human nature we are presented with a précis of whatever dispositions, 
structures or relationships the contextually-minded theorist deems most relevant.
Furthermore though they may focus on the realisation of human beings in their 
environment, there are still ideas about what human beings are – naturally and before 
the particularities of their conditioning (i.e. the non-cultural, eternal/universal aspect of 
their being) – that inform these theories. There is still a central point in human nature, 
dictated by the kernel, that makes some aspects of the political world hold more 
significance than others. Humans are basically productive, or communicative, or 
endowed with psycho-sexual prerogatives, and hence we can best understand society via
appeals to those areas of particular societies or cultures which reflect these prior 
features. We can test assumptions such as these, either empirically or theoretically, to 
determine their accuracy. If they turn out to be inaccurate then it is possible all we have 
is a proposed philosophical anthropology which works well as the component of a 
socio-cultural narrative, but fails to reflect what social and political agents are actually 
doing. (On the other hand if they turn out to be accurate accounts of human nature then 
this will lend additional credence to the political analysis – if not necessarily the 
political recommendations – to which they are attached.)
94 Virno, in trying to describe the ‘biological invariant’ even goes so far as to say ‘the following 
annotations are merely offered by way of orientation: nothing more than a road sign. Whoever 
doesn’t share them, or thinks they fall short, can replace or complement them at will.’ (Virno, 2009: 
95)
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4: Human Nature and its Critics
In each chapter so far we have considered various issues or limitations facing 
particular human nature theories. For the most part these are specific to their schemas, 
but there are other criticisms that may be levelled, either against some human nature 
theories or against the concept itself. Obviously, any discussion of human nature must 
deal with the question of opposition to the very concept at stake. At the very least such 
concerns form part of the backdrop that informs the analysis of whatever themes a 
particular author has chosen to emphasise. In cases where theories are presented in an 
attempt to demonstrate the variation and kinds of human nature theory on offer, 
opposition is usually construed as a part of the general variation in approaches to human
nature – as the argument that humans just are whatever culture, politics or history makes
them. (See for example Stevenson et. al., 2013) In other instances the treatment of 
sceptical theories concerns the thematic implications for human nature theories in 
general. In Loptson’s case, criticism of human nature is principally framed around the 
issue of essentialism which, introduced in the introduction and revisited in the 
conclusion, poses a challenge to the particular theories he discusses. In turn he attempts 
to deal with such criticism by considering the themes and principles raised in the 
process of contemplating these theories.95 (Loptson, 2006) As elsewhere, however, this 
approach is expressed in part in the selection of theories chosen for dissection. Hence 
feminism and existentialism are analysed as, if not human nature theories themselves, 
then at least as theories that concern themselves with the question of human nature. So 
far I have adopted a similar approach, but have grouped human nature theories into 
generalised schemas, of which individual theories are (contemporary) representative 
samples. In accordance with this, in the present chapter I intend to attempt to generalise 
about some of the ways that human nature has been called into question as a reputable 
intellectual concept. In short I shall generalise about the more critical views of human 
nature and human nature theories.
As an extension of the preceding point, we might regard criticisms of human 
95 In essence he believes, as do I, that an interdisciplinary approach better grasps the topic of human 
nature than attempting to subordinate the study to any one particular approach and that, furthermore,
such a theory must be pursued as an ongoing project subject to continual revision.
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nature as a continuation of the main theme of this thesis: the question of where certain 
theorists locate human nature. In this sense, outright denial or rejection of human nature
can be interpreted as an argument about what makes us human – effectively an 
argument that human nature is just whatever external circumstances make it. We can 
easily regard criticism of the human nature concept as an extension of the taxonomy of 
approaches with which I have ordered the previous chapters. Such arguments can be 
thought of as part of an extended continuum, representing a set of approaches which 
locate human nature in a sphere almost completely removed from humans-as-creatures, 
and instead finding the answer to what human beings are entirely within areas of 
interpersonal and social/political activity. In essence, these attempts to encapsulate and 
describe what it means to be human consider the levels most deserving of attention to be
wholly within the socio-political realm. As such, human nature resides within human 
culture(s). Thus an argument against the existence of human nature still adopts a 
position on human nature. We have in front of us a fourth schema. This is hardly a novel
way to think about this: for example, Leslie Stevenson is happy to include Sartrean 
existentialism in his survey of theories of human nature. (Stevenson et. al., 2013: 227ff)
 This reinforces a point made in the introduction: not all theories locate human 
nature wholly (or in this case even in part) within nature, much less view it as 
instantiated in actual humans. At least some of these criticisms, in rejecting a human 
nature of intrinsic, internal faculties and/or dispositions, posit an idea of the human 
where any faculties/dispositions actually originate externally. Furthermore, if culture 
makes us what we are, human nature transforms constantly in step with changes in the 
cultural sphere. (By a logical extension, such a human nature is far more protean and 
malleable than any of the others yet considered – to change human nature all one must 
do is change the culture or other external circumstances governing its particular 
character.)
As we proceed we should also be willing to consider the influence that theorists’ 
professional experiences might exert on their formulation of human nature. Specifically,
human nature is not a field unto itself, but rather an area of concern which might be 
affected or affect a wide range of scholarly disciplines (to say nothing of the political 
implications it may have). Thus human nature theory is not the purview of any one 
discipline, and human nature might be approached from a variety of perspectives. 
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Consequently it is likely that certain disciplinary standards will be applied to an area 
outside the usual concerns of the discipline itself. I would therefore suggest that the 
perspective from which a scholar comes is likely to affect – although by no means 
fatalistically determine – their attitude towards human nature and where it is appropriate
to search for something that might be called “our” nature. Of course here we shall be 
exploring a doubting approach, and as we shall see disciplinary attention informs at 
least some of these approaches. Notably the biologist critics of gene-first Darwinism 
have some sociological affiliations and influences (in particular Marx); similarly 
Midgley comes from a philosophical position interested in truth and social construction,
and so she views theories as partially-cultural artefacts. Later we shall come to 
objections raised by anthropologists and social psychologists, fields accustomed to 
studying culture and viewing human beings as bearers of that culture, and hence fertile 
grounds for criticism of human nature.
Of course there exists a wide range of objections and challenges to the idea of 
human nature, likely due – at least in part – to the variety of disciplinary positions. The 
aforementioned existentialist tradition is one possible example, given that the idea that 
“existence precedes essence” easily lends itself to the idea that human beings are 
determined only by themselves and their ability to consciously direct their own actions. 
At most, humans are enmeshed within their context (their existence within a realm of 
systems the only thing imparting meaning to them) but even then humans, as 
consciousness agents, have an awareness of this and the concurrent ability to 
dynamically define themselves beyond these contextual confines (thus either accepting 
the determining influence of culture or rejecting it for some meaning of their own). We 
shall see a similar, if somewhat more general, instantiation of this idea later on. 
Althusser’s adaptation of Marx effectively makes the same argument within a 
structuralist context, arguing that humanism is irrevocably tainted by essentialism. By 
his reckoning, attempts to talk about human individuals will tend to enshrine a 
contingent instantiation of human relations and consciousness as something universal, 
when in reality any such (extrinsic) essence is – as Althusser concludes from his reading
of Marx – the result of historical systems and processes. Essentialism itself stands as a 
possible charge against human nature, although not necessarily one that accommodates 
the fact that most – if not all – of the perspectives we have so far examined articulate 
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some awareness of variability and malleability into their ideas of human nature. 
Essentialism is a charge that can be laid against those theories of what makes us human 
that reduce the complex phenomena available to a simple distinctive essence, although 
it has a problem confronting human nature theories that deal in tendencies and varied 
and variable properties. (see Machery, 2008) 
Some criticisms might be regarded as sceptical objections, arguing that if there is
a human nature, we can never really know it. We saw a specific version of this in 
chapter one, where Lewontin and Fox Keller argued that the causal complexity of 
genetic expression and the interrelation of biological and cultural influences makes a 
genetic human nature epistemically unknowable. Nature and culture could not, in this 
instance, be untangled thanks to the complexity of their interpenetration. I should note 
that specific objections to particular human nature theories need not concern us terribly 
much, except as examples of a general problem that might conceivably face any human 
nature theory. Certainly the argument that this or that theory is clearly affected by a 
political bias, or reduces humanity to a simplistic caricature, could be argued to fatally 
undermine that theory, but this is not necessarily so, nor need it apply to other theories 
(except where they make the same mistakes).
Still, there is limited space in which to consider all the possible objections that 
can be made with regards to human nature. We might be concerned that a particular 
voice is being overrepresented in our perception of human nature, a prospect that 
Loptson (2006) cites as the case for (some) feminist scholars, but which may have some
other, more general incarnation (we shall see an example of this below). It has even 
been suggested that human nature is an incoherent concept on abstruse metaphysical 
grounds. (Hull, 1989; Buller, 2005) Hence here I shall focus on a limited selection of 
criticism, selected specifically from those whose implications centre on the 
methodological processes of attempts to discern what human nature may be. We will 
consider the implications that what we are examining – and the way in which we 
approach it – is situated within a social and/or historical context which affects the 
concepts that we develop from our analysis. The issue here is the potentially tainted or 
inadequate outcome of our theorising based on the limited perspective we adopt when 
thinking about human nature (or the possibility of such a thing). I then turn to the 
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argument that what we are is simply the outcome of culture, and that “human nature” is 
really the result of social forces. In this case the concern lies in the way culture obscures
any innate qualities that might be considered our nature, as well as how the complexity 
of cultural expression renders any such innate qualities virtually powerless or 
meaningless, reducing them, in the long run, to negligible factors in describing what it 
means to be human. We shall also consider the problem that politics poses for human 
nature theories. This is not simply the charge that this or that conception is wrong 
because it is based on bad politics, which could easily be an objection itself based more 
on politics than analysis. Instead the real challenge is posed by the prospect that our 
very conceptions of human nature are hostage to political game-playing, and therefore 
in some way epistemically compromised.
Metaphysics
First we should consider an objection that supposedly refutes the very possibility
of human nature. Here we will encounter an argument that there can be no human nature
since there is no metaphysical construct on which to secure one. David Buller presents a
particularly interesting attempt at this. Although his main target is ostensibly 
Evolutionary Psychology, in this instance his focus shifts and his argument becomes one
about human nature per se. Buller is concerned in this instance with the degree to which
members of a species can actually be said to share the same characteristics by virtue of 
their nature. 
His first step, drawing on the work of David Hull and Michael Ghiselin, is to 
argue that a species is not a natural kind – it is not a simple grouping which can describe
all of its possible members. There is variation within species, and some species may 
have members which are radically different from one another in terms of a variety of 
characteristics. Conversely, there may be creatures of different species which outwardly 
appear to share characteristics but are not of the same kind of creature. As a result 
species are not natural kinds in the way that an element (such as gold) is. (Buller, 2005: 
439-41) Instead, Buller argues for the position that a species is a type of individual. By 
this is meant that species are a) spatio-temporally located; b) spatio-temporally 
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continuous; and c) ‘unified, cohesive wholes.’ So species are bounded by their location, 
exist in an uninterrupted time frame,96 and constitute a whole by virtue of each 
member’s representing a part of a shared gene pool and ‘held together by the 
organisational glue of reproduction.’ (Buller, 2005: 447; cf. Hull, 1989: 11-24)
Accordingly, members of a species are in fact not bound by their possession of 
certain characteristics, since such similarities are due to homologous phenotypic 
expressions of a shared genotype, rather than some more fundamental ontological 
relation. Instead, creatures are bound by their relationship to a shared ancestor/ancestry 
and share characteristics by virtue of this temporal heritage. This is taken to follow 
directly from the way we understand and study biological organisms, so that ‘as 
biologists understand them, species don’t exhibit the feature of natural kinds. (Ibid: 442,
emphasis original; Hull, 1967) Hence Buller’s approving quotation of Ghislen: ‘What 
does evolution teach us about human nature? It tells us that human nature is a 
superstition.’ (Ghiselin, 1997: 1) Buller interprets this to mean that ‘[s]hared 
characteristics are not definitive of belonging to the same species, they are incidental to 
belonging to the same species.’ (Ibid: 450, emphasis original) Furthermore, because 
species are not natural kinds, they are not subject to laws of nature, since laws of nature 
‘are exceptionless universal generalisations’ that ‘apply to individuals only insofar as 
those individuals exemplify the natural kinds over which the laws generalise.’ (Ibid: 
451-2; cf. Ghiselin, 1997) Laws of nature depend on individuals possessing certain 
properties by virtue of the class – the natural kind – to which they belong, and therefore 
do not apply to individual members of a species nor to species themselves, since their 
shared properties are incidental, the result of a shared evolutionary history.
This, thinks Buller, has implications for human nature, since if we are attempting
to describe human beings and/or human psychology in terms of regular, discernible laws
– which, he notes, is the ambition of Evolutionary Psychology – we can never achieve 
our goal. Laws of nature simply do not apply to human beings in the necessary way. No 
law of nature describes the uniquely human psychology – ‘since Homo sapiens is an 
individual, not a natural kind, [thus] individual human beings are not human beings by 
virtue of instantiating the natural kind Homo sapiens.’ (Buller, 2005: 452-4) The natural 
96  Any such disruption, such as an extinction event, meaning that any apparently identical species that 
emerges at a later date will be considered a separate species, likely having emerged via convergent 
evolution.
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kind at stake here is the natural kind of species, since a species only shares certain 
properties with any other species because they fall into this category, and individual 
conspecific organisms likewise only share properties because they fall into this category
plus share an evolutionary history. According to Buller there are consequently ‘no 
scientific laws exclusive to human psychology.’
For, if there were psychological laws that applied exclusively to humans, 
those laws would have to generalise over natural kinds, and those natural 
kinds would have to be human psychological mechanisms (or aspects of 
their functioning). In other words, in order for there to be psychological 
laws, human psychological mechanisms would have to be natural kinds. 
But, since psychological mechanisms are phenotypic traits, the question of 
whether psychological mechanisms form natural kinds is really the question 
of the logic underlying the classification of phenotypic traits. (Ibidem)
This, he obviously thinks, rules out psychological mechanisms being natural kinds on 
the basis that, seeing as they are phenotypic traits – that is, shared characteristics of 
individual human beings subject to variation – they are similar or “the same” only by 
virtue of our shared heritage, not our ontological classification.
Accordingly, given that there cannot, on Buller’s view, be laws of nature which 
describe a peculiarly human psychological world, human nature cannot be a reasonable 
intellectual pursuit since no formal set of regularities that describe the human qua 
human exist. He holds on to the prospect that psychology in general may be able to 
discover laws of nature pertaining to psychological functioning, and that as a result 
some degree of description will be possible of human psychology (as a subdomain of 
the psychology which captures these general laws) but a specifically human psychology 
will only ever be conditional and constrained in scope. (Ibid 456-7) 
Here we see an inherent problem with the abstract scholastic argument Buller 
puts forwards. The only human nature he considers valid is one based on natural laws 
which apply exclusively to human beings. He defines human nature in an incredibly 
narrow way, not reflective of any of the theories considered here. Furthermore this is not
an approach to the concept that captures what is interesting about it – the socio-political 
import of the question of what we are.97 Buller approaches human nature as a question 
of definition, not one of self-knowledge. The kind of human nature he denies is not 
what anyone else is actually pursuing. Ironically this is because Buller starts from a 
97 And yet, as with many other scholars, Buller appeals to this implication in order to highlight why he 
feels it important to discuss human nature.
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highly algorithmic viewpoint: human nature, if it exists, will be found at some point of 
ultimate, foundational and universal validity. Failing to find it here he discounts all 
human nature theories, since the regularities they identify are not properly real: they are 
not “natural” in the way he has a priori defined the term. This does not, in fact, render it
impossible to talk about what humans naturally are, in terms of reliable, pre-cultural 
regularities. There are other ways of construing human nature that do not depend on 
narrowly defined theories of natural law. (See Machery, 2008)
We should note how this is itself rather reductive. In fact there are strong 
similarities between this argument and the approach taken by those in the algorithmic 
schema. Both look for the defining element of human nature in a universal law or axoim
(or narrow set of such axioms) from which that human nature unfolds. However in this 
case no such algorithmic basis is found and so the possibly existence of human nature is
discounted. This bears similarities with the work of some biologists who adopt a 
radically different perspective on human evolution from that of the gene-centric version 
of “neo-Darwinism” examined in chapter one. On this account genetic inheritance does 
not strongly tie members of a species since said genetic inheritance reveals individuals 
to be non-identical. That is, they will having differing genes which nevertheless express 
themselves in similar fashion. A species is in any case fluid (it evolves, in certain 
instances it may even interbreed with other species and so on) and what unites its 
members is more a case of higher-order traits. Again, this is itself a reductive view – it 
narrows down the question to particulate genetics – but its conclusions subsequently 
remove human nature from any strong association with biological nature of the human 
species.98
On an stringent reading of this reductive approach, no-one could be said to be 
the same when compared with another unless they shared the same genetic material 
organisation – in other words unless they were fraternal twins or clones. We would balk 
at saying there is no similarity between people, however, or for that matter that one lion 
were unlike any other lion. Certainly there are differences and each specimen is 
(genetically) unique, but as comedian Bill Hicks pointed out, ‘your children are not 
98 Ullica Segerstråle relates an interview where Lewontin is described as being as reductionist as 
anyone in his genetic research, but in relation to human nature and society he resists this approach as
unsuitable for the sphere in question. It is worth bearing this in mind when I come to discuss his 
sociological approach to human nature below.
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special’: when we talk about human beings or any other class of object we do so on the 
basis of shared similarities. Critiques of human nature theory that thus address it as a 
reductive matter of definition thus miss their mark, insofar as they do not address the 
descriptive endeavour – the comparison of similarities and differences, with especial 
emphasis on the former – which constitutes the most important aspect of human nature 
theories.
Biology and Culture (Co-)Evolving
Alternatively, even those who subscribe to a reductionist (a possibly even gene-
centric) understanding of evolution may come to view human culture as superseding 
human biology in terms of defining the human experience (and thus their human nature 
becomes as protean and ephemeral as any of the other theories discussed in this 
chapter). This is so in the case of some of those subscribing to the concept of meme 
theory, the idea that culture, ideas, and knowledge can be considered to evolve in an 
analogous way to biological species. This is (the reductive, atomistic conception of) 
selection extrapolated and taken to an extreme. Certainly this is the view of Susan 
Blackmore, who views memes as effectively colonising human minds and determining 
their actions. The main environmental factor of which memes replicate and spread 
throughout a population of human agents is therefore other memes with which they are 
in competition with. These memes supposedly direct the human machines in much the 
same way that genes were supposed to do – so so long as a collection of memes 
contributes to its host’s survival they themselves will proliferate, regardless of the 
wishes of the hosts, their genes or other memes. (Aunger, 2000; Blackmore, 2000a, 
2000b) The psychologist Gary Cziko (1995) viewed it as an extrapolation of the 
principle of selection, which he saw as a new model for understanding all adaptive 
complexity, including learning and cultural advancement. Clearly we have found the 
border between the algorithmic schema and culturalistic explanations for human nature.
Whilst meme theory is largely defunct as a paradigm, the general idea – which in
any case preceded meme theory – persists. Evolutionary theorists Robert Boyd and 
Peter Richerson view culture as a niche that the human species carved out for itself, and 
which now largely exists at a remove from genetic or biological imperatives. 
Interestingly, they use some of the same reductionist (remembering of course that 
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reduction need not imply reductive) models as many evolutionary theorists, including 
the gene-first Darwinists. (Boyd & Richerson, 1995, 2009; Sterelny, 2012) Thus human 
beings, as we find them, are a composite of natural evolution and cultural evolution – 
including those adaptations acquired in the course of exploiting the niche the species 
created for itself. (A niche being, put simply, a part of the environment the species has 
carved out or created for itself – think of the alterations made by beavers and their dams
to the local ecology, or more broadly, the niche of hematophagous, parasitic insects 
which mosquitoes effectively evolved for themselves.) Human nature has its roots in 
evolution, but is resolutely connected to cultural forms, and modern humans 
consequently act and think in a variety of ways that primarily reflect their cultures. 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2006; cf. Sperber & Claidère, 2008) 
As a caveat: in adopting this stance Boyd and Richerson, and those like them, 
approach a form of contexualism – a naturalistic form – being somewhat less sceptical 
of the power of evolution to provide some insights into human nature but in no way 
dissuaded that humans are first and foremost socio-cultural agents. For them, evolution 
could be said to have generated the core of our human nature. It explains our natural 
history, up until the point complex cultures emerged. From there, however, culture has 
assumed the deciding role in human nature, given how fast it changes in comparison to 
biology, requiring us to adapt using our agency (consisting of things like creativity and 
the capacities initially developed for use in cooperative scenarios). This is only 
compounded by the aforementioned notion of culture as humanity’s evolutionary niche. 
For a good deal of time the biology of the nascent species H. sapiens was shaped by our
burgeoning socio-cultural structures, growing a more sophisticated suite of flexible, 
socially-attuned capacities that made us less predetermined than other biological things 
and more cultural. The two strands, biology and culture, “co-evolved”. 
The Political and Moral Authority of (Human) Nature
An alternative is to criticise human nature by referring to the manipulation of its 
normative significance. Making an argument based on the naturalness (or indeed 
unnaturalness) of a certain phenomenon – whether a trait, behaviour, disposition or 
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otherwise – is often used to lend that argument extra weight in social or political 
discourse. This is neither a new occurrence nor one strictly limited to human nature. 
Rather, it has a tendency to appear in discussions employing the idea of nature as such, 
and of the natural order, throughout history. We already saw in the introduction how 
nature can be imbued with a rhetorical potency, given that it sets an apparently objective
standard. (see Daston & Vidal, 2004; Malik, 2002a: 21-5) We also saw how both 
Hobbes and Rousseau used nature as a litmus test for how humans ought to live. 
Rousseau, in particular, held the natural order to be an ideal condition. Similarly, Denis 
Diderot, in his Encylopédie, defended and praised the pursuit of pleasure based on its 
naturalness and natural utility. (see Kramnick, 1995: 265ff)
Nature sets an Apparent Objective Standard
As a result the prospect of a political valencing of human nature inevitably leads 
us to a problem with human nature theories intimately bound up with their role in 
justifying political positions. To this end we can return to the work of Steven Pinker, 
and in particular his thoughts on the relationship between human nature and politics. 
This is, after all, the essential focus of The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) and, to a 
lesser extent, The Blank Slate (2003).  We saw in chapter one how Pinker views the 
implications of human nature (or at least the human nature he describes) as unavoidably 
necessitating a form of liberal democracy. Here this can be unpacked in order to 
demonstrate the possible pitfalls of putting forward such a position. Obviously my 
intent is not simply to single Pinker out as a unique problem. Here, as in the challenges 
that follow, a particular example stands in as a cipher for a more general problem facing
any attempt at conceptualising some kind of human nature. The worry is that human 
nature is simply nothing but a rhetorical device, leveraging the potential of nature to 
bestow authority on an argument. Pinker, after all, sees human nature as something dark
and conflicted that requires proper control. We are inherently self-interested which, in 
true Hobbesain style, leads us into confrontation with one another where our interests 
inevitably collide. This requires an organised and stable political formation capable of 
controlling and balancing the self-interests of its subjects – and Pinker thinks that the 
nation state is just such a political formation. The precise form it takes, however, should 
involve modern liberal democracy, and this recommendation too is made with reference 
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to human nature. 
Pinker does not view human beings as entirely corrupt. His earlier work 
discussed how human beings are characterised by a capacity for communication and 
language which simultaneously separates them from animalistic atavism and deeply 
impacts human experience. (Pinker, 1995) These “better angels” can be cultivated by, 
firstly, curtailing our destructive impulses, and secondly by accustoming human beings 
to higher standards of behaviour and citizenship. (Pinker, 2011) At its most basic, the 
argument is that a functional democratic nation state balances individual interests and, 
in so doing, provides a protected grounds for each citizen to pursue some of their more 
positive impulses without the worry that they will be imposed upon by others. As proof 
of this Pinker points to the reduction in violence in and between democratic polities 
over the course of the twentieth century. There was, for him, no miraculous overnight 
transformation, but the reduction was nevertheless rapid and radical, taking place over 
the relatively short period of the twentieth century. As we saw in chapter one, various 
institutions and practices, all connected with a modern democracy, are given credit for 
this.
However in chapter one we saw John Gray call this account into question, by 
pointing out how violence and conflict are still very present in modern states, directed 
both outward at other polities, or inwards against their own citizens. We also saw 
Ferguson (2013) argue that Pinker overemphasised humanity’s natural proclivity for 
violence: that we are not as prone to violence as required by Pinker, if we are to believe 
that violence has dramatically decreased. If this is an intentional manipulation then we 
obviously have an example of the deployment of the concept of nature for rhetorical 
effect, to bolster and lend credence to a political end. In this case the role of nature as a 
provider of grounds from which to derive values (positive or negative) comes to the 
fore, being employed to support an argument in favour of liberal democracy and its role 
in the progressive development of human history. Yet this is still present if – as I am 
inclined to believe – this is not always an entirely intentional act (although it does still 
suggest poor scholarship). There is a real prospect that bias, conscious or otherwise, will
actually alter someone’s perspective and presentation of human nature. Pinker, after all, 
believes himself to be emblematic of a rationalistic, reason-based approach lacking an 
ideology or agenda, but such belief does not appear to be warranted. (Pinker, 2003; 
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2011; op. cit. Olson, 2013: 39) This logically invites the charge of inaccuracy (and the 
suspicion of inaccuracy even where bias cannot be proven) masquerading as objectivity.
Given the moral and political valencing of human nature, any human nature theory will 
thus have to contend with the prospective use of human nature as a tool of political 
legitimisation.
Human Nature as Political Resource
This opens up the possible charge that human nature is being used solely for its 
rhetorical and legitimising power. It is undeniable that human nature is a contentious 
idea, given that it evokes a sense of permanence and solidity, insofar as these qualities 
promise the prospect of a source of objective value. We can more easily imagine 
changing culture than we can nature, and so the claim that something is in our nature 
easily becomes – or appears to be – a rhetorical device. We have just seen how human 
nature can be used to justify and valorise the status quo and lend it an air of objectivity. 
But this role can also be used in order to push forward a particular political agenda. 
Thus making a claim about what humans are invites concern about what that claim 
entails and what motivates those making it. The suspicion that human nature is being 
used to give force to certain normative political claims is itself a reason to be sceptical 
of the concept on offer. Certain forms of criticism can therefore be viewed as coming 
from opposing political traditions which find human nature to be (just) another space of 
confrontation. As a consequence politics becomes both a grounds for a critique as well 
as a motivation – a possible defect in theories of human nature as well as a reason to 
question them. 
In recent history such debates have often focussed on the idea of human nature 
as a resource for the political right. In particular there has been controversy surrounding 
intelligence testing and the connection with race. The dispute over the infamous content 
of The Bell Curve was in part over the extent to which it appeared that a particular 
metric was being used to justify social stratification along racial lines. At the very least 
it appeared that the authors were explaining this stratification in terms of a natural – and
by implication inevitable – difference between people. (Herrnstein & Murray 1994; 
Fraser, 1995; cf. Segerstråle, 2000: 308-9) Furthermore there was the prospect that the 
arguments represented a ‘missionary purpose’ for revitalising a program for eugenics, 
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clad in a statistical gloss.99 (Fraser, 1995: 2-5) Likewise there was a similar controversy 
surrounding Hans Eysenck’s linking of intelligence to race and ethnicity. According to 
Eysenck the two were inherently linked by heredity, including a selective pressure that 
lead to the descendants of African slaves having an intrinsically lower IQ. (Scarr, 1981: 
62-4; Eysenck & Kamin, 1981; cf. Gould, 2007: 411) This obviously invites a charge of 
political bias and ulterior motivation, notably from fellow psychologist Leon Kamin (of 
Not In Our Genes) but also those who draw attention to Eysenck’s association with 
right-wing and far right groups and publications. (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981; Kühl, 1994;
see also Buchanan, 2010: 26-30) Whether this is particularly indicative about human 
nature, as opposed to the predilections of particular proponents and critics, is 
questionable however. It is possible to argue that the political implications were not part
of a malign intention behind the theories but rather were attributable to problems with 
the science itself. (Segerstråle, 2000: 236-8) At least with regards to Eysenck, his 
biographer attributes his connections with right-wing organisations and ideologically 
suspect publications to political naïvety and spreading himself ‘too thin’ professionally. 
In trying to cover a vast range of topics and ensure his ideas found themselves in the 
public domain, Eysenck supposedly ignored the implications that could be drawn by 
those with an ideology to support. (Buchanan, 2010: 324-6) Of course this is harder to 
sustain in the case of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, given that their arguments
about intelligence in The Bell Curve are bundled up with arguments against welfare 
provision and affirmative action. 
This trend repeats itself in the contentious dispute between the camps of 
Richards Dawkins and Lewontin. Specifically, Lewontin, along with Rose and Kamin 
(1990) make the case that gene-first Darwinism and sociobiology before it (since they 
often portray the two as one and the same) are indelibly stained by a particular 
ideological standpoint, to the extent that a casual reader could be forgiven for assuming 
that they believe gene-first Darwinism to be an intentionally crafted legitimising front 
for a (classist, and almost certainly racist) political position. They argue that there is a 
political drive to categorise people into groups which, wittingly or otherwise, thereby 
legitimises existing social structures, and that modern biologistic accounts of human 
nature represent an extension of this drive. (Segerstråle, 2000: 202-3, 284-6) They also 
99 Arguably reflecting a historical preoccupation with the intelligence of “lesser” social groups. (cf. 
Gould, 2007: 559-60; Segerstråle, 2000: 271n3)
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assert that there is a vested political interest in portraying human beings as 
individualistic, self-interested and predisposed to conflict. Such a concept of human 
nature would serve to justify and reinforce a prevailing political hegemony; to give the 
impression that there is no alternative to capitalism and competition since they are “just 
part of human nature.” Gene-first Darwinism, these critics claim, helps to create this 
picture of self-interested human nature by repeated appeals to human and genetic 
“selfishness”. (Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990; Sahlins, 1977: 72-87) Of course it is 
rather problematic that in fact Dawkins does not celebrate or venerate the selfishness 
supposedly inflicted upon us by our genes, but urges us to rebel against the genes. 
(Dawkins, 2006: 198-201) He argues that all he presents are facts (again making a claim
to reason and objectivity much as Pinker does), and that it is a mistake ‘to derive our 
values from Darwinism, unless it is with a negative sign.’ (Ibid: xiii-xiv) 
However this recommendation that we learn to control our human nature has its 
political implications as well. It has obvious similarities with an intellectual heritage 
that opposes a “fallen” or destructive nature against the moderating (possibly even 
redemptive) effects of culture. Not only does it follow a rather Hobbesian structure, it 
also reflects the antecedent (Augustinian) narrative of Original Sin – the idea that our 
origins are tainted, and we must struggle against our atavistic nature. (Stevenson et. al., 
2013: 115ff, 137ff; Jackson, 2014: 138, 139; cf. Sahlins, 2008) It also closely matches a 
prevailing notion that human activity is intrinsically disruptive and needs to be limited. 
Certain measures need to be put in place to restrict our nature, but not so strictly that 
such restraint becomes intolerable. This presents a strong resemblance to certain 
branches of contemporary democratic and capitalist politics, whereby individuals should
be free from constraint except where this freedom would conflict with that of their 
fellow citizens. Pinker (2011) explicitly affirms this interpretation, of course, and takes 
it to be evidence of the manifest superiority of liberal democracy – it adequately 
controls human nature without suppressing it. As a result it seems that the charge – that 
human nature is being used and portrayed in such a way that it supports a political 
position – still stands. A less conscious – and therefore less obviously disingenuous – 
way for preconceptions about the world to affect conceptions of human nature confronts
us in the following challenges.
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Obstacles to Human Nature 
Parochialism
One commonly occurring charge that the critics level is that most or all human 
nature theories suffer from a problem of personal reflexivity.100 That is, that those 
putting forward theories of human nature are influenced by their context,101 and that this
influence makes itself present in what they envisage human nature to be. The 
implication being that any theory of human nature is therefore simply an expression of 
the prevailing concept of human nature in the culture in which the theory is formulated, 
or else an expression of the theorist’s own particular interests (in either case the 
suggestion is that this precludes the resultant theory being an objective statement). 
(Finlay & Gough, 2003; see also Wilkinson, 1988; Flanagan, 1981: 380-3) This is the 
accusation we often see levelled against Hobbes: that he lived in a climate of political 
chaos and civil war. He saw humanity in vicious conflict with itself and thus the human 
nature which he describes in the opening chapters of Leviathan is one inherently given 
to conflict, discord and ultimately violence. A number of critics of the concept of human
nature thus focus on how human nature theories encounter this potential pitfall.
To use one of the theories considered previously as an example, this the essence 
of one argument that is often levelled against gene-first Darwinian conceptions of 
humanity. Specifically there is a contention that preconceptions about politics, society 
and individuals influenced the direction in which the gene-first Darwinian picture of 
human nature was developed, particularly with regards to the metaphor of a genetic 
conflict by which traits are selected. Indeed, this forms the crux of Midgley’s thesis in 
The Solitary Self. (2010) There she argues that the idea that humans are basically “out 
for themselves” (in that everything they do is ultimately in the interests of their genes), 
is actually rooted in a political perception of essential individuality. This constitutes a 
100 It should be noted, given that there are various types of reflexivity, that what is referred to here is not
the epistemic reflexivity prevalent in anthropology and the social sciences, which consists of a 
recognition of the effect of researchers on the subject they are studying (effectively an explicit 
awareness of their own analysis as itself an intervention).
101 Whether that be historical, socio-economic and/or cultural. Parenthetically, this shares similarities 
with the legitimisation problem discussed above, except that there human nature is being inserted 
into a political narrative (and so “trimmed to fit”), whilst here political experience is influencing the 
development of a human nature theory. The legitimisation in this case comes from the circularity of 
the relationship between human nature and politics.
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slippage between the picture of individual’s roles as political agents and their agency 
more generally. Midgley is proposing that political conceptions of personal agency have
infiltrated a more generic conception of human agents: the idea of “one man one vote” 
has, she asserts, become generalised in socio-political discourse as a picture of human 
beings as individualised decision makers. As a major contributing factor, Midgley 
believes there has been an intellectual assimilation of a certain idea of the individual in 
scholarly circles, particularly in the sixties.102 This she traces to a Nietzschean concept 
of heroic individualism as a struggle against cloying conventionalism, a trend she 
believes was exemplified and introduced into popular discourse by R. D. Laing. 
(Midgley, 2010: 36-40) Of course this is a highly romanticised notion of the individual, 
an individual that is self-contained and self-directing and not an altogether accurate 
model. Midgley finds two things wrong with such a picture. Firstly it results in other 
facets of human nature being ignored or treated as subordinate and secondary to the 
central dictates of the supposed evolutionary algorithm. Secondly, and contributing a 
great deal to this former point, there is another slippage, this time between the picture of
human individuality and the treatment of genes – the units of Darwinian inheritance – as
individuals themselves. The developers of gene-first Darwinism (and sociobiology) are 
therefore primed with what she thinks of as a Hobbesian conception of human nature – 
they expect people to conform to a pattern of rational self-interest bearing a striking 
similarity to Hobbes’ philosophical anthropology in Leviathan. 
This is also the line of reasoning followed by Rose, Lewontin and Kamin (1990) 
as well as by Gould. For them, the self and individual benefit emerged as the main focus
of gene-first Darwinian human nature theories because those were the basic elements of 
folk psychology at the time.103 They note that the prevailing social and political world of
the eighties – when the concept of the selfish gene, Evolutionary Psychology, and gene-
first Darwinism more generally were first elaborated – was dominated by an emphasis 
on individualism, economic competition and the rhetoric (but not necessarily the 
practice) of meritocracy. In turn they point to the isomorphism between this and the 
gene-first Darwinian emphasis on inter-gene and inter-individual conflict as evidence of
a (possibly unconscious) biasing of the science to fit preconceptions about human 
102 Perhaps significantly the period during which Dawkins was studying as a student.
103 Although there is also a suggestion there is also a moral failing at work here. (See Segerstråle, 2000:
41-2) This charge revolves around the idea that Dawkins and those like him are culpable for failing 
to reflect on possible extraneous influences on their theories.
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nature. In essence, because individual competition was the “common sense” view of 
what humans are, it inevitably, say the critics, influenced how the gene-first Darwinists 
viewed the interaction between genes, which is predicated on the view of genes as 
individual units of selection and therefore analogous to individual actors within a 
system. This, they argue, has led to a reductive approach to inheritance focused on 
atomised units, the prioritisation of intergenomic competition, and is even reflected in 
the emphasis on adaptation. (see Levins & Lewontin, 1987) Human behaviour in turn 
comes to be viewed through the lens of a genetic conflict between evolutionary 
replicators, much in the way that social interaction was (and in many ways still is) 
viewed as the outcome of the conflicting interests of individualised agents. Gene-first 
Darwinism therefore construes human agency as being oriented towards safeguarding 
and transmitting the individual’s genes and so, at least according to Lewontin and his 
colleagues, reflects and reinforces a contingent cultural view of humans as self-
interested rational actors.
As an example, cooperation can be – and is – then construed as “merely” the 
outcome of selfish actors at a more fundamental level (see chapter one), much in the 
way that cooperation within a capitalist economy is viewed as an equilibrium state 
resulting from the rational self-interest of individuals. Hence pro-sociality is seen as 
limited (in addition to being open to the charge of being a mere epiphenomenon of 
something more real) and competition and self-interest are seen as more important, in 
turn reinforcing the prevailing attitude towards human beings as self-interested 
individuals. At the very least there is a perception of antagonism between cooperative 
and selfish impulses, a dissonant character to human nature which can itself be 
interpreted as evidence of a ‘dark’ side to human nature. (For example, Pinker, 2011) Of
course whilst this is interwoven with their objections to the science of gene-first 
Darwinian thinking – the methodological and evidentiary roadblocks which undermine 
the gene-first Darwinian case – here the intention is to highlight the cause to which 
critical observers attribute this blind spot (or, less charitably, stubbornness) in their 
opponents’ reasoning. Lewontin (2000; 2011) continues this line of attack, pointing out 
– on the basis of identity politics and critical social analysis – that much contemporary 
evolutionary theory reflects, or at least closely parallels, the preconceptions of the status
quo. (Lewontin, 2000: 199ff) He argues that the resultant picture of human nature is 
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skewed, given that feminist and subaltern perspectives are marginalised, and so have 
little opportunity to give their interpretation of the evidence or to challenge the 
prevailing interpretation.
The core criticism here is that as a consequence this human nature is highly 
parochial. This theory – and theories like it – do not really reflect human nature, or at 
least not an unalloyed human nature, but rather human beings as they are conceived as 
being by the theorists. This conception in turn is the outcome of a scholar’s social 
circumstances. So it becomes possible for critics to argue that human nature is simply a 
reflection of the way someone sees human beings, as a result of prevailing attitudes on 
the matter.
It is (also) possible, with reference to the idea of disciplinary attention outlined 
above, that gene-first Darwinian atomism in fact represents something about the way its 
proponents approach human nature: from the starting point of genetic biology and/or 
reductionist psychology. Rather than social and political “common sense” being 
reflected in these theories it may be the scholarly assumptions of theorists’ academic 
and professional fields. For one, Dawkins is an evolutionary biologist with an emphasis 
on genetics. The attempt to understand human beings through the logic of evolution is 
simply an extension of the project of evolutionary science. (Dawkins, 2006: xvi-xvii, 1-
3; cf.: xix-xx) Approaching the complex world of human behaviour from this 
perspective would seem entirely natural to someone whose scholarly career is 
predicated on that perspective. Likewise psychology is a varied field and psychologists 
span a range of reductionist and holistic approaches, (see Flanagan, 1981) so it should 
be no surprise that some like Pinker, Tooby and Cosmides should develop ideas and 
affinities that deconstruct human psychology into component parts or an underlying 
functional logic. After all, Freud attempted to do something similar by breaking human 
thought into constituent areas each with their own domain and set of priorities. It is an 
even shorter step for them to start viewing what we might term human nature in terms 
of this deconstructive framework. Thus it is possible that previous professional pursuits 
have helped shape this particular atomistic approach towards human nature just as much
as inadvertent political conditioning, akin to the way in which Wilson attempted to 
apply his entomological experience to more complex creatures in Sociobiology.
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If we move beyond gene-first Darwinism, we can see an interesting parallel 
argument being made with regards to WEIRD participants in psychological and 
behavioural research. Joseph Henrich, along with colleagues Steven Heine and Ara 
Norenzayan, argues that by relying on participants who come from Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) backgrounds many psychological studies
will be skewed towards results influenced by one particular context. (Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzayan, 2010a; cf. Sahlins, 1993) In chapter two I briefly pointed out how this 
makes reliance on psychological studies problematic in determining or describing 
human nature: the sample of subjects actually represents a relatively narrow band of 
humanity. To elaborate, Henrich and his colleagues obviously do not dispute that culture
has a profound effect on human behaviour and perception (none of the scholars 
considered thus far would seriously argue otherwise). However this has methodological 
implications that call into question the extent to which psychologists can generalise 
about their findings. Lack of variation in subjects – not just in terms of the “civilisation”
or cultural milieu they come from, but significantly in terms of a specific subcultural 
grouping – makes it difficult to distinguish between the relative influences of culture 
and nature. We might naturally be concerned over which psychological features are 
products of cultural conditioning and which are innate. More importantly, perhaps, is 
the question of how we are to separate these influences with regards to individual 
psychological phenomena: the extent to which a particular behaviour or affect 
represents an underlying innate faculty (if any) and its conditioning/canalisation by a 
person’s experiences. If all subjects in a study have the same background then their 
cultural conditioning will have been remarkably similar, and there will be few variations
to contrast in order to discern any underlying (i.e. “natural”) continuities.
This is not only an issue for the psychologists but also for those philosophers 
and associated theorists who wish to use such studies to further their own investigations.
On this basis we find the call for, at the very least, caution in drawing generalised and 
universal inferences from research outcomes. However this is not to say that Henrich, 
Heine and Norenzayan reject the concept of human nature, nor the use of psychological 
investigations. Instead they are pointing out, from within the discipline, a limitation of 
much of the currently available material about our innate psychology. (Henrich, Heine 
& Norenzayan, 2010a; 2010b; see also Henrich et. al.: 2006) Instead of the charge that 
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an unconscious cultural preconception is biasing the way that the data are interpreted, 
the claim here is that an insufficient attention to the limitations of one’s methodology 
introduces the prospect of error into the inferences one draws. Thought of in this way, 
parochialism may not be grounds for a refutation of human nature theories per se, but 
could be viewed as either a defect of particular human nature theories, or as a 
methodological obstacle or pitfall. To put it in experimentalist terms, one’s view of 
humanity may simply be inaccurate if insufficient care is taken to accommodate culture 
as an uncontrollable variable. More broadly this might resemble the kind of iterative 
investigatory process Peter Loptson recommends his fellow philosophers and other 
scholars adopt in relation to human nature. (Loptson, 2006: 255ff) In such a process 
human nature is subject to an interdisciplinary cycle of formulation and reflection, 
wherein an accurate picture is (ideally) built up through the use of varied perspectives 
and continual scrutiny.104
Historicism
It is not just that theorists may reinforce prevailing preconceptions about human 
beings – the inferences they draw about human beings may be entirely accurate, but 
specific to the context in which they find themselves. The error in such cases will be 
one of illegitimate generalisation of one’s observations. If Henrich and his colleagues 
raise concerns over the social and cultural localisation of human nature theories, the 
concept of historicism raises similar concerns over the temporal contingency of such 
theories. Put simply, human beings are situated within points in time, and their 
behaviour and attitudes will be affected by the circumstances of that time. Both writers 
and the subjects they discuss will be contextualised in particular historical 
circumstances. The opinions of those writers and the observable behaviours (as well as 
their own reported opinions) of those subjects will be conditioned by this historical 
specificity. Generalising from descriptions of human beings under such conditions 
complicates the prospect of ascertaining something about human nature, if it makes no 
provisions for determining what is genuinely universal to all human beings and what is 
the result of social structures or assimilated cultural ideas.
An illustration, and a pertinent one, might come from Darwin’s development of 
104 It is interesting to note that Loptson includes room for folk psychological intuition to make a 
contribution in its own right and identified as such.
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the theory of evolution. Darwin was born and educated during the height of Victorian 
capitalism, which promulgated the idea that prosperity came through commerce and 
competition. This is taken to have had an effect on the emphasis he places on 
competition and natural selection as the primary mechanism of a species’ evolutionary 
development. (Bowler, 1976; Young, 1985) Consequently the theory he articulated was 
similarly affected, influenced as it was by his own experiences and perceptual 
framework. It is possible to see in the idea of natural selection from a pool of competing
individuals a reflection of the meritocratic ideal of nineteenth century British society. 
The “best” or “most fit” individuals come out on top. This reading of events gains 
weight if we consider that Darwin, Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer, despite seeing 
moral sentiments as part of human nature, all saw egoism as the primary and principle 
drive of human beings. (Sapp, 2003: 44-5) In turn this informed their views of what 
human morality is: a conditioning and ameliorating influence on human self-interest, in 
accord with contemporary received wisdom about ethics, economics and nature. 
However as Robert Young points out they go further, Huxley and Darwin both decrying 
slavery and the oppression of women but nevertheless reinforcing the prevailing 
attitudes that both were somehow inferior to civilised white males. (Young, 1985) 
Naturally, this fed back into the thought of those who saw Darwinism as a vindication of
the social status quo, closing the (ideological) circle. (Bowler & Morus, 2005: 145-7, 
426-7) Whites were more evolved – more “fit” – and of them the males were more 
robust and intelligent, and therefore had the right and duty to take positions of 
prominence in society.  Hence what they find when considering human beings, as 
evolved beings, meshes with much of the common sense view of human nature at the 
time, but that calls into question whether it therefore represents a timeless truth.
In contrast, their Russian counterparts found a different emphasis to express in 
their nascent evolutionary science. They appear to have emphasised cooperation within 
species, and instead saw more significance in the struggle of the group with the 
challenges posed by the environment. Daniel Todes attributes this to two factors. 
(Todes, 1987; 1989) One is geographical: The British and Russian empires varied 
greatly in their geography and climate. Rather than the series of verdant islands that 
Darwin encountered, where resources allowed for rapid reproduction rates but where 
space was limited, the Russian empire was spread over a single contiguous landmass. 
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The climate was also harsher, and so the species Russian naturalists studied were only 
able to sustain small populations whose main threat was the environment itself. When 
the population did exceed the capacity of the local ecosystem there was always the 
option of migration. Thus the Malthusian insight on which Darwin relied failed to gain 
traction with a Russian audience. The second factor was more cultural. In contrast to the
market-oriented British, the Russians were still for the most part feudal, and 
consequently there was a perception of a natural cultural bond. Value was placed on the 
community (and in most cases fealty to the feudal and imperial authority) rather than 
competition with one’s neighbours. (Todes, 1989: 24ff) The picture of evolution built up
by the Russians was thus more focussed on cooperation and overcoming adversity 
together (a view easier to assimilate for aristocratic and middle-class intellectuals who 
reaped the benefits of the feudal system). 
Even if we focus solely on the interpretations of the evolutionary evidence we 
can see how different contingent circumstances appear to have coincided with divergent
approaches to the concept of evolutionary struggle.105 The British get a “British” 
evolutionary theory whilst the Russians develop a “Russian” one. The basic principles 
remain the same – development over time at the species level, a selective pressure that 
determines success and so on – but the emphasis changes in significant, if occasionally 
subtle, ways. Extrapolating from observations made within a certain historical context 
to general principles risks installing the effects of said context as part of a (supposedly 
and ideally) universal description. (Sahlins, 1977: 86-7; Midgley, 2002: 149-151) This 
is not so different from the problem that confronts Dawkins, Dennett and Pinker, in that 
the human nature they describe is not only (if we believe their claim) based on 
Darwinian principles, but also the context has not changed significantly. In fact market 
capitalism has only proliferated. It also allows us to better understand Midgley’s 
attribution of the emphasis on self-interest in gene-first Darwinism to Hobbes: she notes
that when Darwin’s theory was first elaborated, comparisons to Hobbesian conflict were
already being drawn. (Midgley, 2010: 41-2) As a result, the gene-first Darwinian and 
EvoPsych emphasis on individual self-interest, supposedly derived through objective 
consideration of evolutionary mechanisms, could easily be traced to a pre-existing 
105 A prominent anti-Malthusian Russian who did explicitly apply evolution to human nature being the 
anarchist Kropotkin, and therefore something of an outlier amongst his respectable liberal and feudal
peers.
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social and economic system which emphasises individualism, rooted in nineteenth 
century convention. (Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1990; Midgley, 2002: xvi-xix; Sahlins, 
1977: 4-7, 93ff)
Predictably, given his historical materialism, Marx also makes a related case in 
his theses on Feuerbach. Here he cautions that any discussion of human essence is 
problematic if one does not acknowledge the (in his paradigm material) context in 
which that essence is situated and which therefore affects one’s perception of that 
essence. (Marx & Engels, 1976: 5-6) It is not only theorists who may be affected by 
their context and intellectual climate – the subjects they study are similarly affected by 
their historical context (recalling once more the analysis of Henrich and his colleagues). 
Althusser in turn used this reasoning to explicitly argue against humanism as a 
philosophical position and human nature as a respectable theoretical category. 
(Althusser 2003: 253-5) For Marx it in fact represents a degree of self criticism; the 
point at which he sets aside the concept of Species Being openly elaborated in his early 
work and instead constructs an idea of human nature out of what is given (about human 
agency and consciousness) in a particular historical moment (a move that I have argued 
left certain assumptions about human sociability implicit and under-defined). Yet there 
remains a heavy emphasis on productivity in his work on human beings that seems to 
reflect the economic concerns of industrial capitalism, although interpreted in a negative
light. Marx principally sees human beings as “reproducing” themselves, that is, as 
creatures that produce the means of their own conditions for living. (Marx, 1994: 80-1, 
123-5) The expansion of productive capacity fundamentally alters social relationships, 
and therefore human experience. As we saw in chapter three, Marx consequently saw 
production as that which defines a person’s relationship with the world, and the 
particular system in which said production is organised thus determines their conscious 
awareness. 
As such, production is a means to some form of self-realisation: it defines what 
it means to be human. (Sayers, 2005: 612-4; Wilde, 2000) Yet production does not 
appear to be the principle feature of humanity across all contexts. The social value 
placed on production, and the personal need to get satisfaction in work, appears to be a 
novel development that emerged with capitalism. (Sayers, 1998: 48-52) Enshrining this 
emphasis on production into considerations of human consciousness looks problematic, 
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even in the cause of criticising the co-opting of productive capacity in the service of 
domination and exploitation. This productive character is itself historical, and need not 
be shared by all of humanity, not even in the feudal societies that preceded capitalism. 
Thus Marx remains ironically open to historicist criticism himself. It is possible to argue
that his emphasis on the means of production and the productive capacity of human 
beings is itself just as much a reflection of the prevailing orthodoxy of nineteenth 
century political economy as the economistic viewpoint of his capitalist contemporaries.
(Baudrillard, 1975) We might, on this basis, go on to say that his idea of human 
(pro)sociality is constructed within the economic framework which characterises his 
political analysis, and thus is overly bound up with his idea of productive 
relationships.106
Even disregarding the prospect that critics themselves are reflecting their social 
or historical context, does historicism really invalidate claims about human nature? 
Darwin makes an excellent example, since, bar creationists, few doubt that his account 
of evolution is true and accurate, even if it has been added to, refined, and augmented 
over the years. Darwin’s theory may have been affected and inspired by his socio-
historical context, but it captured something valid and verifiable about the process of 
evolution. Similarly, the Russian biologists were not conversely wrong: they too 
managed to represent something important about the interaction between a species and 
its environment, and the role played by cooperation. Thus whilst the phenomenon in 
question looks to be very real, the accusation of historicism does not automatically 
invalidate a given theory simply because it shows marks of having been a product of its 
time. We can inadvertently perceive our subject through the lens of our own context and
still feel justified that what we say about it is in some way true or justifiable.
Strategies of Universality
If these problems seem to cast a sceptical light on the accuracy of our ideas 
about human nature, then perhaps we can find some grounds to give these ideas some 
security and devise means to measure their veracity. In short, we have to recognise the 
106 Midgley argues that Marxism is a (or should we say yet another) system which attempts to explain a 
vast range of phenomena through a single heuristic; one of class and productivity. (Midgley, 2002: 
xxxviii, 5-7) Certainly it appears to lose much of its claim to universality.
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need to universalise our claims, and that any discussion of human nature that fails to do 
so in some way is suspect. One attempt at this is visible in the work of Donald Brown, 
an anthropologist sympathetic to the idea of an innate human nature, who devised a 
concept of “human universals”, an attempt to theorise exactly what it would take for a 
feature or trait to be considered universal in the human species and, crucially, what such
universals might be. Brown even goes so far as to describe the “universal people”, an 
anthropological description of the most basic currents in human life but lacking any 
specific content. (Brown, 1991: 130ff) Such tendencies are highly general, rather than 
limited a priori to just whatever can be connected to biological or psychological 
elements. So Brown’s universals include ‘moral sentiments’, facial and verbal 
communication, a sense of self and ‘fears’; but also such things as various kinds of 
classificatory systems, ‘myths’, ‘narratives’ and ‘personal names’.107 (cf. Pinker, 2002: 
435-9) This latter project is, by Brown’s own admission, tentative and presumed to be 
the first attempt at an ongoing project of proposing and considering possible candidates.
The appeal to such universals need not be made in such terms, of course. 
Brown’s psycho-anthropological formulation is simply a usefully explicit elaboration of
the notion. Freud outlined his universals in terms of theoretical constructs which were 
not given any particular overall heading. Marx initially described his universals under 
the heading of Species Being, a borderline metaphysical essence. He later located 
human universals more fully in the interpersonal relations involved in production. By 
way of comparison: Aristotle held that rationality was universal, indeed for him it was 
the defining, exclusive human trait, although it presented variability in its expression (in
other words, slaves and women were less rational and thus in need of the guidance of 
Greek men). Thus whilst what might constitute a universal is therefore not necessarily 
agreed upon, they do provide a way of making claims about human nature that escape 
accusations of parochialism and historical specificity.108 The idea of universals – 
however one construes them – may provide an anchoring point for overcoming the 
problem of individual researchers’ situational and subjective limitations –  which also 
underpins the charge of parochialism – a potential that Pinker has been keen to 
emphasise. (Pinker, 2002: 435-9) The possibility of establishing, to more or less general
107 So these universal people have a symbolic language; rituals and customs directed towards certain 
functions that are themselves perennial, such as conflict avoidance or childbirth; rules for 
membership and the ability to infer these rules; and so on.
108 Presuming, of course, that we can settle on a method for identifying them.
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agreement, a set of human universals would go some way to solving objections of 
critics of human nature. However this comes with its own set of problems.
Firstly, and most obviously, it might just be argued that the methods used to find 
these universals are equally subject to the problem of reflexivity: the studies, analysis 
and discourse that are supposedly aimed at uncovering or reflecting upon human 
universals are themselves influenced by the context in which they are carried out. (cf. 
Feyerabend, 1993; Maso, 2003) We face the prospect of a kind of meta-historicity. How 
can we know that the universals we identify really are universal? The prospect that there
exists some objective structures or facts that can underpin a theory of human nature is 
undermined if our means of discovering them is subject to limitations. It may not even 
be that the methods used are themselves especially problematic – they might in 
principle be perfectly sound and fit for purpose – but the questions asked are influenced 
by the investigators’ own context(s) and so inherently prone to answers that reinforce 
culturally dominant suppositions about what human nature is (i.e., what features of 
ourselves will be construed as universal) or what spheres of human activity (production,
say, or sex, or even evolution) are most relevant.
Secondly, appeals to universality can be construed as just that: as strategic 
appeals to the principle of universal properties, but which are in reality more rhetorical 
devices than examples of true objectivity. This is one explanation for the appeal of 
biological and evolutionary accounts of human nature in the contemporary literature. 
Those, like Pinker, who argue that there are identifiable genetic components which 
correspond to characteristics and proclivities, are appealing to genetics to provide 
universal grounding for their human nature. Thus, if we can identify the roots of our 
nature with our genetics, which we all share, then our concept of human nature will be 
universalizable. Freud could be said to have been doing something analogous, in his 
insistence that his work was intimately connected with the neurological field in which 
he began. (See Sulloway, 1980) John Rawls likewise makes discursive forays into 
evolutionary thought in defence of his idea that humans have a sense of justice, (Rawls, 
1971:502-504) and Marxist political scientist Gary Olson appeals to neurobiology to 
establish a basis for innate human pro-sociality that is critical to his political project. 
(Olson, 2013) Similarly, members of the motivationist schema who attempt to draw 
comparisons with other primates – and especially those who suggest continuities and 
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similarities, such as de Waal – are clearly attempting to establish a ground for 
universality in their claims.
De Waal (who does not even explicitly mention universals) can be viewed as 
setting up the basis for universalising the features he identifies on the basis of a shared 
evolutionary heritage and basic genetic similarities. In doing so he sidesteps the issue of
WEIRD subjects that hangs over the psychologists I include within the same schema as 
him, by broadening his research base to include humanity alongside the (other) two 
chimpanzee species. There is therefore the opportunity to avoid the critics’ challenge by 
deepening (in the case of Pinker) or broadening (in the case of de Waal) the underlying 
foundations of a particular theory of human nature. This latter course is arguably the one
being recommended by Henrich and his colleagues, who are interested in using cross-
cultural studies to investigate underlying similarities. It is also clearly visible in Brown’s
argument that we cannot presume that ‘universals, or features of human nature, are right
on the surface of behaviour.... [W]e can only be sure by going abroad.... [W]e only 
discover the universal when comparisons of variations reveal underlying universal 
mechanisms or processes.’ (Brown, 1991: 156)
However it still appears that the burden of universal validity has been transferred
from claims about human nature themselves to some external standard which is meant 
to bestow validity to those claims. This connects with the arguments put forward by the 
critics of gene-first Darwinism, in particular Lewontin and his colleagues, since they 
effectively claim that the deficiencies they identify are imbuing contingent political 
opinions with the status of scientific fact. Yet this is also a source of the great 
intransigence in that particular debate: Dawkins, Wilson and their peers view such an 
argument as questioning their scientific integrity and objectivity. (Segerstråle, 2000: 
216-9, 375-7; Dawkins, 2006: xiii-xiv) Meanwhile the critics consider themselves to be 
concerned with the purging of “bad” science in the name of objectivity and an accurate 
evolutionary theory. (Segerstråle, 2000: 200-202, 257) This is obviously significant, in 
particular for the scientists involved. The idea of investigating and  representing nature 
without the interposition of one’s self or subjective biases (the essential feature of early-
modern and modern objectivity) remains deeply ingrained as a professional and 
personal virtue on both sides.109 (Daston & Galison, 2010: 246-250) More broadly 
109 Parenthetically, the ‘epistemic virtue’ of trained judgement is, according to Daston & Galison, an 
attempt to account for the unavoidable reality of subjectivity by incorporating an iterative and 
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speaking, the intransigence of the Dawkins/Lewontin debate reflects the circularity of 
the relationship between the critical perspective and the quest for an objective 
(universal) basis for human nature. There is a tension between the attempt to ensure 
one’s theory of human nature has universal validity and the possibility that one is doing 
no such thing. To what extent is the appeal to some new universalising principle “good” 
science or philosophy, as opposed to yet another strategy of universalisation?
Raymond Tallis makes a similar sceptical case, in claiming that what really lies 
behind attempts to apply evolutionary theory to human behaviour is simply the fact that 
proponents of such approaches are overly enamoured with evolution and its explanatory
simplicity, rather than any kind of appropriateness or applicability. Like Kenan Malik, 
he asserts that viewing human beings simply as natural beings that can be explained 
through reference to evolution or biology misses something crucially important about 
humanity – namely, our creativity and rational sophistication. Given that this is not 
restricted merely to biologists but is also a trend prevalent amongst psychologists and 
philosophers it becomes a charge which extends to “neurophilosophy” and ethologists 
like de Waal. (Tallis, 2011; cf. Malik, 2002a) According to this criticism, what really 
underlies the appeal of these approaches is a kind of intellectual fashionability, a 
confluence of (comparative) novelty, explanatory elegance and a veneer of scientific 
objectivity.110 Both Tallis and Malik want to say that there is something problematic in 
this, insofar as it represents an unhealthy enthusiasm for new and overly scientistic 
techniques. But if is really so then an evolutionary grounding would clearly be no 
guarantee of universality. In this regard, certain conceptions of human nature are 
historicised in the sense that the techniques used have a grounding in a particular time 
and place, turned to an old topic of discussion. Thus gene-first Darwinian, ethology or 
other naturalistic approaches have no more validity than Aristotle or Hobbes, they 
merely represent a new intellectual Zeitgeist and a new anchoring point for strategies of 
universalisation. 
reflective attitude towards developing knowledge of the natural world. In short it reflects an 
awareness and affirmation of the necessarily ongoing nature of scientists’ epistemic training. This, 
they argue, supersedes and builds on the attempt to achieve a (“mechanical”) objectivity devoid of 
the illicit imposition of the researcher’s self.
110 Of course, there are affinities here with the potential universalising power of evolutionary theory.
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The Interposition of Culture
This leads us to another objection that potential critics may make, one that, 
appropriately enough, stems from another intellectual milieu altogether. Both Tallis and 
Malik are enamoured, not with evolution as a map to our innate nature, but with human 
beings’ status as rational decision-making subjects. Approaching humanity from this 
position provides an alternative description of what it means to be human, one that 
emphasises culture and social constructs over anterior dispositions or tendencies. Such a
description renders human nature analytically mute: it supersedes discussion of human 
nature in favour of discussing agents in particular socio-cultural situations, or else 
simply those situations themselves. A form of real scepticism starts to emerge, since, if 
there is a human nature, on this view we can never know it, since the ability of human 
subjects to determine their own being will continually intercede between it and our 
observations.
Human Nature is a Mirage
For critics of this stripe, culture emerges as the determining factor of human 
existence – indeed, of human nature – because it sets the conditions in which human 
beings make their decisions (not to mention its own susceptibility to modification 
through human choice). Obviously this is only one way of phrasing the situation. We 
could just as easily formulate this in terms of culture acting as an external force which 
conditions human experience. In either case, we are effectively and fundamentally 
shaped by our societies and social forces – an extreme form of the contextualism of 
chapter three. We perceive our world, and formulate our activities within it, through a 
prism formed by the myriad social influences acting upon us, and there are those who, 
in the light of this, argue that there is little to be said about human nature. Thus human 
nature theories as a whole are mistaken not because they make some error or are 
susceptible to some methodological trap, but because the end that they are aiming for is 
unattainable. In short human nature is a non-existent answer to the wrong kind of 
question.
For example, Malik (2002a) argues that there is something about the fact of 
human subjectivity that makes certain methods of analysis unsuitable. Humans have the 
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ability to choose, for themselves, from amongst the possibilities offered to them by their
social context, and it is this moment of, and capacity for, choice which constitutes 
human existence. Analyses such as computer modelling fail to grasp the true complexity
of this experience. It reduces decision making to restrictive calculations and lacks a 
proper appreciation for the capacity for understanding meaning and values which 
characterises human cognition. (Ibid: 294-304) Similarly, comparisons with other 
primates fail to account for the varied additional cultural factors that are unique to 
human social organisation, as well as the extra deliberative capacity and sophistication 
bestowed by our capacity for rational thought. (Ibid: 214ff) Attempts to model human 
behaviour algorithmically, or treat humans like advanced apes, reduce humanity to the 
status of – to use Malik’s terminology – zombie-hood. To truly grasp the full import of 
human agency one has to account for their special status as rational beings making use 
of the intellectual resources of their cultural inheritance. (cf. Malik, 2002b)
For Malik, and others, the nearest approximation to an innate human nature is 
some essential quality which in fact results in a lack of content. What makes us human, 
in this sense, is just whatever exceptional feature of the human being it is that elevates it
above its natural origins and bestows it with some form of autonomy. This sceptical 
position with regards to human nature has some affinities with an existentialist 
viewpoint, in that there is supposedly a lack of determination which leaves conscious 
beings to direct their own activity.111 These beings do not necessarily appear to be quite 
as undetermined as Sartre’s radically free agents, however, given that they are bounded 
by social circumstance. Still, human beings’ capacity to reflect on their actions and be 
aware of their own and others’ motives is taken to create a radical division between 
conscious subjectivity and the mere reactivity of other animals. Human nature thus 
dissolves in the face of our higher existential capacities, to be replaced with societal 
values and cultural meaning. It is effectively so amorphous or protean that it becomes 
whatever the agent itself makes it.
Culture Overwhelms Nature
Such a position is obviously attractive for some coming from scholarly 
disciplines – such as anthropology – that already concern themselves with culture and 
111 For a fuller discussion of existentialist human nature see  Stevenson et. al., 2013: 227ff, cf. Loptson, 
2006:4-5
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its power over people’s experiences. Thus it is that we see a similar position expressed 
in the work of Marshall Sahlins. Predictably, Sahlins was an early critic of sociobiology,
seen as the use of evolutionary theory as a universal explanation for human experience. 
(Sahlins, 1977) Like Lewontin and his colleagues in the Sociobiological Study Group 
(in reality an academic circle critical of sociobiology), Sahlins emphasised the role of 
language and culture in people’s lives. (Segerstråle, 2000: 141ff) These arguments, 
whilst mainly aimed at fending off the idea that a study of culture could work from a 
genetic basis, nevertheless have a knock-on effect for what it actually means to be 
human. Sahlins argued that biological explanations could not encapsulate the variety of 
behaviours displayed across cultures. Furthermore he contended that there is no good 
case to be made for universal constants underlying this diversity. Instead the cultural 
instantiation of all human existence necessarily means that humanity is inherently 
conditioned by culture and that, given that it is the primary source of diversity amongst 
groups of humans, it is also the primary influence over what and who they are. This is 
reiterated in his more recent pronouncements on the issue: human activities always 
occur within some cultural context or other, using that culture’s modes of expression. 
(Sahlins, 2008: 109-111)112 What this means is that human activity is always carried out 
within culturally determined domains of appropriateness and value, using the resources 
of the ‘symbolic regimes’ in which they occur. 
Nor, of course, have rationalist conceptions of human nature escaped Sahlins’ 
scrutiny: 
However, material forces and circumstances always lead a double life in 
human societies; they are at once physical and meaningful. Without ceasing 
to be objectively compelling, they are endowed with the symbolic values of 
a certain cultural field. ...[I]t is by this symbolic value that the objective 
characteristics of gold, such as its natural geographic distribution in the 
earth, become powerful factors of world history. ...[T]his whole curious 
cultural scheme nonetheless appears to economists as the transparent effects 
of a universal practical wisdom. (Sahlins, 1993: 11-2)113
Similarly, the apparently universal character of human nature can only ever have a 
112 Sahlins even goes so far as to critique the discussion of kinship in evolutionary theories of society 
and sociality (for example see Sahlins, 2008: 45-7). However his argument seems to be based on his 
applying an anthropological conception of kinship to the genetic relations referred to by the 
evolutionists, followed by subsequently glossing over the latter stages where they attempt, with 
varying degrees of success, to extrapolate their principles to social interactions between non-
relatives.
113 It is interesting to note that here Sahlins deploys the Marxian concept of commodity fetishism, with 
a heavy emphasis on the inherent cultural contingency of such created wants.
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semblance of stability. Given that any self-conception is itself articulated within a 
culturally-specific realm of meaning (and what else is human nature but part of an 
articulation of what one is?) it too will be subject to the contingent values of that 
culture, reminiscent of the problem of reflexivity we examined earlier. Furthermore, if 
we, as human beings, are realised and instantiated through our culture, then Sahlins’ 
position also resembles that of Judith Butler’s notion of performativity. For Butler 
human agency is exercised by acting out roles assigned to individuals by the socially 
dominant ideology. (Butler, 2003) 
These roles, being the primary way that individuals experience their existence, 
come to be how those individuals define themselves.114 Human beings, in their everyday
life in society, present themselves in ways that relate to that society. That is, they act in 
ways deemed appropriate to their class status, expectations of gender norms, familial 
relations and so on. (Ibid; Goffman: 1990) People are therefore self-constituting, 
according to their performative acts (the “performance” of a particular social role 
embodied in their actions). Erving Goffman describes this process in terms of the 
presentation of oneself.
A person may be said to have, or be in, or maintain face [self-presentation] 
when the line he effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally 
consistent, that is supported by judgements and evidence conveyed by other 
participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed by impersonal 
agencies in the situation. At such times the person’s face clearly is 
something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is 
diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter.... [H]e must, to 
maintain face in this activity, take into consideration his place in the social 
world beyond it. (Goffman, 2005: 6-7, emphasis original)
Human beings feel they must control who and what they are in response to what they 
perceive to be the expectations that confront them in the exterior (social) world. This 
becomes the primary – arguably the only – way people experience themselves. Hence 
they may, through awareness or alteration of their performance, take control of this 
process and fundamentally redefine their own essence. (See Butler, 2010) Human nature
is thus instantiated in and constituted by modes of social organisation and the ideals 
they embody. 
In cases such as these the human essence that removes us from nature is culture 
itself, given that culture here is language, symbolic representation, and the cultural 
114 Not as the occupiers of roles, of course, but rather as the kinds of being that perform the particular 
activities associated with the specific role(s) they occupy in society.
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entities they embody like customs, rituals and the like. Any innate features are buried 
under cultural articulation, and hence variations in culture are the ultimate source of a 
person’s character or behaviour. Here critics are using the mediation of human action 
via socio-political structures and symbols to argue that some other factor interposes 
itself between any putative nature and our actual experiences and behaviour. This 
mediation is so far-reaching it even gives us the mistaken impression that there is such a
thing as human nature. (Sahlins, 2008; Malik, 2002a: 21-5) More mundanely, it shapes 
people to such an extent that there is simply no space left for nature. Jesse Prinz holds a 
similar view; whilst in chapter two he was cited as part of the emotivist school within 
ethics, in the broader scheme of things he holds that our emotional repertoire is 
conditioned by an accultured sense of appropriateness. Emotional reaction and 
expression are canalised by social pressures. (Prinz, 2013) As a result we can situate 
Prinz at the border of the sceptical and the contextualist camps. He comfortably locates 
human morality in the expression of our emotional responses, but puts forward a case 
for psychological empiricism based on the cultural morphology of those responses. 
According to Prinz, socialisation and cultural cues guide the individual moral agent in 
gauging the appropriateness and acceptability of emotional expression as moral action. 
This is because things like morality operate according to norms and linguistic 
communication, which do not flow from innate qualities but instead canalise them 
(direct them down particular developmental paths) and provide them with meaningful 
content (such as who counts as worthy of harm or protection, where exceptions might 
apply, etc.). (Prinz, 2008, cf. Flanagan, Sarkissian & Wong, 2008) Like Sahlins and 
Malik, Prinz sees the role of certain agential faculties, mediated via culture, as critically 
diminishing the determining role of whatever is deemed (or conceded) to be innate.
Fellow philosopher David Buller stresses the idea that culture may well have 
developed in parallel to, yet separately from, biological evolution in order to advance 
this position. For one, he is critical of the idea that human universals necessarily involve
innate psychological universals, proposing that they may in fact be cultural homologies,
similar across human societies but having no particular root in anything innate. Instead 
it is simply a historical accident that some of these features – usually in the form of 
analogous institutions or types of ritual – appear to have cross-cultural relevance. Buller
proposes that a different explanation for these kinds of feature exists that accounts for 
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their superficial similarity across human cultures and their variety. This explanation is 
cultural evolution, the development of a society’s structures and practices in accordance 
with the pressures experienced by that society. Marriage, for example, could be the 
result of an evolved desire to secure reproductive fitness, but Buller proposes a cultural-
historical reading. He hypotheses that instead marriage could easily have emerged in an 
earlier human society and spread ‘epidemiologically’ rather than according to evolved 
psychological requirements, leading to the diverse forms – polygamy or the various 
positions on divorce, for example – displayed by diverse cultures. (Buller, 2005: 263-5, 
466-7, 469-71)
Buller underscores this by also arguing for a new source of malleability in 
human nature – that of biological evolution. (Ibid: 471ff) He maintains that evolution, 
as an ongoing process, demonstrates the transient character of human nature. The 
continuous presence of adaptive change ‘means that any psychological universals we 
might happen to discover – if we were to discover any at all – are temporally contingent.
For any psychological universals we might happen to discover in the present did not 
characterize our species in the past and are subject to change as our species continues to 
evolve.’ (Ibid: 477-8) As human beings are not finished products (they have not stopped
evolving), we cannot meaningfully describe human nature without succumbing to 
‘temporal provincialism’. So whatever it is that makes something human, it will be 
contingent and cannot, on Buller’s view, be some kind of “nature” given that ‘even if 
those universals have characterised our species for 10,000 years’ there is no guarantee 
they represent the summation of the human animal, past, present and future. However, 
can something be said to not really exist simply because it changes? This seems to 
require us to accept an unrealistically static understanding of what human nature is and 
can be. Marx certainly sees human nature as part of an ongoing process, changing in 
step with social forces. Surely we can legitimately adopt a similar position? We can say 
Theseus’ ship exists even if its constituent parts have been replaced. The question of 
whether there is one ship or many is immaterial in this instance. We can replace an axe 
head without saying that the axe did not and does not really exist, or will not exist 
because at some point we will also replace the handle.
Furthermore, whilst Buller suggests that EvoPsych views humans as the final 
products of evolution, this need not necessarily be the case for any and all naturalistic 
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approaches. Taken together this would imply that it could reasonably be possible to 
describe human nature at a given time, even going so far as to take into account how it 
was in the past, without failing to be aware of such a nature’s long-term temporal 
malleability. This appears to be an attempt to fend off the persistent prospect of finding 
pan-human similarities that could be said to be universals, or in some way innate, by 
defining nature as something metaphysically transhistorical. Buller could then easily 
concede the presence of general psychological features whilst claiming to deny that 
these constitute (part of) a nature.115
The Conceptual Persistence of Human Nature
To what degree do these objections definitively dispel the notion of human 
nature? Is that even the objective? If we take the theorists we have just considered, 
Malik and Prinz might better represent a position sceptical of a “hard” human nature; 
one which finds it necessary to look for the defining aspect of humanity somewhere 
else. Instead they want a more liberal and/or humanist human “essence” which 
fundamentally defines humans as self-directing agents. Sahlins and Buller, on the other 
hand, want no such traces of human nature left behind and deploy arguments such as we
have examined in order to deny the legitimacy of the concept itself. None are, strictly 
speaking, suggesting a crude tabula rasa position, but the former pair sit closer to the 
contextualist schema than the latter. If we press this point further, it also appears that 
few critics have fully escaped the concept of human nature. This is a critical point – 
“human nature” still does work within various paradigms and theories. We are faced 
with Nietzsche’s “eternal return of the repressed.”
As noted earlier, Prinz has appeared previously: amongst those philosophers who
could easily fit within the motivationalist schema examined in chapter two. It might 
115 Exploring this further, Buller is prepared to make claims in favour of some kind of innate system of 
reliable mechanisms. To continue with his discussion of marriage, he proposes the ‘relationship 
jeopardy hypothesis’ to explain differences in people’s approaches to infidelity that serves as an 
alternative to EvoPsych models (his primary target). Rather than entirely disavowing human nature, 
(at least insofar as he seems to entertain some innate mechanisms) Buller appears to be emphasising 
an open-ended array of ‘more general features of the minds’ of subjects, mediated by cultural 
commitments. (Buller, 2005: 332-8) This only makes his explicit disavowal of human nature all the 
more confusing. Surely we could claim this is a picture of what humans are now, but that it need not 
necessarily apply in perpetuity?
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seem strange then that here I cite him again for his explicit arguments against the very 
existence of human nature. Here we encounter an important factor that bears 
mentioning: many sceptics appear to still retain some idea of human nature. Though 
they may argue that there is no such thing, they still have a clear idea of some inherent 
property of human beings. Prinz stands out since he is explicit in what this is, and that is
the emotional repertoire on which our moral psychology is based. For all the cultural 
direction of appropriate emotional expression and the conditioning of our moral 
sensibilities, the human species’ possession of an innate range of emotions and 
emotional responses remains, acting as the raw material for this socio-cultural 
transformation. Taken in its totality Prinz’s view on the moral psychology of humanity 
might sit closer to the Marxian end of the contextualist schema, even if we must ignore 
some of his disavowal of the idea of human nature.
For his part, Malik still finds the idea of a distinctively human essence 
appealing, whilst insisting that it is something other than innate qualities:
Another way of putting this is that human nature is not simply natural. An 
inherently ambiguous concept, human nature means both that which 
expresses the essence of being human and that which is constituted in 
nature. In non-human animals, the two meanings are synonymous. What 
dogs, bats or sharks typically do as a species, they do because of natural 
selection. But this is not so in humans. The human essence – what we 
consider to be the common properties of our humanity – is shaped as much 
by our history as by our biology. (Malik, 2002b)
His opinions expressed in Man, Beast and Zombie move the balance much further 
towards history and culture. (2002a) There the emphasis is resolutely on the role of 
humans-as-agents who get to define their own essence thanks to their subjectivity. There
are certainly no drives here; no innate dispositions or faculties which might interfere 
with his picture of human autonomy. We are looking at a non-natural essence which is 
“to be an autonomous subject”, effectively cordoning off the possibility of inherent, pre-
cultural elements we might regard as natural. 
This is clearly connected to the way in which Malik articulates human nature 
theory within the context of a concern about the tensions between mechanistic 
materialism and humanism. For Malik, mechanism – and by extension, attempts at 
naturalistic descriptions of humanity – lacks an appreciation of the exceptionalism, 
irreducibility, and (although Malik does not expressly use this phrase) dignity of human 
subjectivity. Thus his central concern about human nature is how to resuscitate a 
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humanist conception of this “human essence”. Within the confines of this debate, the 
term “human nature” becomes nothing more than a part of the mechanist effort of self-
legitimisation via a rhetoric of naturalness, similar to that examined earlier in this 
chapter. (Malik, 2002a: 21-5) It is not that Malik has no picture of what humans, qua 
human, “just are” but that he avoids using the term human nature to describe what he 
wishes to advocate for, since “nature” for him implies delegating responsibility and 
control for at least part of one’s activity to some exterior wellspring of humanness.116 
Instead he takes an elevated, idealist notion of agency as a foundational assumption – 
and essentially articulates merely a different kind of human nature theory.
Likewise, Lewontin and his colleagues’ response to gene-first Darwinism seems 
to be less about human nature itself and more about the inadequacy and 
inappropriateness of trying to approach it reductively. In Not in our Genes they present 
their own approach to human beings as one that escapes the dichotomy of reductive 
sociobiological explanation and holistic cultural determinism. (Rose, Lewontin & 
Kamin, 1990; cf. Olson, 2013: 32) Rather they see the human being as the outcome of 
both our species’ nature and its culture – biology still plays a (minor) role, but biology 
conceived of as a process that inextricably interrelates with the environment. This 
heavily implies that they do have some concept of human nature, however hazily 
defined; one which incorporates the sociological sensibilities of the contextualist 
schema of chapter three (no surprise, given their Marxist intellectual and political 
influences).
Concepts of human nature also re-emerge in less obvious forms. Although he 
repudiated species being and the notion of a fixed essence, even in its latter incarnation, 
Marx’s human nature retained an almost idealist emphasis on the importance of 
consciousness (it is this, after all, which is conditioned by experience of the productive 
process). Sceptics may themselves hold to similar ideas, retaining a concept of human 
nature that is hard to detect because it resembles something more abstract than precise 
qualities or essences. Obviously, insofar as they represent something characteristically 
and definitively human, rationality and subjectivity can themselves be categorised as 
this sort of human nature. The picture of an almost radically free choice-making that 
116 And, without responsibility and control, we cannot have the kind of liberal agency he wants us to 
have.
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underwrites these pictures of rationality and self-direction is another central 
presupposition, a founding principle. It is a form of human nature or philosophical 
anthropology used to orient what it means to be human within the theoretical viewpoint 
of its proponents. The point the sceptics want to make is that such a “nature” is 
effectively content-less. However it is possible to press the sceptical position further on 
this point. 
Rationality and rational decisions have been cited as a capacity which removes 
human beings from innate capacities and predilections. This this can be coextensive 
with the assertion of the sceptical position just examined: human beings are intrinsically
self-directing. We can choose from our available options – indeed, we are able to 
formulate and understand our potential options – and therefore are not subject to any 
form of atavistic or instinctive influences. In short our higher capacities render human 
nature mute. However just as parochialism or political deconstruction  pose obstacles or 
problems for the formulation of a theory of human nature, but do not definitively refute 
all human nature theories, so rationality and subjectivity do not guarantee our insulation
from intrinsic influences. At its simplest we can appeal to something like Habermasian 
rationality, and point out that the way we exercise our higher reasoning faculties is 
dependant on how those faculties work, both in relation to its mental functioning (how 
we understand) and its interpersonal functioning (how we communicate). Furthermore, 
rationality is essentially a problem-solving tool, and viewed through an evolutionary 
lens we might consider the contexts in which our rational capacity developed. 
Rationality evolved to make decisions based on highly limited and subjective 
information, largely in the short-term without much – if any – reference to outcomes 
several years or generations ahead. Simply put, rationality may be constrained itself – 
by evolutionary circumstance, the limitations on our ability to perceive the intentions of 
other agents, our own emotional states, and so on. We have no guarantee – indeed it 
seems unlikely – that rationality is some kind of sui generis phenomenon that elevates 
human beings from their nature. Instead, on this reading, it could be said to be part of 
our innate set of capacities – our nature.
This case needs to be developed further, however, and we can do so not only by 
introducing external considerations such as evolutionary paradigms, but rather by 
considering how these higher-level existential properties are being used by those 
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appealing to them. They are, after all, proposed as intrinsic properties themselves (even 
to the extent that capacities such as language are sometimes located within an 
evolutionary framework, the implication being that this is the moment of rupture, when 
our species removed itself from the constraints of other animals). For his part, Malik 
proposes that ‘[w]hat defines us as human beings is our subjectivity, our capacity for 
conscious, rational dialogue and inquiry.’ (Malik, 2002a: 390) But this is more than 
simply a lack of content – it represents a distinctive faculty, one which rather begs the 
question of degrees. (i.e. to what extent does Malik’s subjectivity respond to some 
anterior nature of the kind described by de Waal or by Freud?) Malik, like Sahlins, 
rather assumes that this represents an elevation from nature rather than something which
works on a raw material. But is that not just a supposition? Human nature theories 
reappear as a set of assumptions about what subjectivity means, just what it is that 
culture is working upon and how it is relevant to actual agents. Similarly, for Habermas 
“being human” ‘must include a non-instrumental orientation toward mutual 
understanding without which flexible, normatively structured, social cooperativity 
would not be possible.’ (Moss & Pavesich, 2011: 149) They reveal themselves even in 
the way that critics decide on how much of a nature to allow and how culture does and 
does not condition human existence.117 The repressed human nature returns in the guise 
of subjectivity and agency.
In Sahlins’ case, he is happy to concede that certain bodily needs remain 
constant, but that their cultural mediation overrules their relevance to a discussion of 
what it means to be human.
As it is for sex, so for other inherent needs, drives or dispositions: 
nutritional, aggressive, sociable, compassionate – whatever they are, they 
117 Sahlins, for example, points to the different formulation of the self and personhood across cultures, 
which he takes to be proof of human variability. Different societies simply have different ways of 
conceiving of persons and selves, and this is down to cultural contingencies. Within some cultures 
‘neither agency nor intentionality is a simple expression of individuality, inasmuch the being of the 
other is an internal condition of one’s own activity.’ (Sahlins, 2008: 48-51) Malik, on the other hand,
thinks that though selves in some cultures may be interpersonal – i.e. these cultures construe 
individuals as members of a collective rather than as separate “Is” and “mes” – it is significant that 
individuals still operate as individuals. The functional idea of a “me” is thus a constant, as a 
prerequisite for agency, and what varies is how cultures collectively agree on the boundaries of what
constitutes a self. Individuals remain subjects, even if they are not conceived of as individualised 
selves, able to be responsible for their actions and exercise moral agency. This is because of the 
centrality of self and subjectivity to his argument about the irreducibility of human activity. (Malik, 
2005: 42-6) Hence Sahlins can make do without “individual agency” being part of his theory of 
human nature, but Malik positively requires it (and encourages us to be sceptical of Sahlins’ own 
account if he turns out to be correct).
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come under symbolic definition and thus cultural order. (Sahlins, 2008: 111)
On this view, because human nature cannot be expressed outside a cultural context, and 
thus uses that context’s means of representation, we are to conclude that culture is all 
there is to human nature. Furthermore, Sahlins looks to be conceding that such 
dispositions might well exist but is dismissing them as unimportant. Because we pursue 
any innate desires or obey any innate dispositions within a performative system – that 
is, within a system of culturally specific roles and representations – these aspects do not 
really have any meaningful bearing on what we are. (This despite the fact that many of 
them are implicated in taboos, mores, and other facets of social role-playing. For 
Sahlins the cultural determination of this role-playing is all that matters.) These ‘needs, 
drives or dispositions’ are not considered worth consideration in their own right and are
not regarded as directional or determinate. That we might need companionship is not 
considered as interesting as the means by which that need is contingently expressed.118 
This rather begs the question, however. Just what are ‘aggressive’ or ‘sociable’ 
dispositions? What if they are more content-full than Sahlins allows for? Moreover, why
should we discount the idea that such dispositions do in fact have some relevance to our 
actions? The implication is that continuities (that is, human regularities) are not as 
interesting as discontinuities; that we can learn nothing from the former. (cf. Brown, 
1991: 146-9)
We are asked to presume that this is the limit of such dispositions’ relevance, 
whereas in chapter two we saw fellow anthropologists Christopher Boehm and Jessica 
Flack entertain the notion that innate dispositions were instrumental in both the 
emergence and sublimation of social hierarchies. (Boehm, 1999; Boehm & Flack, 2010)
There, whilst the specificities of a culture’s hierarchy were dependent on its own history
and context, and could not reasonably be considered outside of these, hierarchy itself (as
well as egalitarianism or ‘anti-hierarchy’) was fundamentally a  “natural” phenomenon, 
generated by innate human dispositions. Sahlins’ position seems to suggest that we 
should ignore what appears to be the impetus coming from human nature, and focus 
solely on its cultural instantiation.
So it goes for Buller’s treatment of cultural institutions and rituals. It is clearly 
118 The thought that both might be interesting – and that there may exist a reciprocal relationship 
between the two that warrants theorising – is discounted in the drive to cut out from under 
Hobbesian and sociobiological accounts the entire edifice of human nature.
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problematic to try to claim that any institution is natural, but what if Brown is correct 
and there are stable features – “universals” – which lie deeper? Buller’s alternative 
narrative of an evolving proto-ritual is tenuous and speculative. (Buller, 2005: 466-7, 
470) It is no more plausible than other explanations, whilst obliging us to treat findings 
that imply innate psychological influences as of no consequence. To put it another way, 
the possibility of providing an alternative explanation does not in itself refute the initial 
proposal, particularly if it fails to successfully account for or dismiss the evidence on 
which that proposal relies. However much we may be marked out by an ability to create
cultural institutions and practices, if these capacities are not fully independent but 
instead layered on top of pre-existing dispositions and/or evolutionarily constrained 
capacities then these latter could easily feed into what kinds of institutions and rituals 
and so on we create for ourselves, or otherwise influence their content. (cf. Flanagan, 
Sarkissian & Wong, 2008) This is exactly the kind of possibility that some of these 
critics wish to fend off, and the crucial factor over whether they are successful or not 
thus comes down to what extent we are prepared to entertain and affirm the degree of 
emphasis which they give to culture and/or agency. In short, it depends on the 
expectations we bring with us when we start to consider human nature.
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Conclusion – Towards a Theory of Human Nature
Hitherto I have argued that a crucial factor is the way a given theory locates 
human nature – where it places human nature in the broader landscape of human 
existence. (This is in distinction to other means of dividing theories of human nature, 
such as whether they posit a soul or other non-biological essence; whether they posit 
any degree of continuity with other beings or not; or the position they adopt regarding 
the Hobbesian-Rousseauian spectrum.) There are, of course, other disciplines and 
approaches which can fit into the schemas sketched above – the intent here was to 
expound a taxonomy which can help us understand what characterises the perspective 
on human nature taken by different theories. I have, for example, left out many 
individual thinkers from chapter three who might have an approach similar to Marx or 
Freud (including their intellectual descendants), but whose idiosyncrasies make their 
theoretical orientation distinct. There are also a number of isomorphic, non-western 
traditions within Buddhism and Confusianism that treat human nature as something to 
be cultivated – encouraging the positive aspects/virtues and sublimating the negative – 
which would fit within the contextualist camp. Meanwhile, in chapter two I focussed 
more on the psychological and ethological side of the motivationalist schema, and dealt 
only lightly with anthropology and what might be broadly thought of as “neo-
sentimentalist” ethical philosophy. Indeed, game theory is treated tangentially in 
chapters one and two, yet that interdisciplinary framework may well deserve attention 
on its own, seeing as it encapsulates and illustrates the rift which divides the 
superficially similar evolutionary viewpoints of the schemas in question – namely the 
question of whether we ought to think of human agents as acting in purely benefit-
maximising ways. (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Gintis, 2009) In the preceding chapters I 
have tried to sketch out the most relevant groupings of taxa, by way of an analysis of 
the most prevalent of modern human nature theories.
By contrast, critics of the human nature concept regard human nature as 
something of a myth – what makes us human can effectively be located almost entirely 
in the cultural and inter-subjective milieu in which we carry out our day-to-day lives. 
For them, the term is merely a fiction or label, one which is either irrelevant, suspect or 
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both. As may be readily apparent, I do not think that such an outright denial of human 
nature is warranted. This is the point at which we concluded chapter four. Clearly our 
existence is shaped by our social, cultural and economic forms, but having established 
the presence of an influence other than innate dispositions or tendencies does not 
establish it as an alternative explanation, nor a superior or superordinate one. To do so 
presupposes that culture is the only significant determinant of what it means to be 
human, that it is more powerful, or simply that its mediating effect negates that which is
mediated, namely human nature. Sahlins’ formulation, whereby the encultured 
performance of all activity necessarily means that culture is the only meaningful source 
of our humanity, reveals assumption underlying this. As one review of his The Use and 
Abuse of Biology commented:‘[Sahlins] declares that culture is so independent that it 
cannot be studied in reference to anything but itself....’ (Alexander, 1977) So whatever 
we do within culture cannot be, on Sahlins’ view, anything but cultural in origin. This is 
predicated on the idea that we should give priority to culturalistic explanations, and see 
them as counter, rather than complementary, to explanations that work from any form of
nature. However it is difficult to see why we ought to side with one over the other; and 
we needn’t have to. After all, as we saw earlier, Mehmet Tabak characterises Marx’s 
human nature as ‘a dialectical composite of essence and existence.’ (Tabak, 2012: 3) Yet
in the case of criticisms like Sahlins’ there seems to be some question-begging going on:
there appears to be an assumption that we should consider evidence that culture 
influences human existence to be evidence against human nature. At the very least, 
cultural variations are assumed to be intrinsically more definitive than innate universals 
when it comes to articulating what makes us human. 
Locating Human Nature is a Question of Framing
I believe this goes beyond the presumptions of a particular perspective on human
nature, and instead illustrates something deeper that operates in the various ways that 
people talk about human nature. Where they believe the defining element of human 
nature lies is strongly linked to the disciplinary quirks, considerations and priorities of 
the person in question. ‘Anthropology, education, psychology and other academic fields 
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have their own ideologies, which at any given time focus on a certain range of research 
topics, and which impose blinders on what phenomena are considered worth studying.’ 
(Diamond, 2012: 174) More to the point, these conceptual frameworks make research 
programs possible; they delineate what phenomena should be attended to and what 
should be set aside (otherwise every inquiry would attempt to encompass everything, 
and accomplish nothing). In short, what I am asserting above is that people like Sahlins’
position on human nature is shaped by their sphere of academic activity – by the kinds 
of things they are interested in and investigate. Having investigated human existence via
its cultural and sociological instantiations, when asked to consider human nature such 
theorists do so via the cultural and sociological frameworks they have established.119 The
argument here is that the emphasis on culture emerges from scholarly or intellectual (or 
political) predilection & tradition rather than from conclusive proof that culture-first 
readings are epistemically or ontologically superordinate. 
Scholars simply do not engage with their work in a vacuum, and obviously their 
positions and opinions will be influenced by certain experiences. (Recall Jared 
Diamond’s quote above.) However, what I am suggesting is that the main influence will 
not be ideology but rather the niche – the taxon – one’s discipline occupies, and that 
this applies to all theories of human nature. This is not a simple attempt to deflate the 
arguments made by the critics. If you ask a scholar what they think human nature is, 
their answer will likely reflect their prior area(s) of interest and study. This is hardly 
surprising, but what I want to emphasise here is that the key mechanism behind this is 
the kinds of area in which they start looking for human nature (and if they find nothing 
there, well then clearly they have, or feel they have, justifiable reason to be sceptical120).
There is a disciplinary ecology in which debates about human nature are conducted 
between alternative perspectives – the schemas I have identified emerge from the ways 
in which they each approach the concept in question. I particularly want to distinguish 
this relationship from the influence of society that underlies the potential for 
parochialism, in that in this case it is specifically the way in which theorists become 
accustomed to the perspective of  their discipline. They consequently develop their 
119 These being intellectual frameworks that principally explain humanity through its cultural 
determiners. 
120 The same goes for those attempts that look primarily in the social milieu and context and decide that
the human regularities they have found are attributable solely to exogenous universals belonging to 
society and social structures. In their case they do not see Tabak’s dialectic, but an antagonism 
between nature and nurture in which one side will win out over the other.
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ideas about human nature using the tools, terminology and theoretical constructs they 
typically employ elsewhere (replicating, in some sense, their original object of study). 
As with some modern discourse theory, the crucial factor in how an individual considers
some generalised object of knowledge will be the way in which they routinely approach 
some objects more closely related to their scholarly interests. (cf. Keller, 2011) Power 
relationships, however, have little to do with this; rather we are looking at avenues of 
appropriate investigation guided more by collective tradition than a cadre of intellectual 
gatekeepers. Some of the important differences between human nature theories are, 
then, primarily due to, and can be explained by, the diversification, 
compartmentalisation and specialisation of our academic disciplines.121 As I shall argue 
below, in order to get a proper idea of what human nature is we must therefore get to 
grips with this disciplinary ecology.
Disciplinary Attention
If we continue considering the critics’ position for a moment, we might better 
understand their approach when we see such objections as coming from a holistic 
standpoint. In other words, this is an approach that views cultures as ‘consistent wholes’
and situates individual humans within their cultural framework. This informs the 
background of many of the critics, whether from anthropology, psychology or the social
sciences. It represents the way they themselves contribute to an analysis of the world. A 
paradigmatic position that is interested in the overarching mechanics or dynamics of 
culture (or in the way that agential individuals orient themselves within their ethical and
political regimes) will be understandably sceptical of the idea that such dynamics could 
or should be broken down into individual pieces, such that they might be attributable to 
this or that human characteristic, trait or faculty.122 (Bloch, 2000: 197-200; Smith, 2000; 
121 Discipline is certainly not the only measure of how scholars approach human nature, admittedly. 
Some of the critical approaches may well be motivated by concerns about the political motivations 
and aims of rival theories (as with Lewontin and his fellows) or by an overweening desire to restore 
dignity and responsibility to human agents (as in the case of Malik, see 2002a: 370-2). Ideology may
also affect the extent to which someone will think human beings are inherently good or bad, or what 
we ought to do in response to this inherent goodness/badness – i.e. the content of their human 
nature. Yet I would contend that these extraneous considerations will have a less pronounced effect 
on the structure of a theory of human nature than where theorists begin to look for human nature in 
the first place. 
122 Or whatever term we may want to use to denote a particular aspect or subsection of human nature. 
As previous chapters will have shown there are many terms that are employed across various 
disciplines.
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cf. Laland & Brown, 2002: 148-9) At the very least, this means that human nature 
scepticism represents a valuable corrective to overly reductive conceptions of human 
nature. It also serves to highlight the way in which human nature is often approached 
from the “bottom up”, with notions of psychologies, the inherent structure of 
consciousness or individuality, or even the algorithmic logic behind all these, being 
posited and then fitted into the cultural context. However internally it means that when 
asked to consider the possible form and/or content of human nature these critics do so 
from a position that begins at the political level, and which sees individuals as defined 
by their socio-cultural experience. 
Likewise the algorithmic schema reflects the general intellectual predilections of
the theorists in question. By starting from the question of some basic component(s) of 
existence, they look for human nature in a realm of fundamental principles. This is 
particularly prevalent in the modern form examined in chapter one. Enamoured with 
evolution, the gene-first Darwinian theorists, when trying to articulate what human 
beings really are, start from the principles of evolution and the (as they see it) 
evolutionary agent, namely the gene-as-replicator.  These are, after all, principally 
biologists or psychologists, interested in the fundamental mechanisms underlying 
human action: they are used to looking for the underlying principles and components 
that govern biological and psychological phenomena. Evolution is a powerful 
explanatory force for the origin of such mechanisms. It is therefore unsurprising that a 
gene-first Darwinian theory of human nature should describe a logic which can be used 
to explain why this or that disposition arose in the human animal, and thus reveals the 
“real” reason behind our behaviour. Meanwhile the most prominent philosophical voice,
Dennett, also shares a fascination with evolution as an elegant formal system that does 
away with artificial constructs – his ‘universal acid’ dissolving a priori assumptions. 
(Dennett, 1995; cf. Cziko, 1995) I think this goes beyond mere “biological 
determinism”, the idea that we are just programmed to follow a set of rules. What really 
matters are the systems that inform what we are and can be – the way that evolution 
shaped the development of our dispositions, and the role that genes play in affecting our
behaviour. In particular, they view humanity from the viewpoint of the supposed 
evolutionary beneficiary of our activity.
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I would suggest that what this trend really reflects is an interest in the aspects of 
our being that might be described as “foundational” (in that they are the foundations of 
our nature, the basis on which everything else rests). It is significant that the biology 
they draw on is overwhelmingly evolutionary biology, accustomed to focusing on 
population dynamics and how traits emerge, persist and proliferate within a species. 
Dawkins, after all, regards genes as important because he has come to view them as 
‘immortal’: individual humans may cease, but genes are copied from one generation to 
the next, changing only slowly and imperceptibly.123 They figure prominently in this 
human nature theory because they are the material components of our own evolution. 
Evolution itself is likewise foundational, an impartial, universal process that shaped our 
species along with many others. It represents an identifiable, regular pattern in the 
human world that can be formally understood, which is what these scholars are looking 
for. In other words, genes and the evolutionary transformation of our genotype are of 
interest not simply because they are biological, but because they are the instantiation of 
our species and a product of its (natural) history. In a world without metaphysics 
evolution represents some of the most fundamental processes available for study. 
Biologists like Dawkins or Ridley, or Evolutionary Psychologists like Tooby and 
Cosmides, can trace gene expression (in concurrence with environmental factors) or 
theoretically represent the evolutionary development of a trait. When it comes to human
nature, then, these are the most obvious places to start. Indeed, they are effectively 
already the start of their human nature theory, being (as they are) an attempt to grasp 
certain features inherent to human existence as such. For example the gene-first 
Darwinists are fascinated with the problem of altruism, and the gene-centric paradigm 
they espouse is supposed to explain the complexities of this pro-social behavioural 
trait.124 Such theoretical excursions make Dawkins’ insistence that he is not trying to 
address human nature ring somewhat hollow. His The Selfish Gene and The Extended 
Phenotype attempt to consider human behaviour, what makes us human and what we 
are capable of (including a notable recommendation that we rebel against our selfish 
genes). Gene-first Darwinism as a whole presents an account of how species develop, 
and in so doing reveals the truth, supposedly as impartial as the evolutionary process to 
123 Via mutation, which is really only a copying error which may or may not prove beneficial.
124 To the extent that I felt compelled to spend much of chapter two contrasting this view with that of 
the ethologists and developmental psychologists.
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which its adherents appeal, about what we are.125 This is clearly an articulation of 
human nature, and it comes directly from their area of interest; it is evolutionary biology
and genetics being applied to humanity.
So it is with the other schemas. Marx retained a German idealist’s interest in 
consciousness, but in regards to its relationship to, and determination by, its social 
existence. Freud was likewise interested in how people’s unconscious experiences of 
socialisation could form the kinds of being they became – especially the way this 
mediates the development of the primal Id. In his therapeutic role this became a focus 
on those patients whose particularities made them misfits in their society, particularities 
that could be traced to their emotional and cognitive development. This squares with 
what we see when these scholars address human nature – it is something that is in part 
malleable, and that dynamically reacts to the world around it. It can do this because it is 
situated at the interstices of individual psychology and the social. The areas to which 
such theorists look when describing what they take human beings to be are the same 
ones they turn to to describe socio-political or psycho-social pathologies. Marx was 
concerned with the way in which consciousness reacts to changing (and increasingly 
unequal) social circumstances and, having concluded that consciousness is the result of 
socialised productive capacities, saw human nature as intrinsically bound up with how 
human agents produce goods. In particular this means those goods that are necessary for
survival, in the first instance, and the continuation of their society in the second. 
(Likewise, Virno the semioticist sees human nature as the interpersonal potentiality 
embodied in language and learning.) This, as I have argued, came with a presumption of
pro-social preference, in that Marx’s nascent human nature is better served by 
productive practices in which the social end use of a product is visible and understood 
by the producer; the result being a healthier consciousness. Human nature, for the 
contextualists, can only be analysed in situ, and in this form incorporates external 
effects as part of the realisation of the human essence or nature (what I termed the 
kernel). It is not hard to see how those with interests in society – but who conceive of a 
parallel autonomy on behalf of socially-situated agents, that is, who maintain an 
important place for the individual in their thought – would adopt similarly contextualist 
125 In its most austere formulation: just ‘vehicles’ serving to propagate genes.
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approaches. The individual is, after all, the bearer of human nature, even if it is one 
fundamentally and unavoidably mediated by the political sphere.
When it comes to the motivationalist schema examined in the second chapter, we
can clearly see the way that ethology, as a discipline, shapes the perspective of 
ethologists with regards to human nature. Having studied animal behaviour closely as 
their main focus when they come to think about humanity, they naturally consider it in 
relation to the similarities and/or differences that emerge in comparison with other 
species. Hence de Waal sees in human cooperation many of the same psychological 
mechanisms that he observes in chimpanzees and especially bonobos, merely in a more 
complex and sophisticated form. It is to these mechanisms and the dispositions that 
bring them into effect that de Waal looks in order to discuss the human condition. His 
human nature is, perhaps ironically, markedly non- or pre-human (as are gene-centric 
accounts). On the other hand, Tomasello sees a radical difference between the ways 
these three primates cooperate, one that marks human interaction out from other 
species; however, crucially, he does think that what makes human sociality unique is 
revealed by comparative studies with the other apes, as well as by psychological studies 
of infants and young children. The developmental psychologists of chapter two likewise
have a clear sense of where human nature lies, as their research dwells on the earliest 
motivations displayed by human beings. Their human nature is one of motivation – 
what drives us to act in certain ways – and the inherent directionality of innate 
dispositions. Again, this is unsurprising because this is itself the area that their discipline
usually concerns itself with – we could say their field of study is synonymous with their
study of human nature. Hence much of chapter two actually directly describes the 
research they carry out and the way their findings have been interpreted.
Of course the discipline alone may not tell us much in each and every case. 
Some disciplines have a wide range of problems and approaches contained within their 
remit. Philosophy is a wide field and as such where a given thinker locates human 
nature may depend on precisely what problems they typically concern themselves with. 
Hume, to take an obvious example given his Treatise on Human Nature, was explicitly 
interested in the subject precisely because he was concerned with the relationship 
between perception, rationality and behaviour. His academic scepticism prevented him 
from making definitive statements about what human nature was, and he displays a 
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strongly contextualist streak, yet his conception of human nature emerges as something 
instantiated within individuals and their interactions with the world (largely due to his 
emphasis on the moral sentiments) – neither reductive nor a true tabula rasa. Similarly, 
the philosophers we have considered in the second chapter are predominantly ethical 
philosophers with a penchant for more emotivist and sentiment-based ethics of 
motivation.126 Meanwhile Buller rejects the concept of human nature entirely whilst 
Dennett is an enthusiastic proponent of the gene-first Darwinian paradigm. 
Psychologists and anthropologists likewise run the gamut, individuals falling into a 
variety of areas with respect to where they locate human nature, and the distinction 
tends to emerge based on the kind of psychological phenomenon in which they are 
interested (developmental as opposed to social psychologies, for example) as well as 
their attitude to incorporating the findings of evolutionary theory into their work – 
naturally a question of appropriateness, rather than one about denying the facticity of 
human evolution. Thus particular problems and sub-domains within certain fields may 
tell us more than the generic discipline does about someone’s position on human nature.
So it is not so much that a particular discipline will obviously adopt this or that position 
with regards to human nature, but that where scholars locate human nature governs 
where they fall within the taxa and, given commonalities in interests and training, there 
will be a general (if not necessarily inevitable) similarity within disciplines.
This is illustrated by the case of Lewontin and Rose, and Boyd and Richerson, 
themselves biologists, yet largely opposed to the gene-first Darwinian project – 
certainly in regards to its approach to human beings. These cases seem, on the surface, 
to be counter-examples to the claim I am making. They in fact come closer to the 
contextualist grouping, and as we saw in chapter four they possess a robustly critical 
attitude to human nature. Boyd and Richerson, in particular, are keen to note the 
dynamic interplay between nature and culture in the human case. (Richerson & Boyd, 
2006; see also Segerstråle, 2000; Sterelny, 2012) 
This is a tempting opportunity to invoke ideology: Lewontin and Rose, at least 
are a part of a broadly left-wing resistance to biological (and in particular genetic) 
-determinism. This undoubtedly encouraged their break from other biologists more 
126 So too is Prinz, who as I mentioned in the previous chapter sits uncomfortably with elements that 
could easily belong in a psychological/motivationalist treatment of human nature (the emphasis on 
emotions) and a sceptical position (his position on the conditioning and direction given to these 
emotions by cultural sensibilities).
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enamoured with the “gene’s-eye view”. However, whilst their Marxist affiliations 
certainly affect their approach to human nature, and especially their view of gene-first 
Darwinian human nature theory, I would still maintain that this is not an entirely 
ideological issue, such that their rejection of gene-first Darwinism could be said to be a 
direct result of their beliefs about the best kind of political community. Not least 
because previous generations of socialists were not averse to genetic approaches to 
human nature, in the rather more extreme form of eugenic theory, so there is nothing 
inherent to political Marxism which opposes (or promotes) said approaches. The 
resistance to the spectre of genetic determinism and sociobiology emerged historically 
within the movement. Instead the political convictions of someone such as Lewontin are
linked to an analysis of the ills of society; the mutually reinforcing professional 
relationship between Lewontin and Steven and Hilary Rose (a sociologist herself), as 
well as Lewontin’s own writings (e.g. Lewontin, 2000), suggest that that ideological 
influence is already intimately bound up with a more robust, sociologically-oriented 
scholarly analysis of human experience. In effect, Lewontin is a contextualist when it 
comes to human nature. His emphasis, when discussing this matter, lies within the taxon
we might usually associate with a sociological approach, reflecting his analysis of 
politics and society. He is not a “biologist” in this instance, much less a part of the 
algorithmic schema. This is because what actually determines where we can situate 
someone within the taxonomy of theories of human nature is their characteristic 
approach, rather than whether or not they happen to be a biologist, sociologist or 
behavioural expert. Discipline is merely a good indicator of where one’s interests will 
lie, and a strong but not unyielding or definitive influence on the development of one’s 
approach – individuals still define their own approach. 
Certainly the political commitments of Lewontin, Rose, and those like them 
provide motivation, but I would suggest that what distinguishes their approach to human
nature from that of more reductive biologists is the sociological emphasis associated 
with their Marxian viewpoint. Politically, they view individuals’ consciousnesses as 
inextricably bound up with their social experience, adopting an understanding of human
experience that emphasises the socio-cultural dimension, and so Lewontin and Rose’s 
stance on the question of human nature reflects this.
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Edge Cases
This creates the question of how easily we can really situate any discipline 
within a given schema. In reality, each schema can itself be considered to be a spectrum,
or a territory unto itself. They are general spheres, potentially encompassing a range of 
theories that share some basic conceptual structures. Individual scholars or theories may
put greater or lesser emphasis on certain factors that fall within the broader range of the 
schema’s “topographical” boundaries. 
For example Sahlins puts a much heavier emphasis on cultural formations than 
even fellow sceptic Lewontin who, as intimated in chapter four, retains a nascent sense 
of human nature that may originate in his more Marxian sociology, and an emphasis on 
the ins-and-outs of gene expression and developmental biology. Likewise, there are 
ideas that may sit on the borderlines between the schemas I have sketched out. There is 
the potential for hybridity in the porous boundaries between schemas. This is only to be 
expected, since the schemas are themselves only part of an analytic heuristic and their 
boundaries delineate the most common morphologies of human nature theory. Given 
Marx’s emphasis on the social and economic transformation of consciousness, we might
locate him in the more “political” terrain of the contextualist schema, and be 
unsurprised if those who draw inspiration from him side with the sceptics. Elsewhere 
game-theoretic models might be employed in a number of different approaches, 
certainly within the algorithmic and motivationalist schemas. The deciding factor in this
case, for me, would be the way in which the models in question accommodate 
psychological dispositions into the decisions made by their hypothetical agents. Much 
game theory, especially in its early incarnations, rests on the assumption that agents are 
primarily concerned with their own interests, and will pursue just whatever best 
maximises these interests. This represents a kind of algorithmic approach to human 
nature, in that a simple set of rules – in this case benefit-maximising behaviour and the 
structure of the social scenario (the rules of the “game”) – is held to describe or explain 
how humanity works, whether the end result be “rational” or otherwise. However others
have made efforts to refine game-theoretic models, by arguing that agents are neither 
perfectly rational, nor are they motivated solely by their own concerns. Instead they 
may perceive gains made by a second or third party as valuable, which will influence 
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what strategies they employ to solve the problems game theory tries to model.127 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Gintis, 2009) In short, how well a given theorist integrates an 
appreciation of real-world motivations into their calculations, and adjusts their model of
agency accordingly, as a nexus of these motivations, makes the real difference in where 
they lie within our taxonomy. Grey areas exist between the delineations of each chapter,
then; however the heuristic itself – the idea that there is a topographic distribution in 
how scholars and disciplines carve up the spheres of human existence – can still give us 
an idea of the characteristics of those approaches that fall into these ranges. The crucial 
point is that individual biologists, for example, do not find themselves expressing a 
certain kind of human nature theory because they are biologists, but because they locate
human nature within a certain sphere of human existence, and their training as biologists
will have had some influence over this.
Human Nature and Politics; Nature vs. Nurture
This brings us back to a point made in the introduction, namely the way in which
human existence – broadly construed as the ways in which we simply exist – can be 
approached from two directions: nature and politics. We can regard human nature – in 
the sense commonly used; in the sense of being a description of what we really are – as 
likewise composed of two forces: an underlying, innate component – an “ur-nature”128, 
perhaps – and an external component, which I have labelled politics for simplicity’s 
sake, subsuming within it environmental effects such as culture and economics. The 
first component is to human nature as the laws of gravitation are to the orbits of 
planetary bodies – neither is necessarily any less “natural” but the latter is more 
sophisticated and of a higher order than the latter. Meanwhile the second component 
represents a necessary accommodation of surrounding circumstances – the context(s) 
which affect human nature and accentuate or even give rise to particularities in distinct 
instantiations (in other words, specific individuals or the manifestation of human nature 
within a given historical period).
127 In effect, the argument is that traditional game theory has typically incorrectly estimated the pay-offs
agents expect and value.
128 In the sense of being analytically “primitive”, prior, or an underlying thread, rather than “ur-” in the 
sense of something atavistic. It might also be regarded as the closest we can think of the idea of 
studying human beings in their “natural” state, given that such a task is virtually impossible. 
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Naturally, the taxonomy by which I have grouped particular human nature 
theories also describes a movement between these poles. Significantly, I take it that 
none of the schemas examined actually attribute the full human nature to one influence 
or the other. The obvious conclusion must be that many – not to say most – human 
nature theories locate human nature at least partially outside the realm of nature. 
Certainly there is conflation of the “ur-nature” with human nature as such at one end, 
but no one seriously takes the environment as entirely non-constitutive of the 
personalities, world views and behaviours of individual human beings. There are 
likewise few perspectives which attribute these things entirely to the external 
circumstances humans find themselves in; in some cases this involves an underlying 
assumption of what humans are, or what they are capable of, that informs their socio-
political theories (even, at least on occasion, in the case of some of those most 
vociferously opposed to the concept of human nature). Instead the case is merely that 
those accustomed to working within political discourses about human existence, when 
asked to consider human nature, do so from the vantage point of politics; that is to say, 
from culture and society. Others will attempt to look for human nature in sets of 
principles about the human species, consciousness and so on, with an emphasis on their 
own particular areas of expertise. If asked to consider more socially-oriented problems 
and phenomena, they will proceed to do so in the light of what they have established 
about human nature (for example, de Waal’s The Bonobo and the Atheist).
We thus approach the question of human nature from one of two directions: 
nature (the nature of things or of the human being; the non-cultural element) or politics 
(broadly the social world in which humans find themselves). In fact this better 
represents the division between nature and culture, which are intimately interconnected. 
The borders between the two are profoundly blurred: we cultivate and protect 
supposedly wild nature reserves; environmental effects attributable to cultural or social 
phenomena might have epigenetic effects on foetuses in-utero. There is no stark 
cleavage between the two, but a kind or broad, fuzzy boundary. 
However I also want to distinguish this from the more familiar notion of “nature 
verses nurture”. This latter division is a disagreement over the relative influences over 
what makes us human – the direction of determination. The dyad I am interested in here
is the two ends of a spectrum along which human nature theories are situated – the 
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means by which people address the question of human nature. The two are obviously 
connected. The scholar who militates for nurture is effectively locating human nature 
entirely within the political realm. However this need not mean we should regard them 
as synonymous. Nature ↔ politics represents an axis along which humans objectively 
exist, and the two terms describe the poles of this axis. They are not the sources from 
which determination flows. The differentiation in human nature theories arises from 
where on this axis specific theories locate the quintessential aspect of what it means to 
be human: in other words, the area(s) in which they look for the presence of absence of 
human nature. Nature verses nurture represents the entrenchment of these options. It is 
the identification of particular theories with the pole with which they have the most 
affinity, and the imagined sense that these represent opposed sides divided by some 
border or no-man’s land. It is the intellectual reification of this bifurcation of 
approaches. 
Establishing Analytic Distance
Of course what this highlights is the problem of how we, as potential analysts of 
human nature, can study it from an objective viewpoint. How are we to separate 
ourselves from or own nature – to create a space between ourselves as analysts and as 
carriers or instantiations of the object of our analysis – in order to establish just what it 
is? After all, human nature is the prerequisite of our perception, so how can we perceive 
it? (cf. Virno, 2009: 93-4) This problem relates to two issues already examined: firstly 
the fact we exist along this spectrum of nature and politics (since pretty much any 
human being we encounter will already be bound up with their cultural and social 
experiences: their raw nature will have been transformed); and secondly the difficulty, 
discussed in the introduction, in defining what counts as natural (i.e. establishing the 
absence of human artifice or influence). 
Typically we can separate ourselves from our object of study, maintaining a 
nonidentity of knower and known. Obviously this becomes problematic when the focus 
of our analysis is human nature, since our object is effectively ourselves. It appears 
difficult to experience human nature in a way distinguishable from all our other 
experience – our experience of being ourselves – with all the environmental influences 
that also entails. However theories of human nature have settled on various ways of 
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creating a distance, and thus a distinction, between the theorist and their object. In the 
algorithmic schema we see this distance being created almost literally. For the gene-first
Darwinians human nature is invested in the genes and the impartial universal logic of 
evolution. They easily settle on a vantage point from which to study human nature, 
since they locate it in a sphere ontologically distant from that of human experience. We 
do not, after all, experience genes or evolution directly (i.e. immediately as part of our 
perception of the world). Obviously in the eyes of gene-first Darwinism’s critics this 
attempt is unsuccessful – personal attitudes (such as the contemporary folk psychology 
or unconscious cultural bias) are read into this ontologically distant object, thus reifying
those attitudes. This is related to the idea of translation: by rephrasing human behaviour 
in terms of evolution and translating it back in the guise of the evolutionary implications
for human nature, we attain only a modicum of additional objectivity, and over-
emphasis on this standpoint reduces that potential for objectivity to a mere gloss. 
The other approaches might be characterised as the cultivation of a certain kind 
of professional virtue that effectively aims at securing an objective vantage point. The 
archetypal example of this would be the idea of “philosophical detachment.” By 
adopting a reflective position with regards to their own worldly perspective, some 
theorists attempt to overcome their own particularity. Many of the theoretical practices 
employed by Marx or the anthropologists (either the critic Sahlins or the motivationalist
Boehm) represent attempts at thinking beyond one’s own, limited cultural experiences, 
in an attempt to locate the truly universal systems that structure our existence. The 
professional virtue of the philosopher or the social scientist requires that they 
conceptually distance themselves from the object under discussion; that if they engage 
with particulars at all they do so from an abstract or universalising viewpoint. This 
would appear to be necessary, at least with regards to human nature, if they are to avoid 
justifying the accusations of parochialism and/or historicism. In adopting a practice of 
detachment it becomes possible to avoid such eventualities as the scholar removes 
themselves from from their own particular instantiation of human nature.
In more empirical cases, especially those such as the ethologists or 
anthropologists, this detachment might be represented in an adherence to rigorous 
experimental protocols, aimed at removing individual bias.129 By establishing a practice 
129 Usually by laying their methods and results bare for assessment or to be compared with the 
interpretations they draw. In fact Freud’s reports of his own case studies could be considered an 
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of keeping themselves, as researchers, insulated from their subjects (such as using third-
party interviewers or recording devices to literally minimise contact with their subjects, 
or allowing their subjects a degree of autonomy) they create a distance between the 
human nature that they study their own expectations about it. By being transparent 
about these practices they attempt to approach a kind of discipline-wide self-reflection 
and -criticism. The pitfall appears when the entire discipline shares the same perspective
and so, at least potentially, the same blind spots. Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan’s 
argument is essentially an extension of this: a reminder that by relying on WEIRD 
subjects their fellow psychologists have not distanced themselves sufficiently from a 
particular cultural instantiation of human nature. (See pages 96-8, 146-7 above.) For one
thing, contemporary psychology tends to study the same kinds of people as the 
psychologists themselves, from the same range of cultural practices and backgrounds, 
thus failing to distinguish between the (WEIRD) knower and the (WEIRD) known. 
Additionally this same lack of distance fails, through the relative cultural homogeneity 
of the participants, to adequately differentiate between nature and politics. Features 
might be taken to be natural and non-cultural simply because all available subjects are 
identically influenced by their environment – rather like the pseudo-wildernesses of 
Niven’s Ringworld viewed solely from the perspective of the natives. 
Of course the solution proposed by Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan is to expand 
the cultural diversity of human subjects. If we were to accumulate examples of human 
nature from across this diversity we might be able to better discern what elements are 
not attributable to a person’s social experiences. Alternatively we might search for 
instances where human nature has not been affected by culture, and this is effectively 
what child psychology offers us. This is another sense in which human nature can be 
located at arm’s length, save in this case the distance created is between human nature 
and the general acculturation of adult humans per se. By studying pre-cultural infants 
and young children there is the prospect of capturing something about human nature 
unobtainable through contemplation of people who, like ourselves, have grown 
accustomed to a political sphere of existence.
early incarnation of this practice.
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How Can We Talk About Human Nature?
Having thus considered the trends suggested by the dissection and comparison of
these theories of human nature, we can now ask: how well do any of the schemas 
addressed here really encapsulate what humans are? We have an idea of why members 
of certain schemas look for human nature in the places they do, but are any of them 
warranted? Resolving this question would go some way towards putting the preceding 
discussion to practical use. I want to make the case that we can locate an appropriate 
basis for a study of human nature, and perhaps even suggest how such a study might be 
carried out. In order to do so we ought to consider the relative merits of contemporary 
attempts to discuss human nature. Having categorised these theories of human nature 
according to where they place their object of analysis we can proceed to evaluate their 
suitability for the task. 
In the first chapter we saw how human nature can be regarded as the result of an 
“algorithm” or cosmic, quasi-metaphysical logic. Here I also tried to demonstrate how, 
amongst other potential pitfalls, this approach risks falling into a reductive 
functionalism by which all understanding of human nature must make reference to the 
proposed algorithm. To be sure, functionalism is not restricted to the strata covered in 
that chapter – it can easily occur anywhere, and the productivist tendency in Marx 
amounts to such an occurrence – but it appears as an unavoidable consequence of 
looking for coherent ultimate causes that resonate immediately at the level of everyday 
life. In this way the algorithmic schema risks making significant portions of politics 
simply a function of the unfolding of nature, and therefore fails to adequately synthesise
the two. 
Furthermore there is something unsatisfactory about the algorithmic schema; it 
does not seem to add anything to our understanding of human nature. We are supposed 
to marvel at the way in which altruism is really the result of the logic of survival, 
embodied by the concept of the selfish gene, but what does this really do for our 
understanding of social behaviour? Of course such approaches will think there is 
something called human nature, since they study that which we all share – our human 
genome. But this really is quite limited. As I argued in that chapter, much of the gene-
first Darwinian approach to human nature constitutes translating behavioural tendencies 
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into terms of genetic and evolutionary fitness, then proceeding to translate this back into
the revelation that we have behavioural tendencies which could likely have evolved to 
serve the interests of a social species. This creates an obvious circularity. Trying to 
describe humanity in this way is like Borges’ one-to-one scale map: it recreates what we
are trying to understand, in terms of the tiniest details, and in so doing fails to help us 
orient ourselves. At best, at least in the modern incarnation discussed in chapter one, it 
tells us more about evolution than it does human nature, so perhaps this is not really the 
best way to try to say what it means to be human. This is made clearer if we make an 
analogy with physics: all living things are also governed by the laws of physics. So are 
all human beings. However explaining human nature via the lens of the physical laws 
their behaviours employ, or are bounded by, does not add anything to our understanding 
about what implications those behaviours have for human experience, nor does it reveal 
anything new about their place in the grand scheme of an individual’s existence.
The motivationalist schema seems more promising. In chapter two I 
characterised such approaches as those that take motives seriously (hence the name).  Its
focus is on the ways and means of human (and animal) interaction and cognition. It is 
unsurprising some such approaches would explicitly consider there to be something to 
the idea of human nature, because this is precisely what they study. Killen and her 
colleague Marina Cords do just this when they argue that their field has revealed 
humanity to be much more cooperative than has conventionally been thought. (Killen &
Cords, 2002) Such a claim equates to an assertion that one’s research has uncovered 
something about human nature. Whilst the methods employed obviously vary – 
philosophers will tend to rely on the findings of the more empirical disciplines rather 
than running experiments themselves, but are freer to consider the interpersonal, 
political elements – a common thread is that mental states and dispositions come to the 
forefront, and are subject to discussions on whether and how they are affected by the 
situations actors find themselves in, particularly those involving other actors. In short 
this approach locates human nature within human beings themselves (as opposed to 
their component parts or extrinsic forces). 
I would like to say that the focus on individual, actual human beings, as the 
nexus of their various histories and social commitments, makes sense, since these 
individuals are the bearers of their human nature. Unlike an algorithmic approach, the 
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individual’s psyche is not approached as something generated by an anterior nature. 
Intuitively this is appealing: human beings are the instantiation of human nature 
individually, whilst collectively encompassing a broad range of possible outcomes. Nor 
are they either vehicles for their cultural artefacts or the ephemera of a more 
fundamental, algorithmic nature. Yet the motivationalist schema still has a rather 
tentative relationship with the political sphere: I also mention in chapter two how 
political considerations, when integrated, are often quite limited in scope. Such 
considerations are confined to the field of ethics, say, or anthropologists might limit 
themselves to comparative discussions of the development of a particular social 
phenomenon such as hierarchy.130 When it comes to politics the schema’s general 
approach is to trace the manifestation of some human faculty within differing contexts. 
As such, whilst the motivationalist schema represents an integrative and human-centric 
attempt to locate human nature, it only ever imperfectly accounts for how social forces 
can potentially mediate or even transform human nature, and as a consequence remains 
acutely susceptible to the problems of reflexivity and historicism encountered in chapter
four.
Conversely, the contexualists leave too much unsaid about what they assume lies
in the kernel of their human nature. This kernel’s eccentricities or particularities are less 
interesting to these theorists than what happens to them out in the real world. The 
emphasis here is, after all, on how the context redefines or moulds human nature itself. 
Where Freud did revise his theories, it was to refine his higher-level theories of 
socialisation and psychoanalytical practice rather than to address gaps in his 
understanding of the material being thus transformed. He envisaged the psyche as a 
whole as having a trajectory of developmental stages rather than a number of faculties 
which develop semi-independently – which does not reflect the best current evidence – 
which of course affects his ideas of how the psyche (and by extension human nature) 
develops in the process of its social and interpersonal realisation. Similarly Marx, and 
later Marxists, had an intuitive grasp of human pro-sociality, but avoided a detailed 
discussion about what this might mean in terms of motivations and the mechanics of 
130 An exception to this might be Diamond’s The World Until Yesterday, which is far reaching and 
covers many universal phenomena as they present themselves via a vast array of distinct human 
cultures. Yet the focus there is not exclusively human nature – in fact it takes a back seat – instead 
the book is devoted to surveying the rich variety of human cultures that stand outside the modern 
western WEIRD mould. Additionally, it is not a purely academic text and does not go into every 
detail, yet still even the paperback comes in at over five hundred pages.
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social activity. Instead, as I argued in chapter three, sociality (in the form of social 
production) became an end for political action; a standard we need to attain to reach a 
full, healthy consciousness. I think these two exemplars illustrate a more general risk 
inherent in the contextualist approach – that of passing up an opportunity with regards 
to their nascent concept of human nature. By leaving it under-defined they not only 
leave presumed something that might be open to more definite examination, they also 
lose a potential resource that could refine their political theories.
It seems unlikely that any single approach or schema adequately captures the 
totality of what is understood as human nature. My intent is not to say that any of these 
schemas are wrong. On the contrary, they each say something interesting about what 
makes us human. Rather, not every perspective is necessarily the correct starting point 
when thinking about human nature. In fact it remains unclear where we ought to start in 
such an endeavour. We are confronted with a division between, on the one hand, our 
situation within a specified historical, environmental and social context and, on the 
other, the internal physiological and psychological mechanisms inherited by virtue of 
our species membership. To talk about one inevitably runs into the problem posed by 
the other – the pressures of the second factor must be accounted for in our description of
the first. This seems like an intolerable position, or at least a potentially circular one, 
given that we must explore one side in order to know how it will affect the other, but 
this cannot be done without an understanding of how this second side affects the first. 
Human nature theories thus fall foul of something akin to the Copenhagen 
interpretation: one can know where it is, but cannot simultaneously know what it is 
doing and vice versa. 
The Copenhagen Interpretation of Human Nature
The problem is that we are obviously two things at once: simultaneously natural 
(at the very minimum, existing as biological bodies bound by natural regularities) and 
political (in the broad manner in which I have defined this term above). It terms of what
characterises human beings, we are subject to evolution, we are reproduced via genes, 
we have psychological and motivational features, we engage socially with other 
individuals, we form and follow social norms, we codify and ritualise these norms and 
we form vast continent- and world-spanning civilisations that mediate these norms and 
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our interactions. There are too many aspects to account for all at once. More to the 
point, they are interpenetrated, the distinction between nature and politics being hazy 
and porous. This forces scholars to make a choice in what aspects to attend to, or at least
to incorporate first. Do they pay attention to our socially-determined existence; the ways
in which our existence is shaped by socio-political structures and cultural formations? 
Or should they first try to assess how people think and the innate dispositions that affect
their engagement with one another and their society? Hence theorists make pragmatic 
choices about what to prioritise: they frame the issue as described above, and generally 
turn to areas within either the sphere of nature or of politics.
In reality we should be wary of entirely discounting one side in favour of the 
other, even if we realistically could. There are undoubtedly influences from each side 
which radically shape and determine what we, as humans, are, simply because they play
such a large part in how we experience our selves and our world. Where we encounter 
difficulty is in trying to integrate our understanding of these influences. As a result we 
arrive at a situation not unlike that faced by subatomic physicists. Just as the uncertainty
principle suggests that we cannot know, with equal precision, both the location and 
momentum of a subatomic particle, there is also an inverse relationship between how 
precisely we can describe our natural existence compared to our existence as political 
agents. We can, with some hefty poetic licence, describe this as a Copenhagen 
interpretation of human nature, since we have the tools to describe either the way our 
humanity is influenced by politics, or its innate directionality, but struggle to 
encapsulate both simultaneously.
The Question of Normativity
This thesis concerns itself with an analysis of human nature theories, with a view
to sorting them and, ultimately, clarifying the means by which they in turn use human 
nature as an analytical tool. Of course this now leaves us with the question of human 
nature’s normative import – that is, the way in which it is invoked to give reasons for 
why we ought to do something or pursue some course of action. In the introduction I 
emphasised the importance of the very concept of human nature by referring to its use 
as an anchor for certain normative claims and ethical and political recommendations. 
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This is what makes an analysis of this analytical tool so important: human nature is not 
merely an exercise in discovery, it is also a resource for reason-giving. 
Aristotle offers a paradigmatic example of this. The human nature he describes 
in the Ethics shapes the kind of polis he recommends in the Politics. After all, Aristotle 
viewed human beings as political animals, and whilst particular states are a synthetic 
creation of human beings the polis is nevertheless the natural outcome of what makes us
human. He thus subscribed to an ethical understanding of human nature: knowing what 
humans are (rational, intelligent creatures) can tell the philosopher what constitutes the 
good human life. For him this involved forming political associations in which people 
(or at least male property owners) could exercise their reason and therefore flourish. As 
such there is no particular conflict between human nature and society, since the polis is 
where and how human nature is fully realised. In a sense it is part or an extension of our
nature. (Aristotle, 2000: see especially 55ff; see also Trigg, 1999: 17, 29-31) Instead the 
reasons that states fail – or a polis does not realise human virtues and goods correctly – 
is because of contingent failings on behalf of human beings themselves located in the 
culture. Such cultural malformations lead to bad kinds of state (namely despotism, 
oligarchy and democracy) and thus do not adequately realise human nature, which is 
prior to and less fragile than culture, but only realised in the (right kind of) polis.
Yet the rhetorical power of nature makes this usage a potential pitfall. Any 
normative implications must be self-evidently consequent to the theory of human nature
in question, or else such claims about what we ought to be and do are merely rhetorical 
devices, employing the perception of nature as an impartial arbiter to give themselves 
weight. Can human nature legitimately be used to make prescriptions for how we 
should live? Many, even if only tacitly, seem to think so. Marx thinks we will be better 
off in a society where the exchange of goods is no longer instrumentalised and mediated
by capital. De Waal thinks we ought to cultivate our empathy. Narvaez thinks we need 
to reorient our child-rearing practices. Dawkins – the supposed avatar of austere, 
deterministic science – recommends we ‘rebel’ against our selfish genes and act more 
generously, taking negative moral lessons from the supposed rapacity of our human 
nature.
Obviously we cannot simply say that whatever is natural is good, even if we can 
conclusively prove something is natural to the human being. For example if Aristotle is 
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right and it is natural for humans to be rational this does not necessarily mean that they 
ought to act so as to increase their rationality; nor does it mean there is automatically a 
moral failing intrinsic to irrational actions or decisions. This is somewhat similar to the 
“naturalistic fallacy” from within ethics, articulated be G. E. Moore, which claims that 
the good, or the quality of “goodness”, cannot be determined by some natural quality 
like being pleasurable. Moore’s formulation, however, requires that the (moral) good be 
non-natural in origin. Thus it is clearly of little help in determining what normative 
conclusions we can draw, and how we can draw them, except to constrain us to saying 
that either a) these conclusions will not be ethical or moral oughts, but some other kind 
of normative recommendation; or b) there are no facts about morality that are 
independent of natural facts, and thus no abstractly “real” moral principles/truths.131
The most coherent way of deriving normative recommendations from human 
nature (or natural facts in general), as I see it, is to take a functionalist or goal-oriented 
approach. That is, some approach to normative rules – including but not limited to 
morality – that takes the form of “if x is the desired outcome, we ought to do y”. The 
process or activity y may, of course, be limited or otherwise informed by what we know 
to be possible.132 This also applies to those theories that are, on the face of it, less 
“natural” than most naturalistic explanations (i.e. those particular examples examined in
chapters one and two). After all, if Marx wants to claim that communism is more 
conducive to a healthy kind of human nature than capitalism, then he would need to 
substantiate the claim that the latter deforms consciousness. (And this is, unsurprisingly,
the thrust of much of his philosophical work.)
So it might be that we can agree with the German philosophical anthropologists 
and their normativity (discussed in the introduction) – there are human 
needs/requirements, and they have intrinsic normative consequences. Yet such a claim 
can only be made on the same “if-then” basis. If we have an existential need (of 
whatever description) then that implies we ought to work towards satisfying that need. 
If that need is expressed in a sufficiently detailed manner then we might even be able to 
work out the best way of enacting that “ought” – the most propitious way of satisfying 
131 This latter point is a matter for metaethics, falling outside of the present enquiry. (For discussion see 
van Roojen, 2015; Blackburn, 1993: 111ff, 166ff)
132 Thus: “If flying to America is the desired outcome, we ought to get on a plane – because humans are
incapable of unassisted flight.” Or: “If we wish to combat terrorism, we ought to study anthropology
– because terrorists are living human beings who make decisions based on many factors, not least 
emotion, not abstract rational agents.”
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that need. However, no matter which human nature theory we select the normative 
recommendations we can make will only be as reliable and accurate as the picture of 
human nature we have pieced together.
Another consequence of the view I have put forward, however, is that – like 
Marx, Olson, and even Narvaez and de Waal – it treats human nature as a raw material 
which can be transformed, and thus one with which we might work. If we have an idea 
of how we would like the human world to look (and we can satisfy ourselves that such a
world is within the bounds of human nature; that whatever requirements human nature 
places upon us are met) then we can look at an ethological human nature to give us an 
idea of how to achieve it. In other words, we can determine what dispositions we need 
to cultivate, or what faculties can be activated and developed in order to help us achieve
that end. A blacksmith can either make better swords or better ploughshares if they 
understand the properties of the metals he or she is working with. Likewise, if we agree 
with de Waal and wish human society to be more harmonious and cooperative (perhaps 
because we feel it will result in individuals with healthier psychologies and a more 
secure sense of self; that doing so will satisfy some need or psychological requirement) 
then we can better achieve that end if we understand what human nature is and can do.
Justifying Normative Claims
There are potential pitfalls, even with this modest approach to normativity. In 
chapter one we briefly touched upon a  position like this: that of Ridley and Pinker’s 
assertions that capitalistic, liberal democracies are the most desirable form of 
government, being best able to accommodate human nature (as they see it). The 
argument runs thus: given that human beings have a variety of needs and impulses, any 
human society must be flexible enough to accommodate them all, whilst having the 
capacity to regulate and guide all these conflicting dispositions, opinions and desires. 
Ridley certainly holds this view: he expresses revulsion at the way people’s lives are 
planned out for them in Skinner’s Walden Two. (Ridley, 2004: 199-200) Grand plans to 
engineer society will be doomed to failure and tyranny, since social experiments will 
have to steamroller people’s genetically programmed desires and differences. A society 
which tries to reconfigure human beings is intolerable, as it goes against their nature. 
The only real alternative is one in which human beings are capable of expressing 
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themselves (in a controlled and prudent way). (Pinker, 2003; Ridley, 2004: 185-188, 
267-275) More to the point, the increase in availability of material resources, along with
the control over our own lives afforded by the democratic process, allows us to 
sublimate our self-interest; to pursue our goals without encroaching on those of others. 
This undermines the overly flamboyant claim of some critics that gene-first Darwinists 
think we are merely the sum of our genes. Yet the ideal society, insofar as gene-first 
Darwinists have a concept of one, is very much (almost suspiciously) like the one we 
have now. As they see things, present-day environmental influences on our behaviour 
are not only reconcilable with a genetically-influenced human nature, they are in fact 
fully consistent with it.
The purported benefits of democracy also extend to better control over our 
“demons”. Pinker even argues that this civilisation has lead to an overall reduction in 
aggression and violence, both within and between democratic states. He holds that 
human beings are forever beset by our conflicting interests. Yet in The Better Angels of 
our Nature (2011) he also recognises that we may have a disposition towards making 
pro-social choices; that there is some “moral sense” that means that humans do not 
simply see “good” as being whatever is good for them personally. The trouble is that 
this pro-sociality is limited, and in many situations we might find ourselves acting in 
ways that we might otherwise disapprove of. All too often our self-interested impulses 
get the better of us, either in the form of narrow selfishness or in terms of the ideas and 
groups we hold dear (such as people’s national sentiment and so on). Furthermore this 
internal conflict merely contributes to Pinker’s perception of human nature as 
dangerous, since human nature lacks internal stability. The internal dissonance is not 
only problematic but makes humanity inconsistent. His answer is democratic 
governance. 
In Pinker’s view, with the rise of the liberal democratic state, war has decreased
over time, partly due to the structural relations of such states, and their interactions and 
similarities with one another. He points to decreasing military sizes, less stringent 
conscription policies and an overall reduction in belligerent or jingoistic public rhetoric 
in order to ground this claim. (Pinker, 2011: 255ff) The welfare of individual states is 
more closely tied to their neighbours thanks in part to the expansion of trade and 
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commerce. In this, at least, capitalism is given some credit for making conflict a less 
attractive prospect, since war between trading partners damages both parties’ economic 
prosperity. Our own self-interest actually restrains us from trying to take from our 
neighbours by force or indulging in revenge. Internal violence has also supposedly been
reduced thanks to the stability of the modern state. Formalised and accountable 
incarceration practices have, according to Pinker, removed violent elements from 
society. This is both more humane (compared to, say, execution for minor offences) and 
more rigorous (with a well-funded and nationally consistent police presence capable of 
efficiently holding those who violate the well-being of others to account). 
Democratic ideals have therefore given us, according to Pinker, an inter-
connected society in which each person is an individual, human life (as opposed to 
national honour or pride) is at the forefront of public discourse, and yet we are 
intimately inter-dependant and held together by mutually beneficial codes of conduct 
which we can recognise and abide by. It thus satisfies in us a need to belong, without the
object of belonging becoming a reason to inflict great, ideologically-driven violence 
upon one another. It also increases our knowledge and understanding of one another, 
and thereby gives us the opportunity to become more ethical, as more people around us 
are automatically humanised and recognised as similar. What might be described as our 
more moral traits are consequently accentuated by education and the development of 
human civilisation. Pinker is not under the illusion that all our “evils” are gone, nor that 
we were ever entirely evil in the classic, moralistic sense. However whilst we may still 
rationalise the harm we do to others, and are tempted to ignore the wishes and intentions
of those others to satisfy our own goals, democratic civilisation is so structured as to 
diminish (or repress) such impulses and certainly makes it harder, now that our 
interconnectedness is of a global kind, to condone violence within or between societies.
Philosopher John Gray has been all too ready to point out the political 
convenience of this position. To be sure, Gray does not actually argue against human 
nature. In fact he himself argues that we are more like animals than we care to admit, 
and the idea of human exceptionalism (which he also equates with humanism) is merely
a cultural narrative that only serves to obscure something meaningful about human 
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existence. (Gray, 2003; 2013) (This might upset the notion of human nature as 
something unique or distinctive to human beings, of course, but this does not entail the 
negation of all human nature theories, nor is it disruptive of the way I have addressed 
human nature here.) The division between human and animal is an assumption that our 
species has used to flatter itself, runs Gray’s thinking, and it must be rethought.133
The idea that liberal democracy represents a unique progression, one that 
controls and improves human nature, is likewise a convenient and flattering narrative. 
Gray contends that the story told by Pinker is just that: a story, one that contributes to an
overarching narrative of progress and perfectibility that suffuses and sustains “the 
West’s” self-perception.134 The idea that human nature is corrected by our modern 
institutions serves to justify those institutions and contributes to the impression that they
represent objective progress over other, previous or exogenous, social systems. To 
reinforce this point, Gray also argues that the reduction in violence Pinker is so 
impressed by is in fact illusory. (Gray, 2011; 2015) Instead, violence still permeates the 
modern world, and still persists even in our vaunted democracies. There are still 
conflicts, some instigated by modern democracies, and terrorism represents an ever-
present violent potential that cannot be tamed by democratic engagement since it goes 
beyond such engagement.
 However, Gray has a tendency to cite powerful examples from non-democratic 
regimes – Nazi and Soviet purges of the racially or politically impure, for example. (See
especially Gray, 2015) Where the democracies whose virtues Pinker (and those like 
him) extol do figure is in accounts of colonial conflict (largely historical, although still 
relevant given the timescale these advocates themselves adhere to) and proxy wars. 
Even coupled with Gray’s citation of recent interventions in Syria and of course Iraq, 
much of the most explicit violence is laid at the door of “modern” but not “democratic” 
states, which would play into the hands of Pinker’s argument that modern violence is 
exceptional, and unrepresentative of the true “progressive” historical development 
embodied by modernity. So, we might bolster Gray’s case by highlighting the structural 
violence – embodied in the sweat-shops, imbalances of trade and so on – that the 
economies of modern democratic states rely on to manufacture growth and reproduce 
133 Interestingly, Kenan Malik (2002b) argues that Gray himself also represents a certain anti-humanist 
narrative, no more reliably objective than that of Pinker’s.
134 A viewpoint put forward more fully in his Black Mass, (Gray, 2008)
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their social order. (cf. Olson, 2013: 38-40) Thus the redirected or obscured violence that
Gray wants to draw attention to returns in yet another form.135 A similar argument might 
be made in relation to Pinker’s argument that fewer wars now result in territorial 
redistribution. (Pinker, 2011: 258-260) Today, globalised corporations control, extract 
and process many of our natural resources, alleviating nations of the burden of 
occupying significant tracts of foreign soil in order to secure access. Thus in war the 
victor can leave the territory sovereign, but insist that the defeated party allow open 
trade, which often means allowing the occupier’s companies access to local markets or, 
as in the case of Iraq, access to previously nationally-administered resources. The 
liberalisation of trade – as a condition of loans or assistance from international NGOs – 
also accomplishes this function (and so represents another form of structural violence).
Gray also notes that Pinker endorses the American system of incarceration as 
part of a “recivilising” process, and that this cannot really be construed as a reduction in
violence, not least because it actually constitutes violence directed by the state against 
its own citizens. (Gray, 2011) To add to this, he also raises questions about the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the US penal system. In effect it does not address 
the causes of violence, but, as with its ‘repressive’ stance on drugs, principally concerns 
itself with palliative effects. As Gray acerbically notes of Pinker’s analysis of the 
matter:
Highly uneven access to education, disappearing low-skill jobs, cuts in 
welfare and greatly increased economic inequality are also disregarded, 
even though these factors go a long way in explaining why there are so 
many poor blacks and so few affluent whites in prison in America today. 
(Gray, 2011)
Gray goes on to say 
there is certainly an imprisonable class in the United States, largely 
composed of people that Pinker describes as decivilised, and once they have
been defined in this way there is a kind of logic in consigning this category 
of human beings to the custody of America’s barbaric justice system. (Ibid)
Clearly the charge here is that the contributory causes of violence are not discussed in 
the service of maintaining an image of the modern liberal state as a panacea for that 
violence (whilst ignoring the implicit violence of the incarceration regime itself).
135 This might also potentially sidestep the problem that Gray (2011; 2015) does not present statistics to 
counter Pinker’s own. Gray could concede that violence, as Pinker measures it, has decreased, but 
has given way to more insidious forms of structural violence that Pinker does not even countenance.
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All told, then, Gray accuses Pinker of being blind to the still existing reality of 
violence in human society, and of being willingly selective when it comes to his 
assertion that liberal democracy has contributed to a radical decline in violence. Thus 
the problematic narrative within Pinker’s account is revealed – a (negatively) moralised 
nature becomes a resource in advocating for a particular political and systemic 
viewpoint. Anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson (2013) also takes issue with Pinker’s 
claims for violence within human nature, seeing his argument as equally extravagant 
and overstated. He takes a different tack to Gray, one that argues that human nature was 
not in fact as violent as Pinker suggests in the first place. Obviously this contrasts with 
Gray’s tacit agreement on the violence of humanity, required in order to argue that we 
have not been cured of this violence by modernity. (cf. Malik, 2002b) Ferguson’s 
interpretation of the anthropological and archaeological evidence is that it does not 
support the idea that humans are intrinsically aggressive (and that war has not formed a 
sufficiently strong selective factor in our evolution). If so, then this would lend weight 
to the notion that Pinker’s appeal to a propensity for violence as justification for the 
liberal nation state reflects his political position more than his scientifically led 
theorisations. The problem here is that it looks very much as though Pinker is 
overstating the violence of prehistorical humanity in order to increase the impression of 
reduced violence in modern humanity. Taken together, this raises the prospect that 
Pinker is not only perpetuating a myth but appears to be, consciously or not, selectively 
adjusting the facts to bolster his case.
Keeping in mind these points, the normative conclusions of a human nature 
theory will only pass muster if the human nature theory itself is accurate. The 
implication of the framework I have elaborated here is that this will in part depended 
upon where that theory locates the main impetus or locus of human nature; but this is 
not all. It will obviously also depend on such factors as how well a theory conforms to –
or at least does not conflict with – the evidence available. Thus, no matter the 
substantive content of a human nature theory or the particular normative conclusions its 
articulators recommend, it can still be judged according to its characteristic approach to 
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its object – where it locates human nature within the topology of human existence, and 
how well it reflects the evidence.136
Human Political Ethology
Having considered the available range of theories of human nature, it is worth 
returning to the idea of human nature considered in its own right. As I see it, we cannot 
escape talking about the issue. Even discounting the prospect that many critics will 
likely carry with them an idea of what human beings are, such kinds of ideas are 
integral to our social, political and ethical projects. We often build our conceptions 
about how society works based on what we know about the people in society – how 
people “just are”. Similarly our accounts of social phenomena must make reference to 
how human agents respond to their political realities unless we are to suppose they 
mechanically carry out whatever society had programmed them to do. (See Toddington 
& Beyleveld, 2006: 2-10) I would argue an awareness of human nature is necessary in 
such circumstances, and thus I am obliged to state my own position. 
From what we have covered thus far the main issue here seems clear: such an 
undertaking cannot simply result in an answer. If we presume the (likely) eventuality 
that human nature is in part the outcome of social forces, that interrelations with social 
and environmental forces play a fundamental role in governing what we are, then even 
in this minimal instance we will need to update our conception of human nature as it 
changes over time in step with those social forces. Then there is the necessary process 
of critique and improvement – as we have seen each schema is subject to its own range 
of criticisms, as well as the challenges outlined in chapter four. This does not make the 
end unattainable, however we should be wary of final answers. (None of this, I should 
add, necessarily means that human nature is unreal or fictitious.) Here I want to propose
a program that might go some way to overcoming this obstacle. I use the word program 
since we can develop some of the perspectives we have examined to develop a research 
project with which to address human nature rather than some definitive statement as to 
136 And, if such a theory says something about human nature which seems otherwise accurate or 
intuitively makes sense, then we may have to find other explanations for this (or else, of course, 
abandon our intuition). This is partly what Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008) suggest we must 
do with regards to Kant’s Golden Rule, as they judge his reliance on reason and duty as supernatural.
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its character and content. The result would be something akin to an iterative study of 
human nature, similar to that espoused by Peter Loptson (2006) in his own study. In the 
same vein as evolutionary theory or critical theory, this human nature theory ought to be
considered as an ongoing project relating to a particular field and based on particular 
precepts.
What we need, then, is an explicit affirmation of human nature that seems 
adequate to summing up what we are trying to describe, that can be made amenable to 
the political dimension (if not already absorbed into it) and that does not attempt to 
subsume nature into politics or politics into nature. The best way to do this would be to 
explicitly locate where human nature most likely lies, and to try and find some way of 
tying this into what else we know about the relevant forces in the natural and political 
spheres, balancing fidelity against the realities of the uncertainty principle. The 
motivationalist schema strikes me as the most promising place to start discussing human
nature in this way, especially if we synthesise the various approaches employed by those
falling within this area – ethologists, philosophers, psychologists and so on. For one, 
they show a marked awareness of the multiplicity of human motivations, and do not 
simply look to rationalise conflicting or divergent impulses into a harmonious 
blueprint.137 
Establishing an Ethological Subject
In doing so, I side with the ethologists over the gene-first Darwinians. On this 
my position accords with a sentiment expressed by Midgley:
Because of his methods of observation and his refusal to posit single 
explanations, the ethologist is better off than many previous people who 
have made use of the term "human nature." The term is suspect because it 
does suggest cure-all explanations, sweeping theories that man is basically 
sexual, basically selfish or acquisitive, basically evil, or basically good. 
These theories try to account for human conduct much as a simpleminded 
person might attempt to deal with rising damp, looking for a single place 
where the water is coming in, a single source of motivation. This hydraulic 
approach always leads to incredible distortions once the theorist is off his 
home ground, as can be seen from Marxist theories of art or Freudian 
explanations of politics. The ethologist, on the other hand, does not want to 
say that human nature is basically anything; he wants to see what it consists 
137 Neither the outcome of some biological or cultural (or metaphysical) determination, human nature 
can be considered as a ‘real pattern’ in Ladyman & Ross’ sense (Ladyman & Ross, 2007: 258ff, 289;
see discussion in chapter one).
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of. (Mary Midgley, 1995: 55; cf. Bateson and Laland, 2013)
It is on this attitude of asking what human nature consists of that I propose to base this 
human nature theory. We should attempt to uncover the dispositions and faculties that 
underwrite human activity and experience, and treat these as real and constitutive of 
human nature. The gene-centric viewpoint treats such motivations as ephemera: the 
results of a deeper algorithm which takes explanatory precedence. This attitude or 
pattern of enquiry will be the same for any algorithmic approach. 
The ethologists take dispositions and capacities (and motives) seriously, in the 
sense that these form the central grounds for theorising human nature. Motivations are 
the fulcrum for understanding humanity, not things to be explained via appeals to some 
kind of prior logic that reveals the purportedly “real” foundation of human experience. 
To be sure things like evolutionary utility and social significance are taken into account,
but these are in order to elucidate the central theoretical concerns, not to explain them in
their entirety in terms of some other conceptual framework. This integrates well into the
conception of human nature theory as an ongoing area of research. After all, as I argued 
above, the motivationalist perspective on human nature effectively emerges from the 
kinds of research its respective scholars pursue. Add to this the emphasis on actual 
human beings and we have a fair idea of where to search for human nature.
An additional virtue of this approach is its incorporation of various empirical 
perspectives that promise to satisfy the criteria of naturalness set out in the introduction,
in that they concern themselves with animals and pre-cultural humans, through the use 
of ethology and developmental psychology. These areas will have a degree of validity in
claiming to be able to capture “nature” given that their subjects are largely free from 
socio-cultural determination (as discussed in the introduction). (See pages 16-19 above.)
As we saw in chapter two, psychologists dealing with infants and children have the 
opportunity to study the behaviour (and, within certain limitations, the mental states) of 
human beings before they are significantly affected by culture. Infant helping behaviour,
for example, can be interpreted as significant precisely because it occurs before the 
child has come to expect rewards or even associate rewards with certain actions, or to 
make distinctions in the perceived merit of potential recipients of helping behaviour. For
their part the ethologists can make inferences about the similarities shown by various 
social species, especially those closely related to us, such as the other great apes. Even 
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in the case of Tomasello, who believes that human activity is marked by a radical 
difference – in particular a more sophisticated ability to understand the motivations of 
others – there is still a sense in which comparisons such as these do tell us something 
important about the inclinations and psychological abilities of human beings. This is 
analogous to Kitcher’s recommendation from the same chapter: ‘in any evaluation of 
our evolutionary history you can emphasize the continuities or the discontinuities. I 
think little is gained by either emphasis. You do better simply to recognise what has 
endured and what has altered.’ (de Waal et. al., 2006: 139) An understanding of our 
close evolutionary kin can tell us what kinds of dispositions and types of motivation 
will likely be a part of our own nature, even if it is in a modified form. As far as I am 
concerned, any notion of human nature which makes use of the kinds of tools and 
findings we see in the motivationalist schema will have a far stronger claim to having 
located (human) “nature” than those which do not.
The Political Environment
Thus the benefits of the motivationalist schema are its focus on human beings as 
a nexus of motivations and activities, including their interrelations, and its potential for 
accessing human nature uninfluenced by politics. I take it to be the best starting position
for developing an accurate account of human nature. However as discussed in chapter 
two it has its limitations, namely that it does not take great account of human nature’s 
mediation by external forces. When considering the way that humans fit into their 
culture, or the more complex levels of mediation consequent to our complex socio-
cultural formations, these approaches tend to limit their scope. In the process of 
considering the political dimension they focus on a particular economic or social 
phenomena, or on the manifestation of a specific aspect of human nature. For instance 
Boehm and Flack look at a range of human cultures, as well as comparative ethology, 
but limit their discussion to the question of hierarchy. Likewise the ethical philosophers 
of chapter two obviously probe the deeper implications of an motivationalist human 
nature, but within the specific context of ethics and metaethics. These attempts do not 
capture the full range of mediating factors that impinge on human nature.
What we need is a better sense of how this human nature interacts with politics, 
to build a political ethology. We could even view this as an extension of the ethological 
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project itself, given that one of the main questions of that discipline concerns the  
developmental emergence and implications of a behaviour. Here I think the 
contextualists have an exemplary approach (what they lack, after all, is a more nuanced 
and detailed sense of just what is being transformed by social and political mediation). 
In them we have a more refined idea of the way in which aspects of human nature 
become moulded by a person’s society. I want to augment the motivationalist 
understanding of our human nature with an awareness of its openness and the way in 
which it is politically transformed, according to a sensitivity developed by the 
contextual schema. So, whilst de Waal’s consideration of how (neo)liberal capitalism 
impacts upon the human nature he describes is rather limited, in that there is little 
discussion of the social forces and mechanisms which condition that nature, this is 
precisely the focus of contextualists like Marx or Habermas.138 
In fact, a promising prototype for this augmented, synthetic (and syncretic) 
approach to human nature comes from the field of Marxist political science. Gary 
Olson’s argument about the transformation of our empathic responses takes its lead 
from the studies of empathy carried out by people like de Waal and by neuroscientific 
findings concerning mirror-neurons (the biological mechanisms underlying empathy). 
In this he builds on William Connolly’s work on the links between the brain and those 
areas of concern typically the domain of political science. (Olson, 2013; Connolly, 
2002) He also borrows Connolly’s term “neuropolitics”  for this approach. The general 
idea is twofold: to understand how brain processes affect cultural formations, and to 
understand how cultural mediation channels, manipulates and modifies these same 
processes. It is taken for granted that the relationship is two-way, and that equal 
attention should be given to the innate human forces as to the socio-economic forces. 
Olson’s particular interest is in the way that capitalism generates forces and extrinsic 
motivations which are at odds with natural empathic dispositions. To this effect, he goes
into deeper detail about the effects on empathy wrought by our socio-cultural 
formations, such as global capital, the shift towards prioritising the profit motive in 
contemporary democratic culture, and the “psychopathic” professional culture within 
corporate entities. Notably he finds something problematic in the fact that individuals 
138 In full fairness, there is a sense of certain elements of human nature being accentuated or muted in 
accordance with the prevailing cultural milieu, and of a variability in our ethical sensibilities, so de 
Waal is certainly not devoid of a sense of this conditioning. Motivationalist philosophers are even 
more sensitive to these variations and contingencies.
212
are obliged to compartmentalise their empathetic responses to get ahead at work, where 
the priority is on profitability rather than people, which results in secondary or 
functional sociopathy. People cease to function as “normal” human beings in a 
significant part of their life thanks to a devaluation of a critical human faculty. (Olson, 
2013: 55-6) 
Combined with a greater appreciation of the inner workings of these socio-
cultural variables and phenomena, this moves us further towards an understanding of a 
politically-mediated ethological human nature. Olson himself sees this as a promising 
opportunity for politics. For him the primary (normative) political matter is developing 
what he calls ‘dangerous empathy’, by restoring empathy in instances where it has been 
attenuated, and applying it in new instances, beyond just those individuals already 
members of our group or community. In pursuit of this aim he suggests that images can 
be used to trigger empathetic responses, and thereby call attention to the consequences 
of state and corporate activity in a globalised world, opening up a radical potential for 
questioning the status quo. (See Olson, 2013: 81ff) In this sense the content of this 
human nature refers back to its structure or form, in that there is a transformative role 
for external influences to play, and through awareness of this we can exercise some 
degree of control over the final product.
However I would say that this is also an opportunity with regards to human 
nature. Whilst it does not, in itself, constitute a comprehensive human nature theory, it 
does represent a complementary second step towards one, giving us an opportunity to 
work around – if not entirely overcome – the issues thrown up by the Copenhagen 
interpretation of human nature. In effect Olson has imported an motivationalist kernel 
into a more sociological account of human nature. However his preferred term of 
“neuropolitics” does not seem to encapsulate what is really at stake. This approach’s 
proponents are certainly not trying to locate a neurobiological basis/explanation for all 
political phenomena, nor are they necessarily looking for the ways that politics and 
neurobiology interact. The focus, especially with Olson, is on the psychological affects 
that they associate with political affects; psychological affects that they argue are 
grounded in (but don’t reduce to) our neurobiological make-up. On the one hand, this 
looks like it is merely another example of universalisation akin to that which we saw in 
the previous chapter. On the other, we might reasonably suggest that the term 
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neuropolitics is more of a rhetorical flourish than a description of the endeavour itself. 
Neurobiological findings may serve to ground some of the capabilities in question in the
physical material of the human agent, but what is usually under discussion – and thus 
what is at stake – are the higher-order psychological mechanisms, particularly inter-
subjective ones, which interact with the political dimension. Regardless of terminology, 
there is a promising approach being developed here. Not only does Olson start from a 
motivationalist human nature – drawing on ethological, psychological and 
anthropological research – but he also incorporates a whole network of social (including
global) affects into understanding how human nature is mediated by culture. 
Significantly he perceives human nature as having been pathologised within an entire 
culture if the socialisation process (i.e. growing up within that culture) is itself 
subordinated to a pathological hegemony. (Olson, 2013: 36-9; 57-8) The etiolation of 
empathy is taken to be problematic in that people supposedly become poorer at relating 
to those around them as well as to instances of political or ethical outrage.139 The 
ramifications are obviously that that culture’s understanding of human nature will in 
turn become warped, with the perception that the pathology is somehow natural and a 
reflection of human nature at work.140 By considering the effects of global and local 
political  influences, this perspective shows us a way of considering how a 
motivationalist human nature is transformed over time by the environment; a form of 
“historical-naturalism” if you will. 
There is still a limitation in Olson’s formulation, of course, in that he, like de 
Waal and others, primarily considers empathy, but (less like de Waal) other innate 
factors – such as the psychological structure of in-group bias discussed in chapter two – 
are not factored into the total analysis. Their contribution, in Empathy Imperiled, is 
noted but not pursued in great detail. (Olson, 2013: 55-7) What it does succeed in is 
expanding the political sphere of reference with a more comprehensive understanding of
the systemic and cultural forces acting on innate human properties. This does not mean 
that there are no extant attempts at articulating this kind of human nature theory. In fact 
139 In some sense, of course, he could here be interpreted as claiming that what is natural is good, in that
the claim is we are naturally empathetic and this empathy is being curtailed, constricted, and 
deformed by cultural practices inimical to it. For now we are interested in the structure of his human
nature theory, and so we might refer consideration of the content to Olson’s own work.
140 Thanks to the Ringworld effect, (see introduction) and the problem of parochialism (see chapter 
four).
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there are a number of sources (in addition to Olson) from which we can take inspiration 
or use as prototypical examples. 
To start with, Aristotle’s general structure might provide a sort of model for 
conceptualising this arrangement. His Ethics resembles the motivationalist schema, in 
that there he discusses human dispositions and capacities – noticeably and most 
significantly the capacity for reason – and their effects on our pursuit of the good life. 
(His conclusions relying in large part on the presumption that being rational a large part 
of our purpose, and from thence our pursuit of the good life, involves exercising this 
capacity.) In the Politics he moves much further into the territory of the contextualists, 
his own bibliography describing the kind of dialogue between schemas I am trying to 
evoke here. Politics describes how our political formations will impact our ability to act 
rationally, in the way they encourage or discourage our acquisition of the virtues (the 
habit of exercising our capacities well and pursuing our various desires in moderation). 
Thus there are good states and bad, judged according to the effects they have on human 
nature.
Owen Flanagan likewise casts an eye over the ways in which society and human 
nature interact, and I even go so far as to cite him as an example of the ethical naturalist 
perspective in the motivationalist schema. He also takes an interest in the ways the 
conscious practice of meditation triggers patterns in the brain that are related to peace of
mind, offering a potentially deflationary account of its efficacy and illustrating the 
interrelatedness of intrinsic and extrinsic forces. It is his stance on ethics, however, that 
is particularly interesting. Here the emphasis is on a variety of affects which trigger or 
modify innate human properties; such that virtues differ radically from culture to 
culture, but are rooted in common psychological mechanisms. (Flanagan, 1991; 2009a; 
2011) He and his colleagues at Duke university state the matter plainly:
To understand the full story, we will need what we only have pieces of—
namely, insights from evolutionary biology, animal ethology, developmental
psychology, learning theory, psychiatry, cognitive neuroscience, and cultural
anthropology. All these disciplines and research programs are essential to 
(and thus have a say in) the genealogy [of morals].  (Flanagan, Sarkissian & 
Wong, 2008: 10)
Of course the specification of morality here reminds us that attempts at tracing the 
linkages of human nature and politics can often be limited in scope, but the fusion 
described could easily be extrapolated to a more general application.
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The psychologist Darcia Narvaez also offers us a way of conceptualising this 
extended “political ethology”, one more connected to concrete social activity. Her 
particular interest lies in child development, and the way that moral and social character
develops in response to certain stimuli. In respect to this development, there are certain 
pathways and probabilities related to the interaction between early psychological needs 
and socialising interactions (most significantly with parents or similar caregivers). Thus 
our attention is directed towards the canalisation of human nature, via structures of 
socialisation, with reference to the expected result. (Narvaez & Gleason et. al., 2013; 
Narvaez, 2013; Rest et. al., 1999; cf. Olson: 55) In simplistic terms, humans are born 
with certain requirements (such as a sense of security), and psychopathologies (like 
insecurities or neuroses) occur when socialisation (such as contact between child and 
caregiver) fails to adequately meet these requirements. Thus, on this view, it is possible 
for there to be “good” and “bad” cultural practices, with human nature acting as the 
benchmark for this judgement, without there being a particular prescription for the 
“best” practices. For Narvaez and her colleagues this has implications not only for the 
child rearing practices of a culture, but also with regards to society’s regulation of those 
practices, in other words: policy.141 (Narvaez & Panksepp et. al., 2013) 
In this sense Narvaez’s stance reinforces the idea that the completion of our 
human nature theory rests on extending the interindividual dimension of the ethological 
paradigm, within the motivationalist schema, with an emphasis on the cultural mores 
and structures that govern these interpersonal relations. This ties into the perspective on 
human nature as potential, offered by the Marxist Virno, save that Narvaez enters into 
more specific discussions about the differing potentials and the processes by which each
might be realised. (Virno, 2009; 2015a; page 127 above) Virno’s notion of human 
nature, then, might serve to codify what we are dealing with in regards to human nature-
in-context (once again supplanting a contextualist kernel – in this case a semiotically-
informed notion of potentiality – with an motivationalist nature). Obviously the range of
possibilities in my account is more constrained than in that of Virno, since I am 
proposing that it contains a larger number of pre-existing dispositions and capacities (to 
whit, those identified by the motivationalist schema). This also means that the political 
ramifications Virno sees in our supposed raw plasticity hold less significance than he 
141 Incidentally, she is not convinced that the “west” has necessarily got things right in this regard.
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ascribes to them. Instead I want to borrow the broad structure of his account to serve as 
a paradigmatic framework for how the question of human nature ought to be addressed. 
Human nature is not isolatable in any single instance, since it is never, in its totality, 
actualised; what we are discussing are particular instantiations of human nature, as the 
confluence of our natural and political heritages.
These are promising means of refining our ethological picture of human nature, 
though each may have limitations when taken on its own. Synthesised, however, they 
could provide a much clearer picture of what human nature is and how best to 
understand it. However, the complexity of the relations between nature and politics in 
forming human nature make it difficult to find any single comprehensive description of 
what it means to be human, and thus what we have here are components, constituent 
strands of an ongoing human nature theory.
Some Internal Dynamics of Human Nature
So far all we have is an outline for the structure of this human nature theory. I 
have made few specific claims about what it might say about us. For it to be 
explanatorily useful it will need some substantive content: I will need to say something 
about what we can learn about human nature from those theories I have deemed 
structurally/topographically most suitable. A good place to start might be the issue of 
human nature’s innate goodness which has been touched upon at various points over the
course of this thesis. Specifically, can we say anything about the movement between the
Hobbesian perception of a tainted or dangerous human nature, and the Rousseauian 
idealism of an intrinsically virtuous human nature? Are we essentially good, or is our 
nature ‘red in tooth and claw’? The archetypes I have suggested here have a new 
appreciation for the complexities of human motivation.
In one of his defining works, Peter Kropotkin (1998: 230ff) argued that the 
depiction of human beings has historically emphasised either one of two primary 
aspects. One is the self-assertive individual, who looks out for themselves above all. 
The other is the aspect that he wished to highlight: the characteristic of ‘mutual aid’, the
will and desire to form cohesive communities. In Kropotkin’s view both aspects are 
necessary. When a society’s valorisation of the individual leads to fracture and division 
– ultimately culminating in domination – it needs to be reminded of the sociable nature 
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of humanity. Conversely when a society emphasises mutual aid to too great a degree 
and for too long, it slides into stagnation and oppression, and needs to be reminded of 
the worth of individuals. Kropotkin’s view was that his own society – particularly in the
pronouncements of his fellow naturalists and scientists like Huxley and Spencer – had 
placed too much emphasis on individualism and competition. Self-betterment now came
at the expense of one’s fellow citizens. In Mutual Aid he attempted to put the case for 
our more social “instincts” and dispositions; to argue that not just humans but all social 
species were much more cooperative and other-regarding that was commonly thought. A
century later Killen and Cords made a similar claim in the journal Nature: much 
contemporary psychology and social discourse presumes human beings to be rather less 
sociable than their research shows.142 There they argued that instead of being 
fundamentally self-interested, much of our social and moral character is influenced by 
natural inclinations and preferences. (Killen & Cords, 2002)
A simplistic summary would be to say that we are neither. After all, the very 
reason we can be viewed as either good or evil is because, to parallel Kropotkin’s point, 
human nature can be read hermeneutically, like religious texts, with different 
interpretations accentuating the features that most accord with their view of the world. 
Neither angels nor daemons, human beings are naturally gregarious and inclined to help 
one another, but they are also prone to furthering their own interests even when the cost 
to themselves is minimal. In chapter two, along with Killen and her colleagues’ work on
infant moral perception – including the ability to infer the beliefs and opinions of others 
– we saw how de Waal argued that human beings are more cooperative than usually 
supposed. On his account, our animal empathy and disposition to help one another form
the basis of our morality, and we should be more attentive to this side of human nature. 
Tomasello disagrees only in the extent to which he thinks humans have distinctive 
faculties that make their ethical sense both unique and more sophisticated than that of 
other animals. Both, however, are prepared to say that this gregarious nature has its 
limits, since in times of scarce resources individuals will prioritise themselves and those
closest to them.
These limitations of empathy draw our attention to other components of human 
nature. Agents might also temper their helping behaviour in accordance with their 
142 Mutual Aid having been first published in 1902.
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perception of another individual’s group membership – a phenomenon we also 
considered in chapter two. (Cuddy et. al., 2007; Waytz & Young, 2012; cf. Ferguson et. 
al., 2009) Significantly not only do we recognise group membership, we also respond to
it differently depending on our current emotional state, reacting more aggressively to 
out-group members when we simultaneously experience fear. So not only is the 
tendency to make in-group/out-group distinctions innate, so too is there a reliable 
pattern to the way we interpret the importance of these distinctions. (See pages 86-90 
above.) Whilst the precise social delineations of these groups are a matter of culture 
they operate through mechanisms that are just as psychological and innate as the 
empathetic impulse. This would also have obvious repercussions for discussions of 
ideology and identity: we should hardly be surprised if group membership becomes 
politically contentious if the expression and experience of interpersonal affect is 
predicated on an innate cognitive framework.
Likewise I have argued that alongside other-regarding dispositions humans also 
have an innate tendency to be self-regarding. This would even go some way to 
explaining why socio-political power has been such a constant in human history. 
Humans strive to climb the social hierarchy as a means to assert themselves and 
advance their own interests; and maintaining one’s position within the hierarchy leads to
an obsession with power for its own sake in a manner that might be familiar to Foucault 
scholars. As we saw Boehm and Flack suggest in chapter two, (pages 91-3 above) we 
may also find hierarchy itself emerging from a confluence of internal and contextual 
forces, as an interplay between the desire for social stability, the desire for social status 
(self-interest) and a sense of justice, as well as the way these factors play out in the 
specific dynamics of a given social group. (Boehm, 1999; 2012; Boehm & Flack, 2010) 
The question then becomes: how have some cultures devised means to balance these 
influences, to check or attenuate the manifestation of hierarchy? How have they not 
only sublimated but positively deployed human nature in order to create more 
egalitarian societies?
Clearly we can not consider human nature to be unequivocally good. It certainly 
has a pro-social directionality to it – the ethologists and psychologists of chapter two 
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have proven as much143 – but this is not a guarantee of unstained virtue. It contains a 
multiplicity of forces, some of which contest this pro-social inclination. For our 
purposes, we can say that the internal diversity of human nature means we are likely 
both self- and other-regarding (and there is no reason to suppose this former must 
necessarily be a negative thing, constantly lapsing into selfishness). I do not take this 
multiplicity of forces (self- versus other-regarding, in-group biases, hierarchy verses 
anti-hierarchy, and so on) to mean that human nature can be regarded as indeterminate 
or as pure potentiality. Rather human nature contains within it dynamics which lead us 
in differing directions, and the final form that a particular nature takes reflects how 
these dynamics play out in relation to one another and the social context (leaving it 
somewhat open to extrinsic contingencies).
Such a position should help us avoid naturalising any specific social structure – 
no society is a “natural” outcome of human nature. Human nature is instantiated in, but 
not reducible to, particular individuals (hence the importance of both a “human 
ethology” and its social contextualisation) so it is unlikely that any variety of mediated 
human nature – and thus the society that canalises it into its particular manifestation – 
represents the truest or best expression of human nature. Simultaneously this position 
underscores the idea that human nature is not only a rhetorical trope but also a raw 
material, utilised, intentionally or not, to reproduce a particular social order – or 
potentially, as Olson and Narvaez, in their respective ways, suggest, to resist and reform
the social order. This may or may not disrupt a more traditional, Aristotelian conception 
of “flourishing”, or of realising the potential of human nature, but it does show that 
there are multiple ways to do this, not just one.
Human Nature Theory
Yet this internal diversity and potentiality compounds (or perhaps explains) the 
archetypes’ difficulty in conclusively summarising human nature, and underscores their 
143 Of course on the other hand this might just be the result of a new swing towards a Rousseauian 
perspective, accompanied by a few caveats in order to accommodate those aspects of human activity
which do not seem to fit a picture of inherent human benevolence. For their part the ethical 
philosophers are clearly staking out some kind of inherently positive aspect of human nature by 
locating the source of ethics in human dispositions and outlooks, rather than as external controls 
keeping them in check. But do these represent a more nuanced view of human nature, or just a return
to a (new) Rousseauian position after the more Hobbesian human nature of the last 30 years? Is 
Killen and Cords’ invocation of ‘Prince Kropotkin’s Ghost’ simply the counterpoint to the 
perspective they are critiquing?
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status as parts of an ongoing theory. I would argue that this follows directly from the 
Copenhagen interpretation of human nature. It is an irreducibly complex task to address 
human nature in its entirety – that is, both in terms of each of its components and in 
terms of its mediation and transformation by the context in which it is experienced. We 
can address or schematise the internal ecology of our nature (i.e. empathy, bias, the 
desire to dominate, the sense of justice, the ability to infer the internal states of others) 
or we can select some part of that ecology and consider its transformation. Both have 
import for the idea that we can understand our own nature, and what it means to be 
human, but it is a daunting task to attempt both simultaneously. This, I contend, is why 
“human nature” is located in such a diversity of places. 
Much of this nuance is obscured, however, by the difficulty in talking properly 
about human nature in the first place. Not just by ideologically entrenched critics but 
also by the lack of consensus on what, exactly, we are talking about. What really 
constitutes human nature, and what is “just” peripheral or supervenient. If we can 
establish that, then we can establish a working human nature theory, and this is what I 
have attempted to present here. I have shown that, by formulating a taxonomy of the 
most salient human nature theories, we can ascertain the most suitable focus to start 
with and then properly situate it within the rest of human experience. Proceeding in this 
vein would require research into comparative anthropology and ethology, to refine our 
understanding of our innate proclivities and capacities, and an attendant discussion of its
interrelations with its mediating context, necessarily invoking the question of 
normativity, or what we ought to do about/with human nature. Crucially, although it is 
possible to disagree with where I have located the ideal human nature theory the 
conceptual landscape remains apart from this: it is a general purpose map within which 
others might place a pin where they believe human nature resides and make their case 
for doing so. The map retains its function: a common point of reference by which we 
can gauge the relative distances between theories and the “topography” between them – 
their structural similarities and differences, their continuities and discontinuities – 
facilitating discussion.
Just as evolutionary theory is a paradigmatic approach towards certain 
phenomena in the biological world, and critical theory is likewise a set of tools and 
theoretical precepts used to tackle questions about the socio-cultural world, human 
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nature theory must be considered as an ongoing endeavour, based on open discussions 
about the most appropriate place to locate human nature, and how to trace or account for
the mediations resulting in its particular manifestations. The full picture of human 
nature will only emerge from the integration of various strands of research. Thus its 
theorisation must be an explicit, collaborative endeavour, and a continuous one at that, 
if we are to stand a chance of knowing what we are.
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